University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
4-25-2014

Freedom, Solidarity, Revolution: Marx and the Ethical
James Justin Sledge

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Sledge, James Justin, "Freedom, Solidarity, Revolution: Marx and the Ethical" (2014). Electronic Theses
and Dissertations. 909.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/909

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

FREEDOM, SOLIDARITY, REVOLUTION: MARX AND THE ETHICAL
by
James Justin Sledge

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Philosophy

The University of Memphis
May 2014

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Intellectual labor is a rightly fraught category. Indeed, Marxist revolutionaries
have long looked to the working class understood as the urban, industrial proletariat as
the only objectively revolutionary class. Yet, many of the greatest theoreticians of
revolution, from Marx to Marcos, have worked from a rich philosophical standpoint.
Indeed, I think few would reject Lenin's dictum that ”Without revolutionary theory there
can be no revolutionary movement.” That said, it is often mistakenly thought that such
labor is ultimately performed in isolation. This error is especially pernicious when
would-be revolutionaries quote this or that theoretician as if they were writers of scared
scripture. If dogma is the enemy of philosophy then so much more should this be the
case when philosophy pretends to a revolutionary purpose. Philosophy, or “class
struggle at the register of theory,” as Althusser defined it, is, like all forms of labor,
always already a plural process. It is always, at its roots, a collective expression. This
totality is the material condition for the possibility of labor as theory. With this in mind, I
would like to thank those who have made this project possible.
First, I would like to thank my committee, especially for their words of
encouragement when academic philosophy struck me as more of an impediment than a
opportunity. Indeed, I am thankful for a wonderful, collegial department. The
professors, staff, and graduate students have all proven to be nothing if not supportive
and generous in so many ways.
I would like to extend warm greetings and thanks to my friends and comrades in
Memphis and beyond. I have learned so much in struggle alongside those who carry

ii

forward the shared hope of a radical transformation of the world. We have met in late
night meetings, class-rooms, street corners, bars, and in handcuffs. We have come to
know each other in a tremendous love and in a struggle that I know must go on to final
victory.
I would like to extend special thanks to my partner, erev rav Alana Alpert. She
has seen this project begin in a cramped apartment in Brooklyn, travel back and forth to
Boston, California, Detroit. Her support and care has been key in making this project
possible.
Thanks must also go to the staff of the Lamplighter Lounge and Otherlands cafe.
What emerged from late-night debates in the former often found its way into the writing
done in the latter.
Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to my union, the United Campus
Workers local 3865. I have derived a great deal of inspiration and learned much from
working to organize solidarity among fellow workers into concrete conditions of power.
This project was born out of concrete solidarity, returns to it as theory, only to rush again
back to the actuality of revolutionary struggle.

I dedicate this dissertation to the workers of the University of Memphis.

iii

ABSTRACT
Sledge, James Justin. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2014. Freedom,
Solidarity, Revolution: Towards a Marxist Ethics. Major Professor: Dr. Thomas Nenon.
Renewed interest in radical politics has emerged in the wake of the recent
economic crisis, the Arab Spring, the Occupy! movement, and the struggle against
economic austerity. This is not exactly a boon for Marxist revolutionaries, however.
Major gaps remain in the philosophical underpinnings for any Marxist political program.
This project investigates one of those gaps: the relationship of Marxism to the ethical.
To illustrate this, I turn to the early thinking of the Marxist philosopher György Lukács.
In two 1919 essays, Lukács first rejected the view that socialist values can be suspended
to accomplish socialist ends only to then embrace the Bolshevik program. His dilemma, I
contend, actually emerges from a deep tension in Marxist philosophy itself. To trace its
origin, I look to the political thought of Hegel and his historicist criticism of Utilitarian
and Kantian ethics. For Marx, in turn, to historicize an ethical system is to liquidate its
moral force. From 1845 forward, he maintained that the “mode of production” for a
given epoch is the sole material ground and horizon for the ethical. Marx seems to
undercut the very possibility of his own critical project. I then review recent attempts by
philosophers to make sense of this dilemma. Three positions emerge: Marx is
incoherent; he commits to an underlying “ethics of freedom;” and a Marxist ethics of
virtue. Rather than immediately adopting any of these positions, I will work via negativa
through the concepts of “alienation” and “exploitation” and conclude that neither capture
Marx's mature criticism of capitalism. Finally, I return to Lukács and his analysis of the
concept of the “fetish of the commodity form” and the process of “reification” whereby

iv

relations between subjects and objects become inverted. This, I argue, is central social
pathology of capitalist society. Further, given the relativization of the ethical by
historical materialism, I will argue that the “actuality of the revolution,” the Marxist
commitment to category of “totality,” in addition to the “standpoint of the proletariat”
produce an ethics of virtue founded upon solidarity. This ethic, it too bounded by the
epoch of class struggle, must itself be eventually overcome.
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Wer für den Kommunismus kämpft
hat von allen Tugenden nur eine:
Dass er für den Kommunismus kämpft.
- Brecht
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Introduction – The Specter Returns?
The question of communism appeared answered through the better part of the
1990's and the turn of the millennium. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the market
reforms in China, along with the increased consolidation of neo-liberal hegemony in the
core, meant that history had ended and the communist experiment had failed. The specter
of communism had finally been exorcised from the world. A certain track of political
theory had only to iron out the debates between liberalism and libertarianism while
another provided more or less helpless, nihilistic analysis of the micro-power of
disciplinary institutions. For more or less ten years political theory was either liberalism
triumphant or post-structuralist obscurantism.
The 9/11 attacks and the US led invasions that followed put to rest the naïve idea
that history had ended, with imperialism and its discontents roaring back into open and
bloody struggle. Further, the cascading economic collapse beginning in 2008, the heroic
uprisings throughout the Arab world, their echos in the Occupy! Movement, and the
continued polarizing into extreme right and left in Europe that has further inspired a
generalized questioning of the parameters of the political and the economic.1 Must
imperialist neo-liberal capitalism represent the horizon for political-economy? Are
former hegemonies as absolute as they once appeared? Is political, economic or social
revolution possible? It has been in this generalized period of politico-economic

1. To be sure, we cannot forget that these convulsions, while the most salient in recent
years, must be set into relation to ongoing struggles that began well before the period now
unfolding: the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, continued Maoist rebellion in both India and
Nepal, the anti-imperialist positioning of Chavez not to mention the global justice movement
in the core.
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convulsion that the question of communism generally, and Marxism specifically, has
again been raised as a live avenue of theoretical and practical possibility.
If the specter of communism has returned, it will certainly find Marxist theorists
unprepared. As Jodi Dean relates, when the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities hosted
a conference “On the Idea of Communism” in 2009 it expected an audience of twohundred. To their surprise 1200 people showed up and the conference required a
spillover room.2 While many, especially those sympathetic to the possibility of
revolutionary struggle, take this renewed interest in the “communist hypothesis,” as Alain
Badiou calls it, with enthusiasm, it should also inspire concern around ongoing
theoretical gaps in Marxist theory. Simply put, the left is not prepared, theoretically or
organizationally, for the role it may have to play as capitalism goes into crisis.
Specifically, the (1) calcification and revisionism of theory during the Soviet period, (2)
the esoteric and sectarian fracturing of revolutionary organizations and the (3) disjunction
between academic Marxians and boots-on-the-ground Marxists has resulted in a
generalized crisis at all registers of left praxis. With the economic collapse and the recent
increase of revolutionary activity throughout the world,3 it can be said that the question of
Communism in general, and Marxism in specific, must, again, being asked. While a
boon for the radical left, it is also a challenge. Marxism remains a philosophical theory
still very much in development with some glaring lacunae remaining. Just what
“dialectical change” means given the challenges posed 20th century philosophies of
2. Dean: 2012, 8
3. Not to mention ongoing dissatisfaction and immanent criticism of the dominant
liberal discourse. Not that all dissatisfaction is progressive. The emergent 'left-wing' revival
of the thinking of the fascist Carl Schmitt is worrying as it fashionable these days.
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difference, the teleological character of class struggle, what terms like “bourgeoisie” and
“proletariat” mean during this epoch, the character of capitalism at this juncture, etc., are
all very much unsettled questions. Marxism has never been and, perhaps, cannot be a
complete theory qua theory. Yet, the struggle for a Marxist theory must go forward if
only to be shown for its failures, incompleteness, and danger. History, as both Hegel and
Marx liked to remind us “proceeds along the side of the bad.” It is in precisely this logic
that the process of violent, revolutionary negation must serve as the condition for the
possibility of human flourishing in communism with which this project will concern
itself.
The relation between Marxism and the ethical remains appallingly
underdeveloped. This should be shocking if for no other reason than the reputation of
20th century “actually existing socialism” with its purges, re-education camps, gulags, etc.
No Marxist, given the experience of the 20th century, can ignore interrogating how
communism stands in relation to the ethical. This project will be a kind of ad fontes for
this question. I intend to return to Marx to both track down the origins of his
philosophical relation to the category of the ethical and draw out possible conclusions
which emerge from his thinking. Note that I do not say “the ethics of Marx” or “the
ethics of Marxism” as it is my contention that nowhere in his writings does Marx
articulate a positive ethical system. Though, Marx need not be the permanent horizon for
Marxism.
In chapter one, I will try to give some historical scope and import for this project
by turning to a critical moment in the intellectual and political life of the Hungarian
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philosopher György Lukács. In 1919 Lukács published two essays on the question of
supporting the Bolshevik mode of establishing socialism. In the course of those essays,
he, at first, rejected that socialist values can be suspended for socialist ends only to
philosophically embrace Bolshevism only a couple of months later. He would then go on
to become a high-ranking member of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet State and its army.
By locating his decision in its philosophical and historical context, I hope to begin the
process of illuminating the deeply problematic relation between Marxism and the ethical.
Before turning to the works of Marx himself, I will conclude with some methodological
considerations. Specifically, I will attempt to sketch a Marxist framework such that this
project can share both a commitment to academic rigor and proceed in a non-sectarian
spirit.
In chapter two I hope to show that Marx's silence on the relation of the ethical to
his social criticism has its origin in the political thought of Hegel as it applies to both
Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Specifically, I will attempt to show that, for Marx, to
historicize an ethical system is to liquidate its objective force. I will then turn to a
reading of Marx's enormous corpus to show that, from 1845 forward, he seems to
maintain that the mode of production for a given epoch, itself the result of civil war over
control of the means of production, is the material ground for human consciousness and
its expressions, including ethical ideals. That is, Marx seems certain that “the ethical” as
a philosophical category is radically relative from mode of production to mode of
production. Indeed, he especially condemns other socialists who “moralize” about the
ills of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, Marx is unabated in his non-stop criticisms of
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capitalism which seems to employ the same kind of language. He variously employs all
range of moral condemnation of the capitalist mode of production, while, at the same
time, disavowing the validity of any objective moral standpoint.
In chapter three I will review recent Anglo-phone attempts, primarily by analytic
philosophers, to make sense of this apparent paradox in Marx's thought. Three positions
emerge. The first simply holds that Marx, in typical Hegelian fashion, is using the word
“dialectical” to cover over the fact that he just holds an incoherent position. The second
position takes it that beneath Marx's extreme language hides an “ethics of freedom.”
Though he inherits this ethic from Kant and Hegel, Marx considerably modifies it
through his materialist conception of history as class struggle. The third position will take
it that Marx's position, given the relativism brought on by historical materialism, is more
akin to the virtue ethics of the classical Greek world. I will be reticent to provide a
positive program for Marx, and, by extension, for Marxism, and will begin looking to the
concepts of “alienation” and “exploitation” to get at my position by a kind of via
negativa. That is, I take it that Marx's implicit position can only be derived by inverting
his mature criticism of capitalism. I will conclude that neither alienation nor exploitation
capture the fullness of his critical project.
In the fourth and final chapter, I will return to a close reading of Marx's difficult
conception of “the fetish of the commodity form” to arrive at the process of “reification”
whereby relations between subjects and objects become inverted under the capitalist
mode of production. Because Marx only develops the concept in passing, I will return
again to Lukács for his important discussion of reification in the seminal 1922 History
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and Class Consciousness. Here I will agree that the crucial category, and the category
missing from his more romantic 1919 analysis, is that of “totality” and the
epistemological privilege (or “standpoint” in his 1922 language) provided to the
proletariat as a class under capitalism. Here I hope to explicate the logical conclusion of
the relationship of historical materialism to the philosophical category of the ethical.
That is, that if the mode of production is the ultimately horizon for consciousness then all
ethical systems, regardless of what they take themselves to be doing, are in the business
of creating subjects adequate to their contemporaneous relations of production.
Historical materialism implies an ethics of virtue. This conclusion, coupled with the
Lukácsian-Leninist concept of the “actuality of the revolution,” reveals that any concrete
realization of freedom in this epoch can only be achieved by the virtue of solidarity as it
is embedded and mediated by the class struggle. Freedom is struggle enabled by
relations of proletarian solidarity. Conceptions otherwise remain mired in bourgeois
mystification emergent from the market and are calcified as “rights.”
I have also included a preliminary study of what I take to be a pre-Marxist
conception of the virtue of solidarity as freedom under the rubric of totality found in the
Stoic concept of oikeiȏsis. The concept, which is difficult to literally translate (it has the
sense of “making something homey”), is the process by which social relations are
brought into harmony by being subject to totality of the logos, or cosmic reason. Here I
survey many Stoic fragments for their social-political theory in an attempt to understand
how a sect committed to the private cessation of passions (apatheia) would also be
among the few advocates of a radical cosmopolitanism in an age of ethic, national, and
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religious chauvinism. I will conclude that, given their metaphysical commitments around
the totality of universal reason, the Stoics actually commit themselves to lives of public,
political activism to rationally harmonize social life. Despite what I take to be the most
radically progressive thinkers of the their day, I conclude that their inability to grasp the
origin of values in production, rather than in natural law, hamstrings the extent and
effectiveness of their socio-political platform. This will be especially salient in the case
of slavery. While the Stoics were among the most progressive in their considerations on
the treatment of slaves, they were unable to become advocates for the abolition of the
institution itself. That is, because of their metaphysical materialism and the conception of
the universal totality of logos, as opposed to dialectical materialism and the conception of
totality as a historical-social process, the ancient slave mode of production continued
unabated.
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Chapter 1 – The Lukács Dilemma and Methodology
Many of the philosophical or theoretical tensions to be found in the writings of
Karl Marx were only noticed and wrestled with by later Marxists. The role of trade
unions as a mediating factor in the rise of proletarian power, the national question, the
role of women's labor as a form of primitive accumulation, the place played by race and
gender oppression in supporting capitalist hegemony, etc., are issues Marx all but passed
over but became live and important lines of questioning for later Marxists. This is
especially true in how ethics and ethical evaluations feature into Marx's project. As I
hope to detail in the the next chapter, Marx himself seems to operate from what appears
to be diametrically opposite positions. At times he derides capitalism and the bourgeoisie
as parasitic “vampires,” clearly blameworthy in moral1 terms, and, at other times, he
dismisses ethics in toto as a kind of social illusion.
To get at this dilemma I think it is useful to begin a bit farther afield than the
writings of Marx himself. Indeed, I take it best to begin with history and practice than
textual exegesis or theory. To introduce the question of Marx and the ethical, but also to
illustrate just how much is at stake in this question, I want to turn to two essays written
around 1919 by György Lukács.2 Lukács was among the first Marxists to deeply wrestle

1. Marx employs the terms “moral” and “ethical” in a relatively unsystematic manner
given their technical history in the Hegelian philosophy. I will note if a terminological
distinction implies something of philosophical relevance. Otherwise, like Marx, I use the
terms interchangeably.
2. His class status is, perhaps, worth mentioning here. Lukács was born to enormous
privilege, the son of a wealthy investment banker and minor Hungarian nobility. So, not only
should we consider the serious philosophical character of the ethical dilemma he discusses but
also the psychological character of his breaking with his own class and class interests in such a
radical manner.
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with the fact that joining a revolutionary organization, especially the Bolsheviks, implied
a fundamentally ethical dilemma: the task of communism is human liberation, yet should
this task be carried out by oppressive, inhuman violence? Importantly, he neither
explains the dilemma away by an appeal to 'the force of historical necessity' nor reshapes
Marx's thinking to fit the ethical frameworks developed by the western philosophical
tradition in order to grapple with this dilemma. Rather, the early Lukács earnestly
struggles with the question in a way that is both philosophically rich and revelatory of the
personal anguish many had in deciding to join the cause for revolutionary socialism in the
early 20th century.3 Though he does not let the difficulty lead to quietism. He states the
question of joining a revolutionary program in ethical terms, declares it insoluble, only to
change his mind only a couple of months later. He then went on to become a lifelong
communist. I want to look very closely, maybe too closely, at these essays because I
think the practical concreteness of his situation allows him to express this tension in a
way that Marx, perhaps, could not. Further, I want to pay such attention to these essays
because I take it that every Marxist must eternally make this kind of decision in
becoming a Marxist at all. The dilemma faced in 1919 by Lukács is, to my mind, core to
the condition of being a Marxist as such.
For Lukács, and for Marxism generally, the stating and resolving of the role, if
any, played by the ethical in Marx's thinking was not and could not be a merely academic,
theoretical question. The fact that history, society, and the state (not to mention
3. For good and for ill. Critics will point to Lukács' intellectual capitulation during
the Stalin period though, given the scope of his work, I find it overly blunt to dismiss his
career as an activist-intellectual as merely “reason in the service of dogma,” as Leszek
Kołakowski described it.

10

consciousness) is just class struggle or an expression of class struggle, Lukács argues,
immanently contains the ought that one must build socialism through revolution. His two
essays, “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem” and “Tactics and Ethics,” published within a
couple months of each other, represent a virtually unique philosophical analysis of the
movement to a life of revolutionary action and the kind of demands it makes upon such
an individual.4 They present the decision to join ranks with a maximal Marxist
revolutionary program as an ethical question bounded by both the vast movement of
history, on the one hand, and the immediate contents of the individual will on the other.
Lukács variously articulates a dilemma of how to square the “ethical objective” of
socialism with the radically historicist “fact of class struggle.” There are fewer
arguments in the history of philosophy for which the stakes, both individually and
socially, are so high. In a world both coming out of a period of stasis and ebb into a
period of dynamism and with the Marxist species of communism back on the agenda,
Marxists are more concretely confronted by the same dilemma as Lukács. Indeed, it is
my sense, as I just noted, that Marxists are always already faced with this dilemma.
While it may have been only semi-conscious in Marx, in 1919 this dilemma would be
front and center for a person like Lukács. That is, the dilemma becomes unavoidably
present when the revolution is a question of immediately practical decision making.

4. We should recall that only months after "Tactics and Ethics" was written Lukács
would, in his capacity as commissar of the Fifth Division of the Hungarian Red Army, order
the execution of several people. Again, I begin this project with a discussion of Lukács
because of his philosophically rich and insightful articulation of the problem but also because
of the acuity of what his analysis meant in its concrete immediacy.
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Bolshevism as a Moral Problem
Lukács wrote “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem” to investigate whether or not it
was ethical to support Bolshevism as a mode of revolutionary struggle and, by extension,
whether or not to join the Hungarian Communist Party and attempt a revolution by
similar means in his own country. For Lukács, the question cannot rest merely on the
“ripeness” of objective economic or social conditions. In one sense, it is simply
impossible to ever “objectively” know all the facts of a given economic and sociological
situation under capitalism. In fact, a key aspect of a working market economy is that no
one must be able to know just where the economic forces will move. The
unpredictability, or 'irrationalism' as Lukács would put it, in the market makes for a
equally unpredictable society. It is impossible, Lukács argues, to know in advance when
conditions are maximally conducive for decisive revolutionary action.5 Indeed, waiting
for the revolution would ensure there would never be one.
Bolshevism itself had emerged as a response to the theoretical failures of the
Second International around precisely this issue. In the generation after Marx, but prior
to Lenin, many communists acted as if revolutionary situations were the automatic result
of deepening crises internal to capitalism and the ongoing immiseration of the workingclass. Capitalism would structurally fracture and the miserable proletariat, with the
communists leading them, would simply attain to class-consciousness and seize state
power. Economic crises on the one hand, and immiseration on the other, were supposed
to be the eventual guarantors of the revolution and socialism. The failure of the 1905

5. Lukács: 1977, 418
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Revolution, concrete social conditions in Russia,6 among other factors, led Lenin to
formulate the need for a party of professional revolutionaries who would imbed
themselves in working-class and peasant struggles to advance proletarian revolution.
Rather than wait on certain objective conditions, a position that would go on the be called
the error of “economism,” the Bolsheviks under Lenin organized themselves into a social
force, the party, in the struggle to seize power with workers and peasants. When Lukács
notes that “economic and sociological” conditions are simply not enough to convince
someone of joining Bolshevik ranks, he is, interestingly enough, using logic internal to
Bolshevism itself.
Lukács, who at this stage recognized himself as kind of left social-democrat (or
“romantic anti-capitalist” in his words), realized that the question of Bolshevism was not
merely intellectual. Russia was already a year into their experiment with socialism,
general strikes were racking France and Germany, and, within the year, Hungary itself
was to become the second Soviet state in Europe lasting only the Spring/Summer of
1919. For the would-be socialist, or anti-capitalist generally, it seemed that wide-spread
socialist revolution was not simply on the agenda theoretically; it was on the immediate
horizon in actuality. “Could anybody who opted for waiting and further deliberation, that
is, for compromise, still be called a true socialist?”7 asked Lukács. Why would anyone
wait? If the possibility of seizing power was immediately possible and Bolshevism has
shown itself as the sole mode capable of doing so, what could warrant delay? The answer
6. Only two cities, Petrograd and Moscow, had developed enough industry to produce
a classical Marxist proletariat with the rest of the population being peasants
7. Op. Cit., 419
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for the Lukács of “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem” was the role of democracy as an
moral commitment internal to socialism itself. Was a commitment to democratic
organization of power (e.g., due process for criminal prosecution, open debate, freedom
of the press, etc) merely a tactical option for revolutionary socialism or was it a sine qua
non of the revolutionary agenda?8
Lukács goes on draw out what he takes as a central dilemma for the Marxist
revolutionary. He argues that at the heart of the project has always been two unresolved
tensions. On the one hand class struggle is presented as an sociological fact which
materially explains the unfolding and direction of history. For the Marxist, history just is
the class war: first inaugurated when the primitive division of labor produced that first
social contradiction between forces, means and mode of production only to haphazardly
proceed through feudalism and mercantilism to arrive at capitalism. This is, for Lukács,
a bare fact which acts as “one of the main explanatory principles for the true
interconnections of historical reality.”9 Yet, with class struggle alone Marxism would
only offer up the possibility of perpetual class war. The proletariat of this epoch of
production would simply rise up, seize the means of production, and destroy the class
oppressing it only to produce another underclass which would begin the cycle again: a
perpetual “reshuffling of classes,” as Lukács puts it.10
Further, if history were merely perpetual class war, divorced from any end, with
morality radically shifting from epoch to epoch, the only way of appreciating social
8. Ibid.
9. Op. Cit., 420
10. Ibid.
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activity would be the realpolitik of that epoch's class war. Ethical life would simply be a
question of class hegemony with the values and mores of the class in dominance forming
the standard. History as merely class struggle produces a rational historicism while it
throws morality and values into radical relativism.
Lukács notes that class struggle is not the end of the story for the Marxist. Aside
from the fact of class struggle is socialism as the ethical objective. “Although the class
struggle of the proletariat is designed to produce a new world order, qua class struggle, it
is not the embodiment of this new world order.”11 Yet, the ethical ideal of socialism
without the material grounding of the class struggle is specious idealism. Anyone may
speculate, with all the dangers of ideological mystification, their various utopias: the
republic ruled by philosopher kings, the theocratic Calvinist state, the humanist utopia of
Moore, the communes of the transcendentalists, not to mention the socialist aspirations of
Saint-Simon, Owen, Weitling, Fourier, Lasalle or the anarchist Bakunin for that matter.
Yet, for Lukács, without the material grounding in the fact of class struggle, these are
empty ideological dreams, destined for destruction.12
The class struggle without a “messianic will,” with all the ethical, even religious
senses of that word, towards socialism on the part of the revolutionary leadership, Lukács
argues, descends into opportunism, realpolitik, and vicious, one-sided tyranny. The will
for socialism without the class struggle is an unhinged pipe-dream likely more motivated
by personal fantasies than an objective analysis of history and doomed to fail just the
same. The dilemma at hand emerges from the attempt to reconcile this tension in
11. Ibid.
12. Op. Cit., 421
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practice. The class war is a war and, if Lenin is correct, the revolutionary cannot wait
around for history to iron out the wrinkles. Further, as the Bolsheviks contended, with
finance capital's ability to use imperialism and mechanized warfare to prop up capitalism
indefinitely, revolutionaries must do whatever it takes to secure a world for socialism
before it falls again into the barbarism of the Somme and Verdun. Yet, the Bolsheviks are
committed to secure socialism and are willing to sacrifice democratic organization of
power, up to and including “dictatorship, terror, and the class oppression that goes with
it.”13 It is using “Satan to drive out Beelzebub”as Lukács puts it.14 I think it is key to
focus in on the fact that, for Lukács and other anti-capitalists at that time, disavowal of
Bolshevism was simply not possible. They had seized power in a country that made up
1/5th of the world's surface area and were desperately trying to build in reality what many
had only imagined in utopian hope. By 1919, Bolshevism warranted either solidarity or
horror. For Lukács, it seemed to warrant both.
Marx predicted that socialist revolution would explode first in the most
industrially advanced countries, specifically Germany, France, and the United States
because of their highly developed and highly immiserated working-class. Yet, it was
Russia, that “weak link” of imperialist power, wherein the social contradictions were the
sharpest, that socialist revolution had been carried out by the Bolsheviks.
Controversially, they were ready to use whatever means required to consolidate the
revolution and drive it forward to communism. Lukács senses that “to teach, enlighten,
and wait, in the hope that one day humanity...” would democratically achieve a just
13. Op. Cit., 422
14. Ibid.
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society was tantamount to an “infinite delay” wherein imperialists forces would continue
to wreak havoc.15 To join the Bolsheviks meant sacrificing the seemingly core
democratic ideals of socialism for the possibility of its immediate realization. Lukács
worries “How can we adhere to the democratic principles in the realization of socialism
without letting the tactical compromises take root in our consciousness?”16 This question
would prove prescient. Many years later, just before his death, Lukács would name a
person for whom he thought this process obtained: Stalin.17 Yet, to wait for the pure
democratic revolution, brought on by the masses in pure conscious expression of their
own liberation, may prove impossible. Worse, it may prove to be an objective betrayal of
the revolution already in progress. The Lukács of “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem”
could not take this leap. For him the “instant heroism” of the Bolshevik seizure of power
rested on a “metaphysical assumption that the bad can engender the good.”18 While the
prospect of waiting might require “superhuman strength, the democratic way does not
confront us with an insoluble question as does the moral problem of Bolshevism.”19
Before turning to “Tactics and Ethics” I want to examine this dilemma from an
angle that Lukács seems to have ignored or dismissed. The emphasis on the will and on
15. Ibid.
16. Op. Cit., 423
17. In an interview after the Stalin period Lukács would reflect that “Without a
genuine general theory of society and its movement, one does not get away from Stalinism.
Stalin was a great tactician... But Stalin, unfortunately, was not a Marxist.... The essence of
Stalinism lies in placing tactics before strategy, practice above theory...The bureaucracy
generated by Stalinism is a tremendous evil.”
18. Op. cit., 424
19. Ibid.
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the purity of waiting for a more democratic solution strikes me as conspicuously Kantian
in character.20 Despite his involved attack on Kantian metaphysics and ethics in his 1922
History and Class Consciousness, the ethical logic at work here seems to be that one
cannot will socialism in the specifically Bolshevik mode. That is, Bolshevik realpolitik
prioritizes the winning of the class struggle, through any means necessary, in a way that
contradicts the democratic and egalitarian commitments Lukács takes as a necessary
feature of socialism. Here the moral question of Bolshevism is located solely upon the
individual revolutionary and the condition of their will when they make the decision to
throw in their lot with Lenin. “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem” strikes me as a kind of
Kantian setup and response to the moral problems faced by socialists at that historical
moment. As a deontological analysis, Lukács' analysis may be on to something.
However, a Kantian analysis would not cover the range of ethical analysis, though I
suspect that something of the dilemma raised by Lukács would persist. For instance, one
can wonder how Lukács would have answered a more consequentialist analysis of the
problems presented in “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem.” After all, stripped of this
Kantian setup, the question seems to be simply that of means and ends sub species
historia. Yet, I think what we find in Lukács is what we will find in Marx: a rejection of
both ethical systems.

20. Given the rise in Neo-Kantian Marxism in this time it is not surprising that such a
sentiment would rub off on Lukács.
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Lukács Contra Consequentialism
The risk of both achieving a radically more egalitarian society and avoiding the
wars Lukács thought were brought on by the capitalist mode of production would
seemingly be worth the temporary use of political violence of the majority class upon the
minority class of oppressors. In other words, I suspect that a consequentialist argument
for Bolshevism would not prove difficult to mount. In fact, Trotsky in both his
“Terrorism and Communism (1920)” and “Their Morals and Ours (1938)” would defend
Bolshevik tactics, specifically the taking of hostages, by arguing for an dialectical
interdependence between socialist ends and Bolshevik means. However, I suspect that
Lukács would have maintained that the dilemma he articulated, though weaker, would
still persist. Specifically, I think he would argue that both the Bolshevik seizure of power
and the accompanying political terror in maintaining it were the result of the backward
social forces of Russian industrial production. That is, the very conditions which made
the revolution in Russia possible also rendered its success radically undecidable thus
rendering any means-ends calculation difficult or impossible. Without access to the
totality no individual could actually make this leap.21
Bolshevism, at the time, was even derided by many anarchist factions as
adventurist in character for seizing power when they did. The Bolsheviks, at least in the
faction led by Lenin, and the recent convert from Menshevism, Trotsky, felt that if power
were not seized immediately the revolutionary momentum originating in February of
1917 would be lost . They both felt that the moderate government of Kerensky would
21. As we will see, it is precisely this category of “totality” that Lukács will deploy
in mature works.
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capitulate to imperialist forces politically, to bourgeois forces economically, and thereby
maintain Russia's role in World War I and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. All of this is
to say that: (1) Lukács seems right that there were real epistemological impediments to
appreciating the objective forces which would accurately determine the opportune
moment to seize power; (2) waiting for that moment (i.e., what Lenin denounced as
“economism”) may actually ensure it never comes, could lead to further slaughter and
may derail viable, though less than pure, revolutionary instances already unfolding; (3)
the very conditions which allowed for the socialist revolution and the seizure of power by
the Bolsheviks in Russia (Lenin's analysis of Russia as the “weak link of imperialism”)
also rendered undecidable the ability to calculate with any certainty that this revolution
would work such that all the political violence needed to maintain it would be worth it
and finally; (4) the sheer practical question of how to build socialism in the midst of a
civil war and the simultaneous invasion of more than a dozen imperialist countries
remained utterly unanswered.
Given these factors, I think that Lukács could have answered the consequentialist,
such that given the enormous factors involved, it would have been either impossible or
disingenuous of a person holding themselves to conditions of calculating rationality22 to
make the leap to joining to Bolsheviks. That is, for different reasons, a core dilemma
persists for the would-be Bolshevik: does one throw in with the Bolshevik's gamble to
build radically more egalitarian world given the undecidable odds of success (again, with
waiting being tantamount to being counter-revolutionary), the degree of violence needed
22. Not that rationality was central to Lukács: he centers his discussion on the
Bolshevik gamble on a kind of “messianic faith.”
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to forward the revolution (which is rendered ethically undecidable given the
undecidability of success) given that the die has been cast by millions of workers and
peasants led by professional revolutionaries already in power? It seems to me that in
Lukács' analysis that noting purely rational could ultimately tip the scales of the ethical
decision. What was required was a kind of messianic gamble rather than rational
analysis. The Lukácsof this essay was simply unwilling to make such a gamble. Yet, in
only two months, Lukács, despite his crypto-Kantian argument against the Bolsheviks,
switched sides, with “Tactics and Ethics” as his defense for that new position.

Tactics and Ethics
In “Tactics and Ethics” Lukács again discusses how to relate revolutionary
political activity to ethics though, only two months after the publication of “Bolshevism
as a Moral Problem,” he comes to very different conclusions. He begins by discussing the
relationship of political scope to the actually existing social reality of his day, noting that:
If we define tactics as a means by which politically active groups achieve their
declared aims, as a link connecting ultimate objective with reality, fundamental
differences arise, depending on whether the ultimate objective is categorized as a
moment within the social reality or as one that transcends it.23
If the ultimate objective of a political tendency does not transcend the social reality it will
experience the existing social order (including the law, but also customs, taboos, mores,
etc) as absolutely determining the scope of an action or program. For instance, it would
be very unlikely for the Republican Party in the United States to form a strategy for

23. Lukács: 2014, 3
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swaying an election around a bombing campaign to intimidate Democrat voters. Their
ultimate political objectives (jockeying for positions within government) are immanent to
a political and social system that already exists. Exaggerated acts of illegality would, at
least in the long run, play against a political part of a movement that seeks a legitimate
place within legitimate governance.24
Not so, Lukács argues, for those for whom their ultimate political objectives
transcend the current socio-political order. In that case, the “legal order is seen as pure
reality, as real power, to be taken into account for, at most, reasons of expediency.”25 No
doubt, the law is a real force. Everything from civil disobedience to open, armed
insurgency will warrant, insofar as the state maintains the ability (not to say legitimacy),
a juridical sanction. Yet, if a tendency's ultimate political objectives transcend the
existing socio-political order then the threat of legal sanction is only one of many
considerations when planning a path of action. The legal status of a revolution is either
flatly forbidden or radically undecidable26 but that has not and, Lukács argues, should not
stop a revolutionary tendency. Those for whom their ultimate political objective

24. The immediate effects of the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal for the Bush
administration come to mind as an example of how such realpolitik during the 'war on terror'
was a blow to the legitimacy the administration itself within the larger US body politic. It was
already more or less illegitimate everywhere else.
25. Ibid.
26. Even in Hobbes there is an anomalous case for revolt. While revolution against
the sovereign is forbidden, Hobbes notes that if one begins to rebel one should not stop
defending one's life even from attempts by the sovereign on it. It seems forbidden to revolt
and it seems forbidden to stop once one starts.
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transcends the existing social order, revolutionaries of whatever type, must view the legal
order and its threat of sanction as “an exclusively tactical question.”27
Lukács has a very broad sense of “legal order” in mind here. Following Hegel, he
would likely considered the “legal order” as both abstract right, which protects individual
self-interests, but also the more general customs, mores, and the specifics of legal codes
which concretize and situate abstract jurisprudence into actual social relations.28 The
revolutionary, despite the threat of legal sanction, finds the socio-political system
incomplete, contradictory or one-sided and seeks to correct it, despite itself. It is this
notion of the revolutionary, at first as the romantic individual but later as the class, who
corrects the one-sidedness of social disorder, that will remain key for many Hegelian
Marxists and form the backbone for the “immanent” mode of social criticism.
Lukács goes on to make the a distinction between “immediate, concrete aim” and
“ultimate objective” in order to clarify the question of just what he means by expediency.
For those classes and parties that have achieved their ultimate goal, the scope of their
decision making is primarily, if not only, oriented toward the immediate aims which act
to continue their hold on that ultimate goal (e.g., to maintain sovereignty in the form of
27. Op. Cit., 4
28. The distinction might be made clearer through a specific example. When Mao
declared that Marxism could be distilled into one phrase “It is right to rebel against the
reactionaries” he was simultaneously threatening the social and political order. At one level,
he was urging the masses to armed insurrection against a sovereign government which, like
most governments, forbids armed insurrection. His call to rebel questioned the legitimacy of
the ruling class through question the legitimacy of their right to governance. Further, and
perhaps even more revolutionary, at another level Mao was urging people to go against
thousands of years of culturally legitimated Confucian customs which precisely values not
rebelling, following orders from elders and a strict obedience to the past, the ancestors and
tradition. The slogan “It is right to rebel against the reactionaries” questioned the Chinese
“legal order” in the broad sense I think Lukács had in mind.
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governmental power in the case of liberal-bourgeois politics). If they are to hold power
they must strike an equilibrium between maintaining popular legitimacy and deploying
“the shallowest and most catastrophic form of Realpolitik.”29 If Lukács seems cynical it
should be easy enough to know why. By 1919, the smoke had hardly cleared from a war
in which, of the sixty million mostly European, mostly proletarian, soldiers who were
mobilized from 1914 to 1918: eight million were killed; seven million were permanently
disabled; and fifteen million were seriously injured. He saw, as many Marxists did,
thirty-million casualties produced, in the most appalling kinds of conditions ever known
in the history of warfare, in defense of liberal state power founded on finance capital and
imperialist colonialism. Such an enormity of human suffering seems sufficient to make it
'catastrophic' and, that it was perpetuated in the interests of minoritarian profiteering,
could hardly be more 'shallow.'
The Marxist revolutionary, on the other hand, will very frequently have to forgo
an immediate grab for power in lieu of their ultimate objectives. For instance, while a
Marxist revolutionary may engage in parliamentary elections in a liberal government, and
even win some degree of power, that power remains within a framework which limits the
maximal extent of their revolutionary program. Further, such politicking can become an
end in itself (i.e., a liberal conflation of governmental power with state power) further
forcing a revolutionary program into reformist channels.30 The kind of power to be
29. Op. Cit., 4
30. There error is dual. On the one hand, investing political energy in parliamentary
politics can divest it from building sites of political power with those that, according to
Marxism, have actual revolutionary potential (workers and other oppressed people). On the
other hand, by the time that one could vote on the kind of legislation that would seriously
undermine the rule of capital and its class, objective revolutionary conditions would have to
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gained from jockeying for power within the framework of bourgeois parliamentary
politics should, in many circumstances, be forgone given the ultimate objectives of the
maximal, revolutionary socialist program.
Despite appearances, Lukács argues, the Marxist program is non-utopian in two
senses. Communism is a concrete shift in the mode of production rather than the
instantiation of a set of regulative ideals. That is, the future communist mode of
production is actual material condition for the existence of such notions as “equality,”
“freedom,” or “justice.” Rather than invoking trans-historical or idealist notions it directs
“forces already at work within social reality” toward the realization of its ultimate
objective, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and eventually the communist mode of
production.31 Nor does Marxism post for itself goals which are beyond the scope of those
actually attainable through a widening dialectic of tactics/strategy, strategy/campaign,
campaign/political program. This lesson is quickly learned by the amateur, idealist
revolutionary who waves a red flag demanding 'all power to workers' councils!' at their
first trade union meeting. A properly Marxist program, according to Lukács, will sail
between idealist, utopian speculation and brash realpolitik.
Without such a program Lukács argues, “every revolutionary class or party will
vacillate aimlessly between a Realpolitik devoid of ideals and an ideology without real
content.”32 This is where he locates the fundamental limitation of both the bourgeois
obtain to enforce such legislation. The moment it becomes possible to ban capital, seize the
means of production, etc., is exactly the same moment such legislation would be superfluous.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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revolutions of the 18th centuries and contemporaneous utopian socialists and anarchists.
The bourgeois revolutionaries of the 18th century subjectively had idealist ultimate goals
such as those enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Though,
given the objective class status of the liberal revolutionaries, they were unable to
universally institute without destroying themselves in the process.33 Rather, they yielded
to a pragmatic realpolitik by organizing governmental bodies which objectively extended
rights only insofar as it safeguarded the economic interests of the new ruling class. The
ideals of “freedom, equality and fraternity” increasingly became “ideology without real
content” with the ruling class engaging in “Realpolitik devoid of ideals” simply to hold
onto state power.34 Similarly, the utopian socialists and anarchists build ideal societies
within their minds and, not understanding the real social forces at play, attempt to realize
them. While corruption and reaction may have awaited the bourgeois revolutionaries, a
more immediately fatal tragedy awaits utopians. However, Lukács admits, there is in at
least some sense, a utopian project at work in the revolutionary Marxist program.
Revolutionary socialism can be said to be “utopian” in a looser sense in that it
“transcends the economic, legal, and social limits of contemporary society and can only
be realized through the destruction of that society,” though, “it is anything but utopian in

33. This is, perhaps, most glaringly obviously in the contradiction between the
“unalienable rights” enshrined in the Constitution of the United States with the reality of the
genocidal practice of chattel slavery, the extermination of Native Peoples, along with the
exclusion of women from political life. It is no wonder that many leftists are slow to refer to
the American Revolution as such when it appears to be mostly an act of populist, millitiabacked tax evasion on the part of elite settler-colonialists. I think this is the be contrasted with
the Jacobin revolutionary tendency which, has its most concrete realization in Haiti and not in
Paris.
34. Ibid.
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the sense that its attainment would entail the absorption of ideas hovering outside or
above society.”35
What then, is the bridge that links the immanent non-utopian, non-reformist
“forces already at work within social reality” with the transcendent, ultimate objective of
revolutionary socialism? For Lukács, it is the class struggle itself that “changes the
transcendent objective into an immanent one” by being “at once the objective itself and
its realization.”36 It is here that the Lukács of “Tactics and Ethics” breaks with
“Bolshevism as a Moral Problem.” In “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem,” Lukács' central
argument was that the Bolshevik's realpolitik at the level of class struggle could not be
squared with the democratic, egalitarian aim at the heart of the ethical project of
socialism. A would-be revolutionary simply could not will terror for the sake of safety
nor totalitarian dictatorship for the sake of freedom. Recall that in “Bolshevism as a
Moral Problem” Lukács concluded “although the class struggle of the proletariat is
designed to produce a new world order, qua class struggle, it is not the embodiment of
this new world order.”37 Now, two months later, he will deploy two simultaneous
dialectical moves to justify just the opposite position, a fusing of the tactical with the
ethical. The first is the dialectic between the immanence of the social present with the
transcendent socialist future as mediated38 by the class struggle. The second is the
35. Op. Cit., 5
36. Ibid.
37. Lukács: 1977, 420 As we will see, it is exactly on this point that Lukács will
change his mind.
38. “Mediated” is here a technical term inherited from Hegelian philosophy. For
Hegel nothing is simply and immediately present. Rather, things (including ideas and social
forces/institutions) come to be and persist through the reconciliation of differential, opposing
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dialectic between the individual and class relations as mediated by the “world-historical
mission of the proletariat.”

The Dialectic of Present and Future
The first shift necessary for Lukács' new position is to invert the locus of analysis
for understanding ethical action. No longer is the individual, atomic will with its own a
priori conceptions of what socialism should be (e.g., the democratic ideals of
“Bolshevism as a Moral Problem”) but “the decisive criterion of socialist tactics: the
philosophy of history.”39 Lukács, relying on the notion that the transcendent socialist
future is actualized through the class struggle, draws the more far-reaching conclusion
that socialism is immanently present in the actual, concrete social contradictions of class
struggle. In other words, if the class struggle is the mode by which socialism is
actualized, then socialism itself must be actually present, in some diminished or
incomplete form, in the ongoing struggle for control of the means of production. It is the
class struggle as motive force which mediates between the present fact of social
contradiction with its future meaning as socialism.40 As class antagonisms are resolved in
the universal interests of the proletariat, with the ongoing wresting away of the means of
forces. Nothing is simply “in itself” without qualification but is the result of a process of
mediation through things, ideas, and forces exterior to it which condition it as a thing, idea,
social force, etc. This process of mediation will take on a critical function in Hegel's political
philosophy and its inheritance by Marxism.
39. Lukács: 2014, 5
40. This point is developed at length in History and Class Consciousness where the
proletariat becomes, in very Hegelian language, the subject-object of history as the first and
last class that is both in-itself (produced by objective capitalist class relations) but also foritself (class-consciously acting as a willing, subjective agent for to realize its freedom as a
class which ends class). Regardless, the logic here is dizzying if nothing else.
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production from the bourgeois, the class struggle itself will reach an apocalyptic
crescendo then falls away leaving behind the pure actuality of socialist social relations,
devoid Lukács thinks, of all oppression. In the language of “Bolshevism as a Moral
Problem,” the moral objective of socialism cannot be separated from the sociological fact
of class struggle, the “fact” of class struggle cannot be separated from its “meaning” as
socialism. Such a position is not foreign to Marx's thought, though Lukács may not have
known its best articulation. In The German Ideology, not published until 1932, Marx and
Engels wrote, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an
ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement
which abolishes the present state of things (Wir nennen Kommunismus die wirkliche
Bewegung, welche den jetzigen Zustand aufhebt.). The conditions of this movement result
from the premises now in existence.”41
Further, Lukács shifts the primary unit of analysis to collective class action and
away from the decisive character individual will. History is only intelligible from the
standpoint and analysis of class struggles yet “there will be indeterminable transitional
stages between the tactical means and the ultimate objective; it is never possible to know
in advance which tactical step will succeed in achieving the ultimate objective itself.”42
While he does not develop it, I think Lukács also deals with concerns about the

41. Lukács had a kind of knack for arriving at positions which Marx (and Engels)
would develop but were not published until the late 1920's and 1930's. History and Class
Consciousness, for instance, is effectively a philosophically more robust and rich account of
Marx's 1844 writings on estranged labor which were unknown to Lukács (and virtually all
Marxists) until they were published in 1927.
42. Ibid.
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consequentialist gamble on Bolshevism raised above. His answer seems to be as simple
as it is disconcerting. Given our limited subjectivity, we cannot know what specific
tactical decisions will objectively prove successful in ushering in socialism. Every action
and inaction features into a totality of class antagonisms in which only “socialism or
barbarism” are on the historical agenda such that “the only valid yardstick is whether the
manner of the action is a given case serves to realize this goal, which is the essence of the
socialist movement.”43 Yet, at this point in Lukács' thinking does not provide any
mechanism by which a subject (either a singular subject or a group subject) has access to
this totality. Indeed, without the concept of totality it is unclear that Lukács is warranted
to his position at all.
Individual tactical decisions (and no decision seems outside the scope of this
historico-social struggle) are both historically, and thus ethical undecidable except insofar
as they are taken up into a socialist future. Leaning strongly on Hegel, Lukács reasons
that socio-political actions are only decided by the long run of history. This means that
one must not only act, but, one must act as if all individual actions were equally and
perpetually ethical gambits on the success of one's objective class interest.44 History, not
43. Ibid.
44. C.f., Hegel at The Elements of the Philosophy of Right §339 “The relations
between states are unstable, and there is no praetor to settle disputes; the higher praetor is
simply the universal spirit which has being in and for itself. i.e., the world spirit.” combined
with §348 “At the forefront of all actions, including world-historical actions, are individuals as
the subjectivities by which the substantial is actualized. Since these individuals are the living
expressions of the substantial deed of the world spirit and are thus immediately identical with
it, they cannot themselves perceive it and it is not their object and end.” While nearly
identical structurally, Lukács differs from Hegel in that it is precisely the class-conscious
proletariat as a class in and for itself that which can know its “object and end” though
individuals who compose that class do not. In other words, one can know formally that the
proletariat is the subject-object of history yet maintain that actions and decisions are ethically
undecidable at the register of the individual.
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individuals, will decide the character of an action or decision and so the individual must
sacrifice their own moral scruples in the service of the “world historic mission of the
proletariat.” Slavoj Žižek captures this perpetual ethical suspense when he recounts how
“...in 1953, Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, was in Geneva for the peace
negotiations to end the Korean war, a French journalist asked him what does he think
about the French Revolution; Chou replied: “'It is still too early to tell.'”45 Even the
Jacobin terror is, on this Hegelian approach, still morally undecidable precisely because
its revolutionary inheritance remains perpetually up for grabs.46 If this is true for the past
in relation to the present, then it seems all the more pressing for the present in relation to
the future.

The Dialectic of Individual and Class
It is precisely the more extreme Hegelian tendency toward historicist,
depersonalized, and morally agnostic action that Lukács finds wanting. It is as if a view
from above, from the register of the purely historical, does not quite appreciate the
Marxist project of individual, human liberation through voluntary struggle. The classes
are not simply blind forces of nature but the “real movement” of individual human beings
in a fight for their collective liberation from need, scarcity, and oppression. It is a fight
for human liberation against oppression which has a profoundly moral, profoundly
humanist character. Lukács notes that this amoral tendency of Marx's philosophy of
45. Žižek: 2008, vii.
46. Though Hegel himself thought that the terror was the result of the one-sided
demand of absolute, abstract freedom which, when it was attempted in the concrete, resulted
in indiscriminate murder.

31

history are remnants of “dangerous aspects of Hegel's legacy” which are flatly
contradicted by “the most primitive, universal psychological facts: conscience and the
sense of responsibility.”47 It is simply not enough, Lukács suspects, that an account of
actions which are supposed to contribute to building socialism to be expressed solely in
terms of the tactical question of “how.” They must also, answering to our shared sense of
responsibility and conscience, answer to to the deeply subjective question of motivation,
of “why?” Here Lukács seems to backtrack, in a certain sense, to the more Kantian
position he took in “Bolshevism as a Moral Problem.” In this view from below, so to
speak, Lukács asks “How do conscience and the sense of responsibility of the individual
relate to the problem of tactically correct collective action?”48 He answers this by
locating the role of the individual with their class relation as mediated by the “world
historical mission of the proletariat.”
What seems at stake for Lukács is the character of the actual revolutionary. It is
not enough to be purely tactical (this leads to a realpolitik and a politics of immediate
gains) nor is it enough to be a “beautiful soul,” to have an good will through either
awaiting democratic purity or pursuing only imaginary socialist utopias (i.e., a
commitment to individual, subjective purity which is an objective betrayal of the actually
existing class struggle in which socialism is already becoming immanent). The solution
Lukács provides appears to be a curious kind of Leninist deontology which, at times, has
a nearly existentialist tenor. Quoting Lukács at length seems warranted here:

47. Lukács 2014, 7
48. Ibid.
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...ethics relate the individual and the necessary consequence of this relationship
[the individual to collective will] is that the individual's conscience and sense of
responsibility are confronted with the postulate that he must act as if on his action
or inaction depended the changing of the world's destiny, the approach of which is
inevitably helped or hindered by the tactics he is about to adopt. (For in the realm
of ethics there is no neutrality and impartiality; even he who is unwilling to act
must be able to account to this conscience for his inactivity.) Everyone who at the
present times opts for communism is therefore obliged to bear the same individual
responsibility for each and every human being who dies for him in the struggle, as
if he himself had killed them all. But all those who ally themselves to the other
side, the defense of capitalism, must bear the same individual responsibility for
the destruction entailed in the new imperialist revanchist war which are surely
imminent, and for the future oppression of the nationalities and classes.49
Rather than locating moral accountability solely in the individual will, Lukács makes the
ethical question a dialectic between between the private goodness of the individual will
and the demand to reconcile social contradictions brought on by the current mode of
production such that no decision is neutral within the ongoing class struggle. Indeed,
Lukács is willing to go to the very end in his thinking here. He derides those who do not
appreciate the class struggle as the genetic origins for ethics as operating “at a primitive,
unconscious, instinctual level...no matter how highly developed a creature he may be
otherwise...”50 Lacking a developed class consciousness an individual operates in the
world like an ethical sleepwalker, acting only “in themselves” but not “for themselves.”
Lukács argues that while perfect knowledge of the political situation is
impossible, one cannot escape that one is always already acting in the objective interests
of one of the great classes. For the individual, specifically the class-conscious
proletarian individual, “the attainment of which makes up the content of the class49. Op. Cit., 8
50. Ibid.
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conscious action coincides neither with the sum of the personal interests of the
individuals belonging to the class nor with the immediate short-term interests of the class
as a collective entity” but that which forwards the “world-historical mission” of fully
actualizing the socialist world immanent in the class struggle.51 While each action
provides only for the possibility that it will help realize socialism one must “sacrifice his
inferior self on the the alter of the highest idea” even if the action – violence, murder,
terrorism, dictatorship – is individually repugnant.52 Illustrating this point Lukács
describes individual acts of anarchist terror in the 1904-6 revolution as the most extreme
moment of subjective sublimation to the class struggle, “...only he who acknowledges
unflinchingly and without an reservation that murder is under no circumstances to be
sanctioned can commit the murderous deed that is truly – and tragically – moral.”53 The
ethical character of an action or person can only be really ratified through their being
imbedded in a class, mediated through the struggle of that class, taken up to the register
of history, and sublated. The individual's character and actions retain an undecidable
valence as history, guided by Bolshevik messianism, itself lurches toward Bethlehem to
be born.
It is clear that prior to the 1920's Lukács retains an ultra-left tendency (as
witnessed by his sympathy with the anarchists mentioned towards the end of his essay)
and a thoroughgoing romanticism which, as I hope to show in the next chapters, is utterly
missing in Marx. Yet, I think that these initial gropings for an answer to these questions
51. Op. Cit., 9
52. Op. Cit., 10
53. Op. Cit., 10-11
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are both important historically, philosophically and, I think by the early 20's, push
Lukács into what strikes me as the correction direction for grounding an analysis of the
Marxist relation to the ethical.

Lukács and now Marx
The transition from the Second to the Third International was marked by a
pronounced impetus to not only analyze historical and social forces but to directly shape
them in the direction of revolutionary socialism. Intellectuals and philosophers like
Lukács strike me as best understood in this light. Philosophy did not merely analyze or
consider the question of revolution. It, like all other social forces, was directly implicated
in the push and pull of the social dialectic. While it could be said that philosophy was in
need of the revolution much more than the revolution was in need of philosophy, the
intellectual doldrums of the Second International seemed to work in the interests of the
bourgeoisie. In the early 20th century the social dialectic had resulted in a gain in the
material condition of struggle (workers had seized the means of the production in many
places and were set to in many others) but development on the theoretical side of praxis
was severely lacking. It was a rare, but fatal, instance where practice advanced over
theory.
Lukács could not have known how high the stakes of his philosophical inquiry
were. History will, no doubt, be difficult on both the ethical and the intellectual
inheritance of the Third International. Despite the material gains made by millions of
people, including those in China and gains made by the national liberation struggles
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backed by the Soviet Union, the human cost cannot be denied. The philosophical
philistinism or the Second International gave way, in less than a generation, to the
dogmatic orthodoxy of the Third. The line of philosophical inquiry opened by Lukács
would be closed not long after it had been opened. By the Fifth Congress of the
Communist International (June, 1924) both Lukács, along with Karl Korsch, were
derided as “professors” by Zionviev. Lukács' work would fall in line with the Stalinist
orthodoxy. Zionviev, like virtually all the revolutionaries of the October period, would be
put through a show trial and shot as Stalin moved to consolidate power in the Soviet
bureaucracy. While not all of the failures of the 20th century's experiment with socialism
can be attributed to unsolved philosophical problems central to Marx's project, it strikes
me a reckless for any would-be Marxist to ignore them.
The discussion of these two essays of Lukács above show both the historical
stakes of this philosophical venture in the early 20th century and the immense difficultly
of making sense of what Lukács rightly points out as a dilemma at the very heart of the
Marxist project. The brilliance of Lukács here is to mine out an antagonism which was
neither apparent to Marx nor for which simple interpretive or constructive solutions have
emerged. This lacuna is symptomatic of 20th century Marxism's inability to be dialectical
in regards philosophy generally. On the one hand, those that over-prioritized the need for
revolutionary action played down the importance of philosophically informed theory.
This produced a kind of adventurist Marxism which had its end in groups like the
Weather Underground in the US, the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany and the Brigate
Rosse in Italy. The other side conflated theory with practice (c.f., Althusser and elements
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in the Frankfurt School), pushing the need to actually organize workers and oppressed
peoples into a revolutionary party into the background. This tendency has finally
degenerated into a left scholasticism whereby gains made in Marxist theory could be
surgically removed from class struggle and used to back up otherwise bourgeois
disciplines (sociology, anthropology, psychology, literary theory, etc). Indeed, this has
produced a entire clique of “Marxians” who are little more than kulaks at the register of
theory. While Marx and Engels by 1845 were looking to settle accounts with their
“erstwhile philosophical conscience” it can in no way be said that the relationship of
philosophy to Marx's thought, and Marxism in general, is anywhere near being
concluded. More specifically for this project, the bridge between revolutionary
volunteerism (be it in a humanist mode or otherwise) and historical materialism (be it in a
structuralist mode or otherwise) has never been sufficiently worked out. In short, the
error has come in two directions. Philosophers have rejected the revolutionary
imperative of Marxism and Marxists have ignored the deep philosophical problems
inherent to their revolutionary program. This project emerges out of what I take to be a
need for philosophical analysis of a concrete problem facing any would-be revolutionist.
It is meant to be philosophy as, in the words of Althusser, “class struggle at the level of
theory.” How and why that struggle is waged are questions that can only be answered by
turning to just what relation obtains between Marx, Marxism, and the philosophical
category of the ethical.
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Some Methodological Considerations
The period from 1917 (the October Revolution In Russia) until 1939 (the defeat of
left forces in Spain) was, so far, the most decisive period for radical socialist politics in
Europe. While most analysis of this period focuses on questions around “what went
wrong” – the consolidation and extension of Stalin's power via the bureaucratization of
Soviet Russia, the inability to consolidate general strikes in Germany, France and Italy
into revolutionary moments, the infighting between revolutionary forces in Spain, the
inability to beat back the rise of fascism, etc. – less is done to reflect on either the
concrete gains of the working class during this period or on the enormous personal
gamble taken by revolutionaries at that time. Discussions which allow “what went
wrong” or the failures of 20th century socialism to form the principle hermeneutic for an
understanding of the struggles of that time can obfuscate the extraordinary character of a
generation which directly sought to transform the world in its totality. Just as true as the
grim reality of 20th century socialism's excesses is also that millions of historically
anonymous people rose up and sought an end to nation states, capitalism, religion, and
oppression of every kind through socialist revolution.
People attempted to make world revolution at great individual cost: from Marx
pawning his clothes and living a life of constant surveillance and exile, to the individual
militia-woman shot down anonymously defending collectivized Catalonia from fascism.
The cost, the enormously hopeful gamble on a future in which total human liberation
would be achieved was made by individuals who often doubly sacrificed themselves: the
first sacrifice subsumed their individual autonomy into the ranks of the masses, into the
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tectonic surge of class-conscious warfare; the second was in the reality that the odds of
success were often catastrophically low. Rank and file revolutionaries gave up privileges
contemporaneous to them and died en masse, pincered in by both liberalism and fascism.
Whatever the merits of revolutionary socialism were or are, millions made made their
lives into a gambit for a world of radical human emancipation under that banner.
Merely an analysis of “what went wrong” without an appreciation of the concrete
gains made by such a lived experience of sacrifice is a privilege that can quickly become
arrogance. The May '68 rising captures this kind of arrogance. Such slogans as “Une
révolution qui demande que l’on se sacrifie pour elle est une révolution à la papa” and
“La révolution cesse dès l’instant qu’il faut se sacrifier pour elle” reveal a daring to
struggle but not the willingness to go all the way, to do what it takes to actually win. A
sense of personal entitlement is a poor substitute for committed revolutionary fervor and
philosophical analysis that does not consider the human toll which makes it possible is
suspect at best.
This project lives in the shadow of two difficult truths. Marxists, and
revolutionary socialists generally, must uncynically accept the emancipatory potential of
Marxist praxis and yet unflinchingly own the reality of 20th century socialism's gains and
losses. This project, for instance, will reject the liberal logic that makes a necessary
totalitarian circuit such that Marxism=Leninism=Stalinism (dictatorship of the proletariat
→ the necessity of the party → the gulags and purges, the Holomodor, Dekulakization,
etc.) while, at the same time, rejecting dogmatic apologetics for the excesses. Further,
this project will also deal curtly with “beautiful soul” communism which, after it locates
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'the fall,' wash its hands of any continued analysis and engagement (e.g., anarchists and
formalizt Trotskists for whom, after the late 30's, they can simply dismiss the entire
Soviet experiment as “state capitalism.” Though, I should say, I am actually myself
deeply sympathetic to just such an analysis of the Soviet Union and China.). 21st century
communism, if there is to be such a thing, must come to soberly account for, internalize,
and overcome the communism of the 20th century. Anything less than a honest
accounting of this period will pay poor dividends to future revolutionists.

A Marxist Project
It is only in the last decade or so that any serious engagement with Marx and
Marxism is not an explicitly political act. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
increasing liberalization of China though before the the 2008 economic crisis and the
Arab Spring, there was a relatively brief window when Marx and Marxism could be
approached as a more or less exclusively historical subject of inquiry.54 For many, with
the failure of 20th century Communism also came the proof that Marxism itself was either
rendered philosophically irrelevant or a cautionary tale of the dangers of mystifying
dialectics, historicist science, and totalizing, i.e., totalitarian, grand narratives. The end of
history meant either the triumph of liberalism and/or the impossibility of grand narratives
like 'history' itself. It meant the end of any engagement with Marx and Marxism as a
viable political project. This project breaks sharply with not only post-modernism's
rejection of 'grand narratives' and neo-liberal triumphalism, but, also with 20th century
54. I am thinking thinking primarily in Europe and the United States. This is much
less true for Latin America.

40

socialism as the horizon for the possibility of both the philosophical and political
potential for the Marxism. Yet, the left is in a period of tremendous crisis for which
simple answers, dogmatic repetition, and eclectic philosophical revisionism will not do.
However, the task of engaging with real lacuna in Marx's thinking should be taken as an
endorsement of the overall arc of Marx's thought generally, while, at the same time,
admitting the necessity that 21st century communism is in need of radical re-evaluation,
re-foundation, and re-organization. Further, it must do so in the least sectarian form
possible. I take that arc to mean a commitment to the renovation and re-foundation of at
least the following three concepts:
Historical Materialism: Large-scale social changes are the result of struggles
around maximizing human freedom as it is mediated by nature, social forces, and
production. Foundational to human freedom is control over the means by which society
is materially and immaterially produced and re-produced. History has reached a pivotal
period in which productive capacity could liberate human labor. Yet, the social forces of
production are arranged in the interests of profit-making for a global minority. Thus, the
present epoch is defined primarily by two classes: those that can and do buy the labor
power of others and those that must sell their own in order to survive. History, however,
admits of neither linear progression nor of inscrutable randomness. The struggle for
control of the means of production seems to be the best rubric for grasping history as a
and its concrete totality. Though, we are rightly skeptical about any “iron laws of
history” which make the vicissitudes of this process certain.
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Criticism of Capitalism: Capitalism is an unsustainable mode of production
which relies on the exploitation of the majority of the world's population in the interests
of an extreme minority. Society is organized by the ruling class primarily in its own
interests and in its defense. This includes artificially produced material scarcity and
engineered oppressions at both the social level (e.g., patriarchy, racism, gender
oppression, able-ism, etc) and the individual level (e.g., the horizon for subjectivity and
inter-subjective relations is profit mediated by commodity exchange, subjects are forced
to become objects). The persistence of capitalism is an existential threat for most life on
earth, via the threat of catastrophic war and ecological collapse, and, as such, must be
overthrown.
Advocacy for Socialist Revolution: The capitalist class has used and continues to
use genocidal violence to maintain and expand its power. There is no reason to expect
the future to be otherwise. Mass revolutionary forces must be systematically arranged to
seize the means of production such that a sustainable, maximally free form of society can
be created. That mass revolutionary force will most likely have to take the form of an
organized, disciplined party in order to successfully seize state power and the means of
social production and reproduction. Through relations of solidarity, the proletariat, the
class which sells its labor power in the production and reproduction of society, must use
whatever force in their power to overthrow bourgeois forces. Given the high level of
productive capacity of global capitalism, revolution anywhere can become the genetic
condition for revolution everywhere. Socialist revolution forms the only concrete, longterm method by which to achieve human freedom.
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While this is an admittedly philosophically contentious, bare-bones Marxism I
have no access to either some a-historical Archimedean point nor a grand, unified
inheritance of Marxism from which to begin. We may attempt to forever untie Gordian's
Knot or we can cut through it. Given the reality of crisis, our only option is to forgo
academic subtlety and cut. Further, I am resistant to beginning from an inheritance of
extreme partisanship which characterizes the current radical left. In other words, here is a
dilemma. No 20th century variant of Marxism seems persuasively adequate to the present
task, neither do I think that a mere ad fontes return to Marx will yield us a “pure”
Marxism missed by previous revolutionists, nor can we just start from scratch. We are
adrift with patchwork sails. So, with a kind of admittedly heuristic sketch, will this
project go from broad-strokes and attempt to contribute to a more robust characterization
of Marx's philosophy and its relation to the ethical. We must be brave enough to fail as
we navigate between revisionism, dogmatism, and eclecticism. If we do fail, and we
must in some sense, we can always, in the words of Beckett, “fail better” in the future.

One or Several Marxes?
All of this is made more complex by the reality that Marx's relationship to
philosophy itself is both profoundly deep and violently strained. Further, no single
'Marxism' is to be found in the the jumble of Marx's writings. He was neither a
systematic philosopher nor is there a single work that one can point to as a specifically
philosophical magnum opus. The dissertation of the young Marx, a discussion of ancient
Greek atomism, is perhaps the most sustained 'philosophical' text but it predates his
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becoming a Marxist, so to speak. Even Capital, his definitive analysis of politicaleconomy, is both incomplete and does not explore in depth either the philosophical
origins or implications of his findings. Indeed, he likely felt that theory (i.e., philosophy)
had gone as far as it could without radical social transformation. That is, the task of
philosophy was now to be realized in revolutionary action. Despite this, Marx relies at
every turn on Kantian notions of freedom, Hegelian criticisms of civil society,
Aristotelian conceptions of essence as end, and so on. It seems that is precisely because
Marx is so steeped in the world of philosophy that he can at once deploy and disavow its
importance. Lacking such a properly philosophical text, what we have are thousands of
pages including his dissertation, newspaper articles, notes, pamphlets, monographs, coauthored texts and, like any 19th century intellectual, a wealth of correspondence.
Nowhere is there a systematic explication of any singular “Marxism,” nor especially a
“Marxist ethics.” What remains is a dialectic on the part of the reader of Marx between
interpretation and constructive philosophy.
The publication history of his writing only further complicates this problem. No
complete and standard edition of the works of Marx and Engels exists. Texts now taken
as key were unpublished until the 1930's. Indeed, many undergraduates will have only
read the selection on 'estranged labor' from the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, a text unknown
to the revolutionaries of the early 20th century and not well known until the 1960's. A text
now considered canon was, at perhaps the key moment in the history of Marxism, neither
published nor known. The reasons for non-publication themselves seem numerous. The
German Ideology, the text in which Marx and Engels discover (or invent, depending on
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one's evaluation) historical materialism, seems to have been their own private internal
processing of ideas with the second part, a criticism of Max Stirner, being more or less
irrelevant by the time it was completed. The Grundrisse, which has recently come into
philosophical vogue for dubious reasons, is in key areas contradicted by Capital, the
work which Marx took as definitive. Non-publication is certainly not synonymous with
apocrypha nor vice-versa. With all this in mind, I have opted to rely on the Marxist
Internet Archive (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/) for all my references of Marx
and Engels. This provides readers without access to the various and incomplete collected
works of Marx and Engels with immediate access to the material.
Further, these works span several decades and and represent a wide spectrum of
thought. Marx was foremost a revolutionist and his ideas can swing violently in a range
of directions. He is prone to speaking in hyperbole and to making extreme
pronouncements only then to moderate them pages later. Themes which seem central to
one text effectively disappear or are utterly transformed later, e.g., the concept of
alienation. There are as many schemes to parse Marx's thought as there are scholars of
Marx. It is my sense that attempts to make Marx systematic inevitably say more about
the systematizer than about Marx's own thought. Some see four distinct periods, others
three, some see a concrete break in his thought, others focus on underlying themes which
unify his thinking. What strikes me as a key for negotiating all this is Marx's
commitment, from start to finish, to the dialectical method. He will come upon the
incompleteness or one-sidedness of a concept, engage it with radical criticism and
produce a new concept in stark contrast to the one under criticism, only to swing the
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pendulum of analysis back the other way later. Marx's thought zigs and zags as the
dialectic swings back and forth, stops, starts again elsewhere and in another direction.
Concepts are marked by a critical, dialectical mobility in the thinking of Marx. Thus, to
take a concept in the isolation of one text or one sentence and declare it the final
articulation of Marx's thought on the matter is a dangerously linear hermeneutic for a
thinker committed to a dialectical process. Interpretation of Marx's thinking is always, in
some sense, a constructive exercise. We must follow his thought in its totality if we are
to grasp his mature position. Even then, Marx can himself prove to be a poor Marxist.

The Dialectic of Interpretation and Construction
The task of deriving a Marxist position or analysis of philosophical concepts is
not merely a forensic task. Simply quoting Marx is often in the service of vulgar
dogmatism. This is especially true of what role ethical considerations (or the travails of
any philosophical concept for that matter) operate in Marx's thinking. Any “Marxism” or
relation with it of philosophical concepts like the ethical will be a gestalt produced
somewhere between an interpretive analysis of Marx's writings and a constructive task
which applies his method where he left off or went astray. This project does not envision
“Marxism” as a body of work but as a commitment to a certain process of criticism. I am
very sympathetic to Lukács when he writes in his 1922 essay “What is Orthodox
Marxism?”:
Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once
and for all every one of Marx’s individual theses. Even if this were to be proved,
every serious ‘orthodox’ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern
findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto –
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without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox
Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of
Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of
a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method.55
Much has been written on just what the “dialectical method” is. What I take to be key for
this project is: (1) Marx's development of philosophical concepts, such as “the ethical,”
vacillate because he detects, in a typically Hegelian fashion, that their articulation is
never perfectly adequate. Rather, any analysis of the concept must constantly be subject
to how it is mediated by contradictory social forces, the material conditions of
production, and the class struggle, etc. The articulation of a philosophical concept in
Marx's thought represents that concept at a moment in a process rather than as thesis with
a truth value. The violent swings in Marx's thinking are, this project holds, more
symptomatic of this process at work than as the flowering of so many contradictions and
overall befuddlement in his thinking. Rather than attempting to answer the question
“What is Marx's position on ethics?” this project will seek to track the dialectic of Marx's
thought as it concerns the concept of 'the ethical' along with its accompanying concepts
like “alienation,” “exploitation,” “reification,” etc. Further, (2) in so far as this project
sees itself within a Marxist scope, it will endeavor to continue, given what can be
understood from Marx's own thinking, his critical project as regards the concept of “the
ethical.” That is, this project will seek to continue the dialectical movement of ethical
conceptions found in the writing of Marx, a project dangerously abandoned by both Marx
himself and subsequent revolutionaries. With this in mind, I do not think that one can

55. Lukács: 1977, 2
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both accept historical materialism and declare to have found “the Marxist Ethic” once
and for all. While we may not land on any ethical grounding for the Marxism I do not
think it wise to abandon all ethical thinking for some vulgar instrumental reasoning.
Why this is will be clearer as the project goes forward, but my hope is that this project is
clear enough that its own one-sidedness will be easy to correct through further analysis
via struggle. I intend to restart a dialectical process not provide an end to one.
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Chapter 2 – Marx the Non-Moral Moralist
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there is a profound, perhaps fundamental
tension in the thinking of Marx between what Lukács termed the “fact of class struggle”
and the “ethical objective of socialism.” To put the same tension in another light, one is
struck by Marx's attempt to speak simultaneously in the “is” language of scientific
discourse per historical materialism (in which values are the relative product of historical
processes) and the seemingly trans-historical “ought” language of traditional ethical
discourse. This chapter will argue that Marx seems to have inherited and extended the
critiques of Utilitarianism and Kantian deontology made by Hegel and explore how Marx
inverts and extends Hegel's criticisms of Utilitarianism and deontology. I will then turn
to Marx's use of historical materialism as a mode of criticism for human consciousness
and its expressions to show that, despite his rejection of morality, Marx is never far from
a moralizing criticism of capitalism. This will all setup the central paradox of the project
such that I can both review the current literature and begin to offer my own analysis by
exploring Marx's notions of alienation and exploitation.

Hegel on the “One-Sideness (Einseitigkeit)” of Utilitarianism and Deontology
Kamenka has rightly noted that if one were to cull together a compilation text of
Marx's comments on ethics or morality it would not contain any sustained discussion in
excess of a few sentences.1 Given that Marx is one of the most titanic social critics of
this epoch, we rightly find this shocking. Though it seems generally overlooked, I

1. Kamenka: 1969, 6
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suspect that what explains Marx's generalized silence on the question of ethics overall is,
in large part, the direct result of his inheritance of Hegel's position on two contenders for
ethical analysis: Utilitarianism and Kant's deontology.
In order to grasp Marx's inheritance of Hegel's criticism of utilitarian and
deontological ethics it is necessary to summarize the latter's thinking on the development
of human freedom as Right (Recht) which is the subject of the 1821 Elements of the
Philosophy of Right. In this work Hegel argues that the human will is the rationality of
pure practical reason, with “right” being its first realm of actualized freedom. At first, the
will, while infinite in itself, is empty of content. In order for the will to concretize its
freedom it must give itself content. It must start the process of being for itself (für-sich)
rather than simply in itself (an-sich) The will, to be be properly free, must be actualized
through the determinacy of the sphere of right, in the lived, inter-subjective sociopolitical sphere. Authentic freedom cannot merely be the infinite ability to choose but
consists in the specific making of choices, to have this rather than that in actuality rather
than in the mere infinity of the formal will. Right is the utterly “sacred sphere” where the
existence of the free will is identical with freedom as idea.
In order to realize its freedom, spirit must externalize itself through a process of
alienation (Entäußerung) into the sphere of the material world. A person, then, is an
embodied individual, particular, self-conscious will whose freedom is realized in the
externalizing expression of their will upon material things. The drive to choose must be
rationalized between the infinite dictates of the drives and the exterior pressures which
seek to impinge upon the freedom of the will. It is at this moment of the dialectical
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march through which human freedom is concretized that Hegel seems to take up the
limitations of utilitarian forms of ethical reasoning. Hegel is, however, as dense as he is
laconic. In §20 of The Philosophy of Right he takes up a discussion of how the infinite
drives of particular, abstract individuals must be tamed and rationalized by being
submitted to a universalizing idea or force. That universalizing idea is, for Hegel, the
maximization of happiness. Hegel writes:
When reflection applies itself to the drives, representing them, estimating them,
and comparing them to one another and then with the means they employ, their
consequences, etc., and with a sum total of satisfaction – i.e., with happiness – it
confers formal universality upon this material and purifies it, in this external
manner, of it crudity and barbarity.2
Hegel is a bit clearer in a lecture of 1822-23:
We start with the question: What should a human being do? To this the answer is
that we have to get to know human nature. A human being has such and such
drives. When they are summarize as a single end, then this gives rise to the theory
of happiness. In what should a human being seek satisfaction? In drives, but not
in individual ones; instead we should calculate to what extent the one must take
precedence over the other.3
At this relatively primitive period of the dialectic of freedom, Hegel contends that the
idea of happiness and its maximization within the will is the first moment by which both
the multitude of unruly drives within the particular will can be corralled and mediated
through one universal idea. As always for Hegel, the movement away from the
immediate to the mediate and from the particular to the universal is a positive, sublative
movement of the dialectical process. However, being so early on in The Philosophy of
Right we well know that such a moment in the dialectic of human freedom will prove
2. Hegel: 1991, §20
3. Quoted in Op. Cit., 401.
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one-sided, immediate, and incomplete. In other words, utilitarian reasoning as regards
happiness cannot be a final mode by which human freedom, and for Hegel human beings
are just freedom, is actually realized. Hegel's criticism of this utilitarian thinking seems
two fold:
In happiness, thought already has some power over the natural forces of the
drives, for it is not content with the instantaneous, but requires the whole of
happiness....But two moments are present in the ideal of happiness: the first is the
universal which is superior to all particularities; but secondly, since the content of
this universal is merely universal pleasure, the individual and particular, i.e., a
finite quality, reappears at this point, and we are compelled to return to the drive.
Since the content of happiness lies in the subjectivity and feeling of everyone, this
universal end is itself particular, so that no true unity of content and form is yet
present within it.4
At first, Hegel acknowledges the universality of the idea of maximization of happiness as
a force by which the drives of an individual can be sublated. Despite this progressive
moment in the dialectic, Hegel understands such a standard for human behavior as
ultimately one-sided and limited. “Merely universal happiness” is said to be “merely” in
so far as it is indexed, or has its standard, in the individual “subjectivity and feeling of
everyone.” Individuals, while having the universal “maximization of happiness” as an
idea to control their drives, remain merely individuals in that happiness can only be said
of particulars in their “subjectivity and feeling.” The universal relies upon the particular
in a way that forecloses upon it being further concretized as true human freedom. Again,
freedom, for Hegel, is external, inter-subjective, and of a socio-political character.
Further, the universal of happiness, the form, relies on the particularity of the individual
to give it content. The individual, so far unmediated by moral (inter-subjective relations
4. Op. Cit., §20, Addition.

52

of ownership) and ethical life (inter-subjective relations mediated by institutions),
remains within the sphere of arbitrariness (Willkür) such that the universality of happiness
would, in fact, produce a contradictory social totality5 in which actual human freedom
would be foreclosed upon. In other words, it would produce a contradiction in the sphere
of Right itself. Utilitarianism as a means of social organization, it seems, is formally
overcome in Hegel's thinking before he even begins a discussion of concrete societal
institutions. It is to these institutions that Hegel turns next. Specifically he moves from
the abstract right of the will in itself to ground of inter-subjective relations, possession,
and private property.
To be free, the person must “give himself an exterior sphere of freedom.”6 To
create this exterior sphere of freedom, the person appropriates objects external to the will
(firstly, the body itself), physically possesses them, and transforms them eventually in
property. Insofar as I may express my will upon an object I may also alienate my will
from that object – I may give it up as property (excepting my body, religion, etc...).
The person is immediate, that is, situated within a realm of other persons. If I am
to have property at all it must be on the ground that, at least via ownership at this level of
the dialectical progression, I cannot have all property. The unit of property I own exists
within a sphere of others such that in order to have any property I must have it through

5. Note that Hegel will not accept a negative principle by which to ground freedom
such as “pursue your private, subjective sense of happiness insofar as it does not impinge on
others.” In general, individual happiness is not the goal of Hegel's political thinking. Rather,
individuality generally must be set into a dialectic with all of social life to form a harmonious
concrete totality. In other words, for Hegel neither the hegemony of the state nor the
autonomy of the individual form the basis for understanding an instituting right.
6. Op. cit., §41.
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the will of others.7 That is to say, we must all agree to respect each other's property in
order for any of us to have property at all. This mediated ownership of property, through
the wills of others, is contract. For Hegel, and this is key, the will ultimately only realizes
its freedom in others. The right of property, through contract, recognizes that others too
are embodied individual, particular, self-conscious wills whose freedom is realized in the
externalizing expression of their will upon material things. The right of property is the
recognition of others as persons. The freedom of the will is increased through the
actualization of its objective character (in property) through mediation (the will of
others).
Property is brought about through coercion and has thus not eliminated the
infinity of the individual will who, despite their realization of freedom in contracted
property, may still engage to supervene upon the common will through coercion. When
the individual will acts through coercion upon another's concrete freedom, here their
body but, by extension, their property, it is crime. This is a result of the abstract character
of right at this stage: freedom stems from purely external constraints (contract and its
accompanied force) and, while property is determinate, its assurance is predicated on a
generic, universal conception of the will – something property was supposed to
dialectically mediate and supersede. Because this right is abstract, and achieved by
mutual coercion, it is inevitable that particular wills will attempt to impose themselves
upon the common will.

7. E.g., I can claim possession to anything whatever but, at this stage of the dialectic,
my positive claim relies upon other's negative claim (they disavow possession) as regards the
same object.
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This negation of the common will, in the form of crime (here primarily thought of
as murder and theft), must itself be negated through punishment. The determination of
the specific character of the punishment, given the abstract nature of right, will have an
arbitrary character and take the form of revenge which, given the individual character of
crime in this moment, may be properly handed back in kind – infinite vendetta may result
because of the abstract character of right. The negation (punishment) of the negation
(crime) upon the freedom of the will must itself be rationalized (mediated), not through
the arbitrary character of the common will, but in universal principles which respect both
the offended will, but also the personhood of the offender. Specifically, this principle of
shared justice, in so far as it contributes to the greater freedom of spirit, must be
autonomous, the universal principle must be given by each will to themselves.
The will, having expanded its freedom by extending itself upon the sphere of
objects, now turns back into itself to recognize that it alone must be the ground for proper
actions if it is to be more truly free. It is here, especially in §§133-141 that Hegel will
detail the one-sidedness of Kant's deontological ethics as it connects up to the sphere of
right. For Hegel, morality will be the condition in which the will is not only infinitely in
itself, but also, for itself. Though “because particularity is distinct from the good and
falls within the subjective will, the good is initially determined only as universal abstract
essentiality – i.e., duty. In view of this determination, duty should be done for the sake of
duty.”8 It is personified subjectivity, whose interiority provides them universal principles
upon which their actions are mediated, by which freedom is expanded. Such principles
are however, purely formal at this moment toward actual, absolute freedom. Actions are
8. Op. Cit., §133
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moral, Hegel contends, in that they flow from my specific intentions (they are mine and
given to me by me), follow from principle of obligation (any 'one' ought to do them as
they contribute to welfare, the universal end of will itself), and they are in relation to
others (the action may be universalized as the end of will of others in general).
When the will interfaces with the mutual recognition of others as subjects
(recognizing their welfare or them as 'ends in themselves') and of others as persons with
rights (recognizing their property, at least at this point) such a condition is properly called
“the good.” Though, morality, in its inward, subjective character has for its only
determination the conscience9. The character of the conscience, however, remains formal
and empty of specific content. It is here, in the addition to §135 that Hegel clarifies what
he takes to be the one-sided nature of Kantian ethics:
Whereas we earlier emphasized that the point of view of Kant's philosophy is
sublime inasmuch as it asserts the conformity of duty and reason, it must be
pointed out here that this point of view is defective in that it lacks all articulation.
For the proposition 'Consider whether your maxim can be asserted as a universal
principle' would be all very well if we already had determinate principles
concerning how to act. In other words, if we demand of a principle that it should
also be able to serve as the determinant of a universal legislation, this presupposes
that it already has a content; and if this content were present, it would be easy to
apply the principle. But in this case, the principle itself is not yet available, and
the criterion that there should be no contradiction is non-productive – for where
there is nothing, there can be no contradiction either.
Hegel's criticism of Kant relies on what he takes to be the moment in the dialectical
unfolding of right at which moral thinking appears. The sphere of morality is that in
which property and welfare are delimited by contracts bound by individual conscience
9. Conscience, far from being a vague feeling for Hegel, is very powerful. For him it
is the expression of “absolute entitlement of subjective self consciousness to in itself and for
itself what right and duty are, and to recognize only what it thus knows as the good; it also
consists in the assertion that what it thus knows and wills is truly right and duty.”
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alone. Moral life, as a system in itself, contains only the formal structure (duty informed
by conscience to will the good universally for the sake of the good) but is totally devoid
of the ability to generate the maxims by which the system can be instantiated. That is, the
maxims can only be generated from within a concrete socio-political setting which is
always particular thus contradicting the formal purity of the system. For instance, Kant
condemns adultery in that it cannot be universally willed without undermining the very
structure of marriage upon which it is logically dependent. Hegel would pounce here and
say that the formal system of moral life relies on the particularities of ethical life, that is
of a concretely particular society (in this case, one in which marriage exists) to actually
function.10 Its one-sidedness is that its universalizing power is radically reliant on
concrete particulars for content. Kantian deontology is either empty formalizing or lacks
precisely the purity it touts as its strength11
Hegel goes on to argue that subjectivity, in its immediate, formal-universal
character, cannot be raised to the form of totality without melting away back into the pure
in-itself which it must overcome to actualize its freedom. Otherwise Hegel suspects that
either individuals will defeat conscience and recess into pure subjective desire for power,
what he calls “evil,” or develop a “passion for the universal” to do pure “good” without
10. Hegel employs a distinction that is absent from Anglo-American political thought.
For Hegel, moral life (Moralität) is the sphere of life that is immediate, autonomous individual
where the will is conditioned by external constraints. Political it is associated with private
property and liberal formalisms. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) however, is associated with the will
as inter-subjective and conditioned by internalization of socio-political institutions. The
immediacy of Moralität is overcome by the mediation of concrete reality of the family and the
state and becomes ethical life (Sittlichkeit).
11. This criticism, while reshaped by historical materialism, is directly inherited by
many Marxists. Lukács greatly develops this criticism as providing the “contemplative
attitude” of the bourgeoisie as a whole.
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reference to actuality (here he has Robespierre and the reign of terror in mind). While the
maximization of happiness was subjective content without objective form, the categorical
imperative is objective form lacking subjective content. Only by a further dialectical
mediation can the two be reconciled and realized. Abstract right (subjective welfare in
the form of universal, maximal happiness) and morality (rational, objective legislation via
subjective duty) must be dialectically reconciled through mediation by actual institutions,
into what Hegel will called ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It is only through this further, and
seemingly final, mediation that happiness and duty can both have concrete, universal, and
non-contradictory content. What is key here is that Hegel does not reject utilitarian or
deontological systems as somehow somehow utterly incorrect or mistaken. Rather, they
are moments in the dialectical development of freedom which are both necessary and
incomplete. Further, it is precisely by unveiling their place in this phenomenology of
freedom through Right that Hegel thinks he can logically deduce their necessity and
simultaneously criticize their one-sidedness. The ideal deduction proves to be criticism.
The mediating institutions will expand like concentric rings from one's selfrelation, family relation, relation to civil society, the state, international relations, and
finally world history itself as freedom is concretely realized. While While Hegel is often
painted as an arch-conservative and even proto-totalitarian, he concludes that only sociopolitical systems which concretely realize the dialectical unity of individual freedom as
mediated by robust institutions will survive the long march of history. On this note,
Hegel's own inability to see past his own historical circumstances, or his bowing to
Prussian censorship – we will never know, cannot be said to negate the power of his
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phenomenology for the sphere of the political. It is no wonder that the young Marx,
himself obsessed with freedom, would fall into a prolonged and tumultuous affair with
Hegelianism.

From Hegel to Marx
The question of just how Marx is downstream of Hegel has filled volumes. I do
not seek to add much to that pile. I want to take two extended passages that bookend
Marx's overall project to suggest the aim (concrete human freedom) and methodology
(the historical dialectic) of Hegel's project survive into Marx's thought, inverted but
intact. From beginning to end Marx is interested in the concrete emancipation of human
power, specifically labor power and, by extension, human society built by that power. As
early as Marx's Introduction to the Criticism of The Philosophy of Right (1843) we find
his entire project outlined as such:
The task of history, therefore, once the world beyond the truth has disappeared, is
to establish the truth of this world. The immediate task of philosophy, which is at
the service of history, once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been
unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms. Thus the criticism
of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the
criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.....
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material
force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material
force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the
masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem
as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But
for man the root is man himself. The evident proof of the radicalism of German
theory, and hence of its practical energy, is that it proceeds from a resolute
positive abolition (aufhebung) of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the
teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical
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imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved,
forsaken, despicable being....12
The Marx of 1843 is solidly in the orbit of the Hegelian philosophy via Feuerbach. There
is even a plainly Kantian admonition at the end of the passage above. For the early Marx,
the task of history is straightforwardly that of realizing the concrete freedom of man,
especially from what Marx takes to be his chief scourge: religion. Though, and I think
this is important, Marx certainly has the religious beliefs of the masses in mind here, I
suspect that he also has Hegel's absolute idealism, the coming to be of God's selfconsciousness through the free consciousness of man, in his sights. In fact, in the
surviving sections (§§ 261-313) of Marx's critical notes on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, it
is the “superstitious” and “mystical” nature of Hegel's idealism at which Marx
relentlessly hammers. Marx's criticism of religion is not merely its effect as the “opium
of the masses” but also its continued effect to mystify the dialectic of history. In general,
and this seems missed by many Marxists, Marx seems to accept the overall parameters,
methodology and conclusions of Hegel's project, though he inverts and extends it.
Further, I remain skeptical of delimiting a “Hegelian” period from some later, more
mature “scientific” period in Marx's thinking.13

12. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/law-abs.htm
13. For whatever reason possibility of the continued influence of Hegelianism on
Marx has troubled generations of academics of all stripes, both “continental” and “analytic”
Marxists intellectuals (not that this division makes much sense in the history of Marxist
philosophy). Conspicuously, Marxist revolutionaries, especially Lenin, have turned to Hegel
in times of revolutionary ebb to better ground themselves in both understanding Marx and
renovating Marxism.
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I take Marx's statement in his 1873 German Afterward to Capital vol. 1, and
Capital is supposed to be his most “mature” and “scientific” work, allegedly devoid of all
mystical Hegelianism according to Althusser,14 to be more or less definitive of this
continued influence:
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents
him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive
and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right
side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed
to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a
scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because
it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of
things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its
inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form
as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less
than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its
essence critical and revolutionary.15
Several things about this passage strike me as key. First, Marx allows that Hegel's
dialectical understanding of the development of the sphere of right is generally correct
and comprehensive. However, and Marx may be simplifying his actual thinking, it is
upside-down or backwards. It strikes me that Marxists would find little problem in The
Philosophy of Right if they just read it backwards: Rather than the deduction following
the path from the idealist freedom in the subjective will to concrete freedom through
social institutions, the Marxist could, given the allegedly deductive character of the text,

14. There is a persistent 'no Hegel of bust' mentality that pervades much of post-1968
French philosophy. For reasons that appear little more than intellectual fashion, this mentality
has been taken up in to Anglo-phone continental philosophy as well. Needless to say, I do not
find in Hegel a boogieman.
15. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm
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just as well track the production of subjectivity from the concrete, material conditions of
society.16
Secondly, Marx does not seem to be criticizing “bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire
professors” for being Hegelians ipso facto but for not driving the dialectic of freedom to
its final conclusion. Alluding to the infamous passage that “What is rational is actual and
what is actual is rational,” Marx is insisting that even given the rationality of the actual,
the process of the dialectic of history, idealist or materialist, has not and will not end.
While every moment in the dialectic of history is rational (i.e., it is deduced from the
previous resolution of contradiction) there is nothing about that which means new
contradictions and tensions will not arise. Neither the Prussian state nor the communist
mode of production mean the end of history, though Marx's comments on the so-called
“permanent revolution” are admittedly scarce. Far from rejecting Hegel here, it seems
that Marx is pointing out that he takes his project to have out-Hegeled both Hegel and his
inheritors.
I see Marx as very much within the shadow of a Hegel whose sense of freedom
has been concretized as the liberation of labor power and whose dialectic has been
16. I am struck by just how close Hegel often comes to the Marx of 1844. In §§243-4
Hegel describes how division and specialization of labor both spiritually demoralizes workers
and creates a ever-widening wealth gap. Hegel warns that this spiritual malnourishment, in
the form of the “feeling of right, integrity and honor” which are supposed to flow from work,
and not merely the accompanied poverty, will produce a “rabble” (Pöbel) which threatens the
stability of society through “inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the
government, etc.” Despite the fact that Hegel insists that mere poverty itself does not create
nor inflame this rabble, he does not turn to his analysis to any contradiction internal to the
process of labor in society itself. Given his method, this is conspicuous. His answer? Expand
markets through colonialism. One might argue that the entire drama of Marxism, the struggle
over the emancipation of labor, would actually occur between these two sections of The
Philosophy of Right with Hegel's spiritually malnourished “rabble” only a stone throw from
Marx's alienated proletariat.
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snatched from the heavens and and mixed with the actual stuff of material history. Just
the same, I hope to show that Hegel's criticisms of morality, of Utilitarianism and
deontology, though radically extended by Marx, remain structurally intact. Rather than
arising from the inner workings of the subjective will towards freedom, these ethical
systems (along with all value systems) will ultimately prove be the result of historically
specific societies which produce subjects amenable to the continuance of its polity. By
showing this deduction, Marx too will use the dialectic of history to criticize what he
takes to be bourgeois ethical systems.

Marx on Deontology and Utilitarianism
I think it is in this post-Hegelian context that we can make sense of the few
references Marx actually makes about Kantian and Utilitarian ethics. As we have noted
above, Marx has very little to say about ethics generally and even less of specific schools
of ethical philosophy. I want to briefly survey these few references before moving on
exploring the tensions in Marx's thought on the possibility of ethical thinking.
Marx, no doubt, knew of Kant's philosophy. He references, especially in his
correspondence, aspects of Kant's metaphysical and anthropological work. His interest
does not seem to extend to Kant's ethical writings. Overall, there is virtually no
discussion on Marx's part of Kant's ethical system as such and even the language of 'duty'
is more or less absent from his writings. One important exception to this tendency is
found in The German Ideology. In the section in which Marx describes the vicissitudes
of liberalism in the German context since the French Revolution, he describes how
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Kantian ethical thinking is an expression of the socio-political inability of the Germans to
actualize liberal values. Marx writes:
The state of affairs in Germany at the end of the last century is fully reflected in
Kant’s Critik der Practischen Vernunft. While the French bourgeoisie, by means
of the most colossal revolution that history has ever known, was achieving
domination and conquering the Continent of Europe, while the already politically
emancipated English bourgeoisie was revolutionising industry and subjugating
India politically, and all the rest of the world commercially, the impotent German
burghers did not get any further than “good will”. Kant was satisfied with “good
will” alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the
realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses
of individuals, to the world beyond. Kant’s good will fully corresponds to the
impotence, depression and wretchedness of the German burghers, whose petty
interests were never capable of developing into the common, national interests of
a class and who were, therefore, constantly exploited by the bourgeois of all other
nations.17
The German bourgeoisie, themselves fractured into so many fiefdoms (which they
inherited from an equally fractured aristocracy which was itself continually rocked by the
Peasant Wars), was impotent in the great race of liberal nation building, colonial
expansion, and industrializing their modes of production. While inheriting liberal
political theory but, without having the national and economic basis for this theory to
have expression at the register of class, Marx theorizes that the German bourgeoisie
sublimates and internalizes this class impotence such that it becomes the absolutely free
will of the petty-bourgeois atomic subject. He writes:
Neither he [Kant], nor the German middle class, whose whitewashing spokesman
he was, noticed that these theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie had as their basis
material interests and a will that was conditioned and determined by the material
relations of production. Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from
the interests which it expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations
of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of “free will”, of
the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely
17. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03d.htm
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ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates. Hence the German
petty bourgeois recoiled in horror from the practice of this energetic bourgeois
liberalism as soon as this practice showed itself, both in the Reign of Terror and in
shameless bourgeois profit-making.18
For Marx the unique rationalist extremism of Kant was the not result of a great discovery
in the realm of philosophy but flowed from a contradiction between the political form to
which the German bourgeoisie aspired but for which there was no sufficient economic
base. Interestingly, it is precisely the German petty bourgeoisie's steadfastness in their
Kantian ethical commitments which hamstrung their ability to become successful
capitalists on the national and international level. The social contradiction which gave
rise to Kantian ethics is, for Marx, the exact same condition which will ensure that it must
be overcome by just the class which produced it. Marx writes:
Since German economic relations had by no means reached the stage of
development to which these political forms corresponded, the middle class
accepted them merely as abstract ideas, principles valid in and for themselves,
pious wishes and phrases, Kantian self-determinations of the will and of human
beings as they ought to be. Consequently their attitude to these forms was far
more moral and disinterested than that of other nations, i.e., they exhibited a
highly peculiar narrow-mindedness and remained unsuccessful in all their
endeavours.19
This is typically Hegelian in its thinking. The more successful the German bourgeoisie
became, i.e., the more they resolved the contradiction between economic base and
political form, the more their subjective interests must be invested with profit
accumulation rather than the internal goodness of their wills. By the 1840's, Marx
argues, this process had reached a critical threshold and, through shifts in the sphere of
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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the international economic base, Kantian ethics was overcome by the very class which
produced it.
Finally the ever more powerful foreign competition and world intercourse — from
which it became less and less possible for Germany to stand aside — compelled
the diverse local interests in Germany to adopt some sort of common attitude.
Particularly since 1840, the German middle class began to think about
safeguarding these common interests; its attitude became national and liberal and
it demanded protective tariffs and constitutions. Thus it has now got almost as far
as the French bourgeoisie in 1789.20
For Marx, once the German bourgeoisie had the economic base upon which liberal
capitalism could successfully function, Kantian ethics withers away as an ethical system
to which any class subscribes. It does not in the least matter for Marx if a few 'Berlin
ideologists' continue to argue about the validity of the system if the system itself has no
grip on an actually existing unit of social selection, i.e., a class of people. In the
movement of the material dialect, it is true for Marx, just as it was true for Hegel (though
for inverse reasons), “The rational is real and the real is rational.” For both, the truth of a
system is its survival in history and not in the 'beautiful souls' of its adherents.21 After
this discussion of the material conditions for the rise and fall of Kantian ethics there is no,
as far I know, further analysis of the merits or problems with Kant's ethical system. The
rational, good will simply cannot survive long in a world of irrational market forces and
the hegemony of the profit motive.22

20. Ibid.
21. This section also highlights just how Marx inherits the method of Hegel and
logically inverts the procession of historical change at the register of ideas. For Marx,
concrete social forces both produce and overcome the contradictions at the register of
consciousness.
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Marx has significantly more to say within the sphere of what one would recognize
as utilitarian ethics though it is rarely direct and almost always wrapped in his typical
exaggeration and vitriol. While Marx's thinking is often framed in utilitarian language
(and some have argued he is, in fact, a kind of utilitarian23) he vociferously rejects
Utilitarianism at all points of his career. Marx saves the greater portion of his invective
for the “arch-Philistine, Jeremy Bentham, that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of
the ordinary bourgeois intelligence.”24 While Marx actually mentions Bentham in this
section to criticize his, and by extension all of English political-economy, notion of the
self-correcting market system and the notion of a static 'labor fund,' it is only in a
footnote that Marx contends with Bentham as moral philosopher:
Bentham is a purely English phenomenon. Not even excepting our philosopher,
Christian Wolff, in no time and in no country has the most homespun
commonplace ever strutted about in so self-satisfied a way. The principle of utility
was no discovery of Bentham. He simply reproduced in his dull way what
Helvétius and other Frenchmen had said with esprit in the 18th century. To know
what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be
deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticise
all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first
deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in
each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naiveté he
takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal
man. Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely
useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present, and future. The
Christian religion, e.g., is “useful,” “because it forbids in the name of religion the
same faults that the penal code condemns in the name of the law.” Artistic
criticism is “harmful,” because it disturbs worthy people in their enjoyment of
22. Interestingly, some Marxist in the early 20th century will take the position that
while Kant's ethics are impossible now (under capitalism) that when relations of production
are rationalized so too will morality. Communism becomes the goal, in part, because it will
allow human beings to be ethical, in Kant's sense, for the first time in history.
23. Schaff: 1963 and Derek P. H. Allen: 1973 take this position.
24. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch24.htm#S5
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Martin Tupper, etc. With such rubbish has the brave fellow, with his motto, “nulla
dies sine line!,” piled up mountains of books. Had I the courage of my friend,
Heinrich Heine, I should call Mr. Jeremy a genius in the way of bourgeois
stupidity.25
Beneath Marx's vitriol is hardly even a caricature of an actual utilitarian position. Indeed,
it is clear from the few places where Marx tracks the history of Utilitarianism and
expresses his exasperation with it that he does not understand the claims of the ethical
system. For less than clear reasons, Marx takes Utilitarianism to hold that there is a moral
obligation for individuals to maximize their own utility over and against one's relations
with others. This is clearly not the utilitarian position, not even that of the more egoistic
variety forwarded by Stirner. We can see this clearly when Marx, in his typical sardonic
tone, seeks to take liberal values to task as they are deformed under the capitalism:
This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase
of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There
alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both
buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by
their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to,
is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality,
because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of
commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each
disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to
himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with
each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks
to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they
do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or
under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their mutual
advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all.26
While Marx clearly (perhaps willingly) misunderstands Bentham and Utilitarianism
generally, we can reconstruct what his more principled rejection of the system entail by
25. Ibid.
26. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch06.htm
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turning to his more extensive comments in the 1845 The German Ideology. There Marx
seems to launch three criticisms of Utilitarianism.
The first is by agreeing with and inverting Hegel much in the same way as he did
in the criticism of Kant we saw above. Hegel understands utilitarian thinking as an
incomplete mode by which human freedom can be actualized. In the Phenomenology of
Spirit Hegel, Marx notes, puts such thinking as the flowering and final result of the
Enlightenment struggle against superstition and the basis for the foundation of rational,
secular states. Instrumental, calculating reason triumphs over mysterian religious
sentimentality. Marx appreciates this historicizing gestures but pushes it forward and
attempts to ground the march of history in material conditions. For Marx, utilitarian
thinking, with its atomic individual and hedonic calculus, is the result of the rise of the
primitive mercantile bourgeoisie, especially in England. Marx even traces the difference
between continental and insular Utilitarianisms to their relative differences in economic
development. While the continental variety (Helveltius and Holbach) remains more
abstract and 'sentimental' due to the relatively weak position of the emergent bourgeoisie,
the insular utilitarian expression is more firmly the expression of an established and
stable bourgeoisie. For Marx, the flowering of Utilitarianism is anchored in “the rise of
joint-stock companies, the Bank of England and the time of England’s mastery of the
seas.”27 From this mercantile relation emerges a normative social relation which, as
capitalism takes hold socially, is naturalized. Feudal, monkish asceticism, and Weber's
Ben Franklin (the classic, image of American pragmatist Utilitarianism) couldn't be

27. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03m.htm
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further apart and both take their moral laws as written into the fabric of nature. For Marx
this is only further proof of the patently non-naturalness of both, if not all, moral systems.
Mercantile calculation is naturalized and given normative force in the form of utilitarian
thinking. Social history, in the concrete reality of class division and struggle, produces
moral systems and not nature, much less God. This naturalization of the unnatural,
specifically the way in which subjective human relations take the form of objective
commodity relations is at the heart of his invective directed at Bentham above. To Marx's
mind, this is why Bentham takes as his standard human being the British shopkeeper and
why such a move seems so egregious.
Further, Marx rejects that any singular social relation, or “mode of social
intercourse” to use his language, can form the basis for determining what people ought to
do in a given society. He puts it, “The apparent absurdity of merging all the manifold
relationships of people in the one relation of usefulness, this apparently metaphysical
abstraction arises from the fact that in modern bourgeois society all relations are
subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial relation.”28 Again,
Marx seems to generally misunderstand Utilitarianism, but the criticism here may have
some teeth. Marx thinks that of the manifold social relations it is the underlying
economic system which will determine what particular social relation(s) will obtain as the
dominant-cum-normative one whereby the otherwise empty and formal notions of “good”
and “bad” are filled. Not only is the selector historically relative, but it just strikes Marx

28. Ibid.
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as absurd to think that the manifold of social relation, especially among contradictory
classes, is susceptible of reduction to any one relation.
For Marx, Utilitarianism is a calculating morality fit for a calculating class. It is
the unit under calculation that he will next attack. Marx takes it that that maximizing
happiness (in terms of pleasure) is the overall of utilitarian aim and he seems to accept
Utilitarianism as an accurate sociology of people's contemporaneous behavior. His next
attack is an extension of the first criticism – he seeks to historicize happiness, and by
extension, pleasure, itself. Marx takes it that various epochs produce differing and
contradictory forms of pleasure for different classes. Indeed, the management of
pleasure, from hedonistic luxury to stark asceticism, in a given society is an expression of
the social relations of production. He traces a sort of genealogy of pleasure: from the
Roman slave mode of production, through the travails of feudalism, and the rise of the
bourgeoisie, showing that the content of pleasure radically shifted, and that there persists
contradictory pleasures which correspond to the antagonistic class relations. Only with
the rise of the mercantile bourgeoisie have pleasures been reigned in (excessive luxury is
wasteful and breeds the contempt of the rabble) and brought under one index, utility. On
the other hand, it is only with the rise of the proletariat, Marx thinks, that the historicity
of pleasure is visible and therefore mutable. In a meandering sentence Marx writes:
It was only possible to discover the connection between the kinds of enjoyment
open to individuals at any particular time and the class relations in which they
live, and the conditions of production and intercourse which give rise to these
relations, the narrowness of the hitherto existing forms of enjoyment, which were
outside the actual content of the life of people and in contradiction to it, the
connection between every philosophy of enjoyment and the enjoyment actually
present and the hypocrisy of such a philosophy which treated all individuals
without distinction — it was, of course, only possible to discover all this when it
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became possible to criticise the conditions of production and intercourse in the
hitherto existing world, i.e., when the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat had given rise to communist and socialist views. That shattered the
basis of all morality, whether the morality of asceticism or of enjoyment.29
Again, in the second, infamous sentence, Marx links the ability to historicize moral
systems with the ability to deny their force and validity. Here, to his mind, insofar as
happiness-cum-pleasure is itself historically relative and contradictory it cannot be used
as a basis for the morality generally. There just isn't any universal and objective form of
pleasure to be counted.
Finally, Marx goes in for a kind of immanent criticism of the Utilitarianism of his
day. In general, the system strikes him as fundamentally hypocritical given its
contemporaneous collusion with capitalism.30 For Marx, the relation of utility, even in its
most generous reading, is actually a cover for relations of 'mutual-exploitation' given the
hegemony of capital. In Marx's thinking, capitalism is a system of commodity exchange,
the most important of which is labor power, for which long term social viability is linked
to the accumulation of profits. In order to survive one must either sell one's labor power
or buy it so as to generate a profit. Life and death, and its accompanying pleasures and
pains, are tied to either buying or selling labor power, the genetic commodity by which
all other commodities emerge. The primary manner in which one can buy labor power in
such a way as to generate a profit is to coercive workers to produce in surplus of what is,
on average, socially necessary for the reproduction of society., i.e., it is necessary to
exploit people in order to succeed under capitalism. Marx takes there is a contradiction
29. Ibid.
30. It should be kept in mind that Marx strongly associates the morality of
Utilitarianism with the political-economy of thinkers like James Mill.
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between, on the one hand, endorsing capitalism as a system of exploitation and, on the
other hand, admonishing people to act so as to maximize their overall utility in relation to
the utility of others in terms of happiness-cum-pleasure. For Marx, this is a bare
hypocrisy in which the utilitarians urge us to maximize happiness in a system that only
functions insofar as it maximizes misery (i.e., minimizes happiness) as it maximizes
profits.31
As we have seen, Marx tactic for criticizing utilitarian and deontological ethical
systems followed a similar track. He explains the systems as an expression of historically
relative class-dynamics in order to liquidate their normative force. For Marx, to
historicize is to criticize. This is just the first wing of Marx's overall attack on ethics
generally. In the next, he will more rigorously deploy his conception of “historical
materialism” to show that not only do ethical systems, and all expressions of human
consciousness, have their origins in the material conditions of history but that normative
systems actually function to legitimate and extend the hegemony of the ruling class. In
the more extreme variant of this theory Marx will seem to reject all normative claims
despite this constant litany of criticism of capitalist rule via the bourgeoisie. It is this
broader criticism that I want to take up next.

31. Marx, for whatever reason, neither urges nor expects utilitarians to actually use
utilitarian thinking to formulate a critique of capitalism itself. Likely, he thinks that the class
strata of the utilitarians of his day would simply be unable or unwilling to work against a
system for which their existence is actually predicated. Regardless, Marx's other criticism of
the system would still need answering.
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Marx's Criticism of Morality as “Ideology”
The early 20th century Neo-Kantian socialist Karl Vorländer noted that "The
moment anyone started to talk to Marx about morality, he would roar with laughter."32
Marx's derision of morality and moral thinking as illusory and reactionary are a persistent
theme throughout all periods of his thinking. As early as The German Ideology of 1845
Marx insists “communists do not teach morality at all...33” rather “communism is the real
movement which abolishes the present state of things.”34 Further, he takes it that the
discovery of class-struggle as the motor of history and the ultimate generative source of
consciousness and values has “shattered the basis of all morality.”35 On this ground he
takes aim at other humanist socialists who are:
...no longer concerned with real human beings but with “Man”, has lost all
revolutionary enthusiasm and proclaims instead the universal love of mankind. It
turns as a result not to the Proletarians but to the two most numerous classes of
men in Germany, to the petty bourgeoisie with its philanthropic illusions and to
the ideologists of this very same petty bourgeoisie: the philosophers and their
disciples; it turns, in general, to that “common”, or uncommon, consciousness
which at present rules in Germany.36
He extends this thinking in The Communist Manifesto such that, “Law, morality, religion,
are to him [the communist] so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush

32. Quoted in Lukes: 1985 27.
33. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03f.htm
34. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm
35. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03f.htm
Sometimes this is translated as “shattered the staff of all morality.” The original is “Damit war
aller Moral, sei sie Moral der Askese oder des Genusses, der Stab gebrochen.”
36. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch04a.htm
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just as many bourgeois interests.”37 Later in the same text Marx seems to relish the
objections of his imaginary bourgeois interlocutor:
“Undoubtedly,” it will be said, “religious, moral, philosophical, and juridical ideas
have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion,
morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change.”
“There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common
to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all
religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore
acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.”38
Rather than shifting to preach a new communist morality Marx simply leaves it that “The
Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no
wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas. But
let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.”39
Twenty years later it seems that in his contributions to the 1864 draft of The
General Rules of the International Working Mens' Association that Marx urges its
members to the ends of “truth, justice and morality, as the basis of their conduct towards
one another and to all men, without regard to color, creed, or nationality” with the
struggle of the working-class ultimately for “equal rights and duties...”40 He would
privately recant of this language. In a 1864 letter to Engels, Marx would explain that “I
was obliged to insert two phrases about 'duty' and 'right' into The Preamble to the Rules,
ditto 'truth, morality, and justice' but these are placed in such a way that they can do no
37. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communistmanifesto/ch01.htm
38. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communistmanifesto/ch02.htm
39. Ibid.
40. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/10/24.htm
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harm.”41 From this exchange it is not only clear that Marx was opposed to such language,
except for perhaps its propaganda value, but that it could actually prove dangerous to
building working-class political power. This is unsurprising, especially in terms of 'right,'
given that Marx as early as the 1843 On the Jewish Question frames “rights” as only
accessible (i.e., real) insofar as they do not upset the hegemony of the monied and the
powerful.
Separating his thinking from other socialisms which valorize “equal right” and
“fair distribution” he notes that such ideas while, at one time useful, are now 'dogmas'
and 'obsolete verbal rubbish” which pervert “the realistic outlook...by means of
ideological nonsense about Right and other trash so common among the democrats and
French Socialists.”42 He slams the anarchist Proudhon in an extended footnote in Capital
vol. 1:
Proudhon begins by taking his ideal of Justice, of “justice éternelle,” from the
juridical relations that correspond to the production of commodities: thereby, it
may be noted, he proves, to the consolation of all good citizens, that the
production of commodities is a form of production as everlasting as justice. Then
he turns round and seeks to reform the actual production of commodities, and the
actual legal system corresponding thereto, in accordance with this ideal. What
opinion should we have of a chemist, who, instead of studying the actual laws of
the molecular changes in the composition and decomposition of matter, and on
that foundation solving definite problems, claimed to regulate the composition
and decomposition of matter by means of the “eternal ideas,” of “naturalité” and
“affinité”? Do we really know any more about “usury,” when we say it contradicts
“justice éternelle,” équité éternelle “mutualité éternelle,” and other vérités
éternelles than the fathers of the church did when they said it was incompatible
with “grâce éternelle,” “foi éternelle,” and “la volonté éternelle de Dieu”?43
41. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/letters/64_11_04-abs.htm
42. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm
43. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch02.htm#2
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As late at 1877 he rejects socialists who would replace a properly materialist understand
of politics with a “modern mythology with its goddesses of justice, liberty, equality and
fraternity.”44 From the proceeding I think it is clear that, from the early to the later Marx,
there is a persistent sense in which morality is, in some important sense, an illusion and
an impediment to building revolutionary socialism. Further, and I think this is often
overlooked, Marx's retains the vast amount of his criticism of moral thinking for other
socialists and anarchists rather than liberals and monarchists. Perhaps the later two
groups are, to Marx's mind, simply not worth engaging. Regardless, I think we can
conclude that no matter the twists and turns of Marx's philosophy, he maintains stalwart
in his condemning moral reasoning as illusory, as a fundamentally mistaken basis for
criticizing capitalism, and as an argument for the struggle towards revolutionary
socialism.

Historical Materialism as Critique
In 1886 Engels wrote that some forty-one years previously that he and Marx had
written a text “to settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience.”45 That
text, perhaps the most sustained engagement with strictly philosophical matters aside
from Marx's dissertation, would go on the published in 1932 and became known as The
German Ideology. The text itself, mostly a sustained and vicious attack on the youngHegelians and the egoist philosophy Max Stirner, was already largely irreverent by the
44. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/letters/77_10_19.htm
45. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwigfeuerbach/foreword.htm
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time it was finished and was famously “left to the gnawing criticisms of the rats.”46
Running nearly 700 pages, it is an immense and often difficult tome. Marx and Engels
seem, at times, to be orbiting an idea which is just beyond their grasp giving the text a
repetitive, baroque character. That idea, as Engels would later clarify and upon which
Marxism would be built, was the “materialist conception of history.” Briefly put, the
theory holds that (1) history is the product of struggles around control of the material
reproduction of societies, (2) such struggles are capable of rational, scientific analysis,
and (3) there is an effectively one way causal relationship between a society's mode of
production and its accompanying antagonisms with the contents human consciousness
and, by extension, culture, religion, aesthetics, and, most importantly for this study,
morality. To put (3) in another idiom, the class struggles of a given society form the
material conditions for the possibility of human consciousness, its content, and
expressions.
To be sure, this is an extraordinary claim and Marx will vacillate on the degree to
which consciousness and its expressions are directly reducible to, determined or
conditioned by, historical conditions. The difference between history being the ultimate
conditioning factor or being the strict, immediately reducible determinator is
philosophically important and both positions can be extracted from The German Ideology
specifically and from Marx's post 1845 work generally. My sense of the matter is this: in
1845 Marx over-develops the concept of historical materialism and, with the zeal of the
proselyte, breaks in the direction of historical materalist determinism. I would call this
46. This is turned out to be literally true. Sections of the MSS had to be reconstructed
due to vermin damage.
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position immediate historical-materialism. Through the 1840's, beginning with The
Communist Manifesto and congealing in the works where he actually attempts to
concretely analyze revolutions with the historical-materialist method, he 'softens' his
determinism, such that historical-material conditions are the primary conditioner and
ultimate horizon of consciousness and its expression. This weakened position, which I
take to be the more mature, I will term “mediate historical materialism”
While Marx never explains the vacillation in his position, I think the issue may
have both an epistemic and structural47 character. To explain this I would like to draw a
parallel to evolutionary biology. While we know that the mechanism of speciation is
random mutation and natural selection. We also seem to know the unit of selection, the
gene. Yet, we lack the ability, given the enormity of data, to provide long term
47. To be more specific on the structural aspect, I tend to accept Althusser's position
in his 1969 essay, “Contradiction and Overdetermination”:
Here, then are the two ends of the chain: the economy is determinant, but in
the last instance, Engels is prepared to say, in the long run, the run of History. But History
‘asserts itself’ through the multiform world of the superstructures. from local tradition to
international circumstance. Leaving aside the theoretical solution Engels proposes for the
problem of the relation between determination in the last instance – the economic – and those
determinations imposed by the superstructures – national traditions and international events –
it is sufficient to retain from him what should be called the accumulation of effective
determinations (deriving from the superstructures and from special national and international
circumstances) on the determination in the last instance by the economic. It seems to me that
this clarifies the expression overdetermined contradiction, which I have put forward, this
specifically because the existence of overdetermination is no longer a fact pure and simple, for
in its essentials we have related it to its bases, even if our exposition has so far been merely
gestural. This overdetermination is inevitable and thinkable as soon as the real existence of the
forms of the superstructure and of the national and international conjuncture has been
recognised – an existence largely specific and autonomous, and therefore irreducible to a pure
phenomenon. We must carry this through to its conclusion and say that this overdetermination
does not just refer to apparently unique and aberrant historical situations (Germany, for
example), but is universal; the economic dialectic is never active in the pure state; in History,
these instances, the superstructures, etc. – are never seen to step respectfully aside when their
work is done or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to scatter before His Majesty
the Economy as he strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. From the first moment to the
last, the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes.
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predictions about any given future species. I think something similar is true for the
historical materialist. While they may know the mechanism (class-struggle) and the unit
of selection (the revolutionary class), the vast social field produces so much data that
strict reductions and, by extension, long term predictions are just not feasible. Historical
conditions may actually be determinative of consciousness and its expressions but the
historical materialist can only honestly appreciate it as the primary conditioner and
ultimate horizon. I think Marx captures this, and its accompanying psychological effects
on the historical-materialist, in the famous opening to the1852 Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte,“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs
like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”48
What does all this have to do with this discussion of Marx's thinking on morality?
It strikes me that three important issues arise from Marx's development of historical
materialism as regards morality. The first is that Marx seems to take it that if
consciousness has its ground in the material conditions of a society typified as a historical
epoch then the ideas that flow from consciousness, including ideas about morality, are
relative from epoch to epoch. Further, the conditions by which ideas within a specific
epoch are valued will also change from epoch to epoch. For Marx, this means there can
be no a priori standard by which to judge the values of any epoch. Rather, criticism is
made by pointing out the contradictions internal to a given society in a given historical

48. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm
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epoch. For instance, Marx cannot produce a system in which he could condemn slavery
for all times. Rather, he would look at the institution of slavery over and against the
values that a given society tells itself it has and point out contradiction as they appear.
The contradictions are not “bad” in themselves but speak to an underlying social onesidedness that will, over time, resolve itself through further class struggle. He captures
this in The Communist Manifesto, “The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in
no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that
would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations
springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our
very eyes.”49 In the later 1871 description of the Paris Commune, he extends his thinking
to the actions of revolutionary communists:
They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it
that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own
economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a
series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no
ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.50
In both passages valuations of a certain social condition are immanent to existing social
relations not trans-historical moral laws by which society and individuals must be made
to conform. Such sentiments are why I am suspicious of readers of Marx, like Brenkert
and others, for whom Marx wishes to wrest natural human freedom from the shackles of
class society. Of course, Marx certainly says things like this. But I am more prone to
49. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communistmanifesto/ch02.htm
50. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/ch05.htm

81

suspect from 1845 afterward Marx wants to resist claims about human nature generally.
Often conversations about Marx's project are derailed into conversations about human
nature being either inherently altruistic or not. Marx himself rejected just such a debate
when he wrote of Stirner:
Communism is quite incomprehensible to our saint [Stirner] because the
communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do
they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it
disappears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, as Stirner does
so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do
not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as
much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the selfassertion of individuals.51
As noted here, Marx thinks that when he can show the historical and social origins of
moral systems or conceptions of 'human nature' that it will immediately snatch away their
normative power. That they are results of historical processes which are relative to
material conditions means they cannot have any universal, objective reality, and thus no
binding power on social relations. For Marx, as we have seen in his treatment of Kantian
deontology and Utilitarianism, to historicize is to criticize. To be virtuous, to do your
duty, to die with honor, to increase overall human happiness, to be blessed by God(s), to
be at one with the universe, etc. are all, at base, expressions of social and material
conditions which change through time via class-struggle.
For Marx, no moral system, nor any other expression of human consciousness, is
independent of history produced through class-struggle. Why then do moral obligations
(along with its strong emotive and psychological impulse) arise? For Marx, while all

51. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03f.htm
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expressions of human consciousness have their origins in the material conditions of
society, not all idea have equal social force or potency. Marx seems to separate mere
ideas from “ruling ideas.” He writes:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that
thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental
production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one
class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals
composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and
therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent
and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range,
hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate
the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the
ruling ideas of the epoch.52
For Marx the ideas of the ruling class not only reflect the concrete social conditions from
which they emerge (i.e., their own social hegemony) but actually downwardly supervene
upon all of society as standard by which other ideas are judged. Thus the slave comes to
believe that it is good to obey the master, a feudal serf to be tied to the land, the woman
to be dominated by her husband, and for the worker infinitely produce. Marx, and more
so later Marxists, will term the misunderstanding that consciousness causes history rather
than history causing consciousness “false consciousness.” When this “false
consciousness” directly works against the interest of a revolutionary class, this is usually

52. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm
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termed “ideology.”53 Morality, especially couched in metaphysical systems like religion,
becomes the central tool for the ruling class. Marx writes:
the conditions of existence of the ruling class (as determined by the preceding
development of production), ideally expressed in law, morality, etc., to which
[conditions] the ideologists of that class more or less consciously give a sort of
theoretical independence; they can be conceived by separate individuals of that
class as vocation, etc., and are held up as a standard of life to the individuals of
the oppressed class, partly as an embellishment or recognition of domination,
partly as a moral means for this domination.54
The ruling class, despite their hegemony, is itself dimly if at all aware of the true origins
of these ideas in the forms of morality, philosophy, religion, etc. The “ruling ideas” may
flow through the ruling class without them knowing and with they themselves submitting
to what they take as eternal laws of duty, honor, rationality, the good, God's law, etc. In
fact, the ruling class may be even more stupefied by such notions. Holding such notions
as sacrosanct, it would easy for a lord someone to believe in the divine right of kings, a
slave-trader in racist anthropology, or a banker in trickle-down economics.

53. As often pointed out, it is Engels that first usually 'ideology' in this manner. In a
1893 letter to Franze Mehring Engels describes how the error of thinking that thought can
flow from pure thought:
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously,
indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to
him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or
apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content
from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought
material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not
investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems
obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also
appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm
54. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03n.htm
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It has long been noticed that if Marx is a strict economic determinist as regards
expressions of human consciousness, then how do ideas come to contradict ruling ideas
and revolutions happen at all? First, as I have stated above, I do not consider Marx an
strict economic determinist and it seems clear to me that ideas are, at least apparently,
modified by other forces (ruling ideas being an important such modifier). Yet, I think the
question is important. While Marx posits that the social sphere is a totality for which
there is no outside, so to speak, he is also clear that it is a totality marked by internal
contradictions. Specifically, there are social antagonisms which emerge from a
contradiction between what Marx calls “intercourse of society” and the “forces of
production such that:
The more the normal form of intercourse of society, and with it the conditions of
the ruling class, develop their contradiction to the advanced productive forces, and
the greater the consequent discord within the ruling class itself as well as between
it and the class ruled by it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the
consciousness which originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it
ceases to be the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the
more do the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in which actual
private interests, etc., etc., are expressed as universal interests, descend to the
level of mere idealizing phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy. But the
more their falsity is exposed by life, and the less meaning they have to
consciousness itself, the more resolutely are they asserted, the more hypocritical,
moral and holy becomes the language of this normal society.55
For Marx, changes in the “forces of production” (how a given society materially
reproduces itself) proceed faster than do changes in the “intercourse of society” (the
totality of social relations mediated by culture, law, mores, religion, morality, customs,
etc) such that, over time, a contradiction emerges such that ruling ideas not only do not
55. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/germanideology/ch03abs.htm#p310
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map onto actual social relations but appears starkly decadent and hypocritical to the
masses. Indeed, Marx seems to think that appeals to moral obligation itself, as Kain has
pointed out, are often symptomatic of just such a growing contradiction otherwise ruling
ideas would just appear as ideas, natural, and eternal as ever.56 When this contradiction
hits a critical mass “false consciousness” becomes “class consciousness” and the
revolutionary class, acting in and for itself, attempts to overthrow the ruling class.

Marx's Moralizing Critique
It is easy to imagine a person who finds Marx's attacks on the capitalist mode of
production compelling without affirming either his materialist theory of history or his
predictions for proletarian revolution and socialism. Indeed, in my teaching of Marx it is
just this position which emerges among the majority of students: Marx correctly
diagnoses the problem but socialism is either impossible or doomed to failure. This
should not be surprising given that Marx spends far more time criticizing capitalism than
he does strategizing how to organize proletarian revolution or describing post-capitalist
social arrangements. Despite our desire for some positive program, especially for some
sense of social relations to follow the grand revolution imagined by Marx, we find very
little.57
56. Kain: 1991, 94
57. In the Grundrisse, part II, we read that Marx imagines socialism to consist of:
Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own
communal (gemeinschaftlich) relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal
control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the
development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production on the
basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the

86

Despite all that has been said before of Marx's rejection of morality, it is difficult
not to read more than a few pages of any text without finding sustained, acerbic criticisms
of a rather moralizing character. From as early as Marx's doctoral dissertation on
Epicurean and Democritean atomistic materialism to the very end of his life, the
watchword of Marx's thinking is criticism (Kritik). In article written in the form of a
letter to Ruge Marx declares his philosophical purpose as “ruthless of criticism of
everything existing, ruthless in two senses: The criticism must not be afraid of it own
conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be.”58 Though, in this period, Marx will
still rely on the moral language of his time to make that criticism. As pointed out above,
he still uses Kantian language to outline his desire for a “categorical imperative to
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being.”
This language does not endure long and Marx nowhere, to my knowledge, runs a

alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the
comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities.
In a more specific, and very rare moment of utopian idealizing, Marx writes,
in the German Ideology:
In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just
as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.
In general,as Lukes: 1985, 10 notes, the three criteria Marx seems to set out
as specific to socialism/communism (1) the self-realization of individuals (2) the
rationalization of social relations with "each to their ability and all to their need." I would add
a (3) the mastery over nature which is neither domination (an alienated relationship to nature
marked by mere Enlightenment instrumental reason) nor servility (a naive relationship to
nature marked by romantic, mystical reliance on nature as such).
58. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09.htm
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deontological criticism of capitalism59 or sets revolutionary struggle as a “duty” for the
proletariat. It is, however, in this period, prior to 1845, that Marx will first criticize the
money relation as inimical to the human essence of freedom an go on to use the
Feuerbachian notion of species-being (Gattungswesen) to describe how human begins
live a life fundamentally estranged from their essence. Marx shifts away from criticism
such that “Criticism is no longer an end in itself, but simply a means; indignation is its
essential mode of feeling, and denunciation its principal task.”60 Later that year Marx
will locate the relation between 'indignation' and 'abasement':
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human selfestrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this selfestrangement, it recognizes estrangement as its own power and has in it the
semblance of a human existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in
estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman
existence. It is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the indignation at
that abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the
contradiction between its human nature and its condition of life, which is the
outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature.61
Though, by late 1844, Marx began to turn away from a discussion of essence or nature
that dominated The 1844 Economic Manuscripts. By as early as this text, from the antiProudhon tract The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx, while still using “an expression of
Hegel,” seems to have gained the escape velocity to propel his thinking beyond the

59. An exception might be erected in Marx's continual discussion of how capitalism
is internally contradictory and irrational in nature thus producing irrational and contradictory
human relations. There is a sense, not fully developed, that given the rationalizing of
production there will follow a more fully rational human being. Marx never really explores
this line of reasoning though it appears, as we will see, in the thinking of Engels and trickles
down as far as Trotsky and perhaps beyond.
60. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm
61. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch04.htm
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parameters of self-estrangement and alienation. However, he had not yet developed his
theory of historical materialism nor the economic analysis of exploitation to be found in
The Grundrisse and Capital. The Marx of the spring of 1845 marks a transitional period
inaugurated by The Theses on Feuerbach.
If we take the Theses (which Marx is said to have tacked to the wall in front of his
writing desk) as both a summary of the findings of the pre-1844 period and programmatic
for period to follow, it seems that we should find at least a glimmer of Marx's resolution
on his ethical or practical thinking. While the Theses are notoriously curt and dense (and
for many Marxists seem to have an almost kabbalistic character), many of them deal
directly with how values, specifically religious values, are generated and how
Feuerbach's analysis fails in that it stops at the “abstract – isolated – human individual” of
“civil society” when human beings are, in fact, “an ensemble of social relations.” Thus,
the nature of ethics as practical philosophy cannot be decided solely in any individual
intellect because:
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a
question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
reality and power, the this-sidedness (Diesseitigkeit) of his thinking, in practice.
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question.62
This practical question here, the question to which any form of consciousness including
conscience itself must conform, is the task of the revolutionary transformation of the
world by the proletariat in the interests of emancipating human labor power. On this
point Marx will not waver an inch throughout his entire writings. The most famous of

62. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm
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the Theses, indeed the text inscribed upon Marx's gravestone to this day, concludes, “The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”63
Of the many things to be said about this gem, the most important for this project is to
note the character and context of the statement. Marx, certainly imagining Hegelian
philosophers who, for the first time, are claiming to understand the development of
philosophy as the result of a grand historical process, have the privileged position of
diagnosing a historical epoch that is not only fundamentally one-sided and incomplete
but, for workers, patently inhuman. It is this “inhumanity” of the production and
reproduction of the conditions of human society that Marx will rail against for the rest of
his life.
As we said before, it is difficult to turn a few pages of Marx's writings and not
find him making judgments which strike the reader as patently moral in character in any
period of this writings. In the 1844 MSS we read how:
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his
production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper
commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of
men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labor
produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity
– and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general.64
Such a condition is not only scientifically diagnostic, but evaluative about how this state
of affairs is bad, and how another, coming mode of production will not transform human
beings (inherently free subjects) into commodities (objects enslaved to market relations).
In the Grundrisse Marx will refer to how the otherwise socially required average labor
63. Ibid.
64. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm
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time for the production of use-values is turned over the “monstrous objective power” of
market forces, that “personified condition[s] of production, i.e., to capital.”65 This is all
to the effect that:
within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productiveness of
labour are brought about at the cost of the individual labourer; all means for the
development of production transform themselves into means of domination over,
and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a
man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every
remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him
the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as
science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they distort the conditions
under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism the
more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and
drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital. But all
methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time methods of
accumulation; and every extension of accumulation becomes again a means for
the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion as
capital accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his payment high or low, must
grow worse. The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus
population, or industrial reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation,
this law rivets the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did
Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding
with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at
the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil slavery, ignorance, brutality,
mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces
its own product in the form of capital.66
Lukes has captured Marx's litany of condemnations of capitalist society found in Capital
alone. He lists:
'naked self-interest and callous cash payment', 'oppression', accumulation of
misery', physical and mental degradation', shameless, direct and brutal
exploitation', the 'modern slavery of capitalism', the 'horrors'...'torture' and
'brutality' of overwork, the 'murderous' search for economy in the production
process, capital's 'laying waste and squandering' of labour powers and 'the natural
65. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch16.htm#p831
66. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch25.htm#S4
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force of human beings', and capitalism as a system of production 'altogether too
prodigal with human material; and exacting 'ceaseless human sacrifices....67
To this we could add the “moral degradation caused by the capitalistic exploitation of
women and children” that Marx and Engels detail at length, no doubt to shock their
Victorian audience.68 By the end of Capital, Marx, in one of more literary moments,
describes that “If money, according to Augier, 'comes into the world with a congenital
blood-stain on one cheek,' capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore,
with blood and dirt.”69 Marx's imagination repeatedly links capitalism with monsters.
Three times in Capital Marx declares variously that “Capital is dead labour, that,
vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it
sucks.”70 Along with vampires, usury is describes as being “like a werewolf” and
capital's “blind unrestrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for surplus-labour, capital
oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the
working-day.”71 More examples of Marx's moralizing language abound but I think this
litany should suffice.
From the above I think it is clear that internal to the thought of Marx from 1844
onward there is a persistent tension, if not flat paradox, between historical materialism as
a mode of social criticism and what, if any, normative ground upon which Marx makes
67. Lukes 1985, 11
68. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch15.htm#S3a
69. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch31.htm
70. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch10.htm#S1 In general,
Marx is taken with the metaphors that involve the supernatural.
71. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch10.htm#S5
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just those criticisms. In other words, Marx's criticism of morality seems to undo the
possibility of the kind of criticism he makes. To my knowledge, Marx never noticed,
much less, dealt with this problem. In the next chapter I will to turn to how others have
resolved this problem, starting with Engels and then turn to Marx's two most important
normative concepts: alienation and exploitation.
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Chapter 3 – The Moralities of Marx
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there is a major theoretical tension
(perhaps, paradox) in Marx's thinking: the historical materialist method seems to
undermine the very foundations upon which Marx condemns capitalism and advocates
socialism. This chapter will, starting with Engels, review the major attempts to (1)
uncover the ethical foundations of Marx's thought and (2) resolve the apparent
contradiction. As we will see, there is nearly universal agreement that “freedom,” as
inherited from Kant and Hegel, is the central ethical concept for Marx. Though, just how
this freedom is conceptualized will lead contemporary interpreters of Marx in a variety of
directions. I will review and analyze the conclusions of contemporary anglophone
studies of Marx and his relationship to the ethical.
This chapter will end by engaging in a kind of via negativa in which I will begin
to capture Marx's positive position on the ethical by turning to an analysis of the early,
humanist concept of alienation and the later, structural concept of exploitation. I will
argue that neither of these alone forms the core of Marx's criticism of capitalism. Rather,
both rely on the process of reification which I take to be the core social pathology within
capitalist society. This will point the way to the final chapter in which I examine the
process of reification and the inversion of this pathology.

A Detour Through Engels
As we have seen, Marx writes very little, much less systematically, on just how
ethical values can be reconciled with historical materialism. Specifically, he gives us
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very little to understand how he can condemn capitalism and, at the same time, reject
what appears to be all ethical reasoning as a dangerous, reactionary delusion. While the
remaining sections of this project are primarily focused on a more contemporary analysis
of the matter, it seems worth looking back to the writings of Marx's longtime companion,
collaborator, and comrade Friedrich Engels. Written during Marx's lifetime, Engels'
1877/8 polemical text the Anti-Dühring contains the only sustained discussion of
morality, as such found, in the entire Marx-Engels corpus.1 While much has been made
about how little Marx and Engels actually had in common, with Engels often being
disparaged as intellectually inferior and less creative generally,2 I hesitate to simply erase
him from the formation of Marx's thought.
To be sure, Engels accepts the historical materialist position that ethical systems,
like all expressions of human consciousness, flow from and are delimited by the forces of
production in a given epoch. In his own epoch, Engels detects three distinct moralities.
The first is the “Christian-Feudal” morality inherited, though in decline, from the
medieval period. Engels divides this morality into Jesuit-Catholic and ProtestantOrthodox varieties with the latter having a “loose 'enlightened'” strain. This
“enlightened” protestant strain is, I suspect, Kantian ethics, though, Engels is silent on
just what he means. The second is the “modern-bourgeois morality,” again, the nature of
1. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm All
quotes below are from this small section of chapter 7.
2. This is a best case analysis. So often the roots of the failure of Marxism are
located in Engels' reworking and “dumbing-down” the nuanced and penetrating analysis of
Marx. The reality, at least practically, was that Engels did the hard work of taken often
contradictory, half-worked out ideas and texts from Marx and actually made them such that
they could have practical, organizationally viable potential. Marx may have mined the
diamonds but certainly Engels polished and set them.
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which Engels does not articulate. What I suspect that he has in mind is Utilitarianism,
though Engels does not invoke, even in passing, the analysis or reasoning he and Marx
had developed in the German Ideology. Needless to say, Engels' silence here is very
frustrating. Alongside the morality of the past (Christian-Feudal) and the present
(modern-bourgeois) Engels forwards that there is also beginning to exist the “truly
human....proletarian morality of the future.” However, if, as Engels says:
But when we see that the three classes of modern society, the feudal aristocracy,
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, each have a morality of their own, we can only
draw the one conclusion: that men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their
ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class
position is based — from the economic relations in which they carry on
production and exchange.3
Two questions seem to emerge here. How can one (1) judge which is the correct morality
and (2) explain why the three share so much in common if they, in fact, flow from
irreconcilable social contradictions. As to (2), he notes that these moral systems are
similar because they have emerged from the same historical process and, because society
must be at least meta-stable (my language, not his) in order to persist as such. Indeed.
The category of the ethical may just be how contradictory system itself is forced to
harmonize as much as possible at the social register. While Christian, Utilitarian and
Kantian ethical systems may axiomatically differ, they may persist in a society insofar as
they can made amenable to the present mode of production.
Engels' analysis of the historicality of morality points to an interesting difference
between the Marxist and Hegelian dialectical process. While for Hegel the contradictions
of previous periods are totally synthesized into a new period as the dialectic proceeds, for
3. Ibid.
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Engels it seems that the social conditions change such that previous aspects can survive,
but not robustly obtain, into the future. These “survivals” have beleaguered many
Marxists for a whole range of reasons.4 I think the whole matter is rather more simple
than some have made of it. While it is possible for any person to hold subjectively any
value system, the “truth” of it is its ability to obtain at the register of a class through time,
for it to become historical. While a person in contemporary society may personally hold
to the morality of the Mongols, Aztecs, or Samurai (apparently “Jedi” is even a
recognized religion in the UK) such a morality is not “real,” in the Hegelian sense of the
word, because it has no world historic potential. The Marxist would say that such a
system cannot be true because there is no class which actually expresses such values and,
just as importantly, such a value system is either indifferent or detrimental to how society
is actually reproduced. While a moral concept such as “honor” may be key for the feudal
warrior (the knightly or the samurai class5), it becomes an impediment for the dog-eatdog world of the market. During the process of class ascendance, such values cannot be
selected for if the bourgeoisie, as capitalists, are to have long-term success. “Honor,”
“dignity,” and similar concepts cannot long breathe capitalist air. Yet, they can survivein-decline long after the conditions which gave rise to them have been overcome. We

4. Althusser discusses turgidly discusses this issue towards the end of his landmark
1962 essay “Contradiction and Overdetermination.” He and I both think to link Lenin's
obsession with the survival of peasant religious observance years after the October
Revolution. Lenin himself tried to explain this “survival” on continued domestic craft
production of goods when the peasant should be lead by industrial, proletarian production in
the cities.
5. The 1877 Satsuma Rebellion led by Saigō Takamori in which the samurai class
attempted to resist westernization for the sake of the traditional values is a telling example of
just what I have in mind. The .577 Snider-Enfield had little time for honor.
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might say that moralities, like all expressions of human consciousness, have a kind of
half-life determined by socio-material forces.
As to (1), the question of choosing the “correct” ethical system, Engels
immediately notes that, given historical materialism, he rejects “every attempt to impose
on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical
law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand
above history and the differences between nations.”6 Despite this, he does attempt to
work out the first question. He writes “Which, then, is the true one? Not one of them, in
the sense of absolute finality; but certainly that morality contains the maximum elements
promising permanence which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present,
represents the future, and that is proletarian morality.”7 Engels' standard here is
unsurprisingly Hegelian. It is the moral system which promises to endure the longest into
the future that is the correct, though, as he makes sure to note, not in any absolute, a
priori sense. He will argue just a few lines down that while all previous moral systems
have been the expressions of their respective classes and, by definition, carry with them
contradiction and one-sidedness, the coming communist revolution led by the proletariat
will resolve all contradictions between the forces and mode of production. While all
previous moralities have been specifically pegged to various classes, the “proletarian
morality of the future” will be universally shared by all people and thus will be the first
“truly human morality.” For Engels, “class morality,” with its contradictions, must be

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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overcome by a “human morality” which can only be ushered in by a class for whom its
emancipation, the emancipation of labor, is co-extensive with the emancipation of all.
What is the content of such a “truly human morality”? Engels doesn't utter a
single word about it and, instead, uses the opportunity to attack Dühring for:
presumption in advancing his claim, from the midst of the old class society and on
the eve of a social revolution, to impose on the future classless society an eternal
morality independent of time and changes in reality. Even assuming — what we
do not know up to now — that he understands the structure of the society of the
future at least in its main outlines.8
Much like Marx, Engels is vigilant to refuse speculation about the future communist
society and to attack those that do so as utopian and idealist. In the end, Engels seems to
want to sit the fence between deploying a historical-criticism of contemporary morality
itself while predicting the coming of a morality which, while not absolute, will yet be
sufficient to govern social relations under communism. To my knowledge, Marx himself
never commented on Engel's analysis of ethics in the Anti-Dühring one way or the other.
Though some dismiss Engels thinking as generally flatfooted and dogmatic compared to
Marx, it is difficult to think that, given their close collaboration, Marx would have not
given some kind of critical feedback if Engels had been far from the mark. Indeed, in a
case such as The Communist Manifesto, we know Marx to have radically rewritten the
original draft of Engels. Regardless to what degree Engels' thinking here mirrors Marx,
we are still left with virtually nothing of substance as to their positive position on the
question of ethics.

8. Ibid.
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While this project will not trace the genealogy of Marxist thinking on ethics, it is
worth pointing out that, for at least the first quarter of the 20th century, the place ethics
played in Marxism was on the mind of many revolutionary socialists.9 Marxists
variously attempted to place Marx within the confines of Kantian deontology, crude
means-ends Utilitarianism, Bolshevik messianism, scientific amoralism, and others. One
thing that most of these approaches share is what they lacked: key texts of Marx himself.
As I have mentioned earlier, texts such as the 1844 MSS, The German Ideology, The
Grundrisse, and others were not known, much less published, during the great period in
which Marxism transformed itself into a world historical force. Marxists were simply
unable to use some of the most philosophically rich writings of Marx himself as a
touchstone, for better or worse, when it came to the relationship they were to have with
the ethical. Of course, the writings of Marx need not and should not form the horizon for
Marxism. I would go so far as to agree with Lukács when he writes that even if:
recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual
theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious ‘orthodox’ Marxist would
still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence
dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto – without having to renounce his orthodoxy
for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical
acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or
that thesis, nor the exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers
exclusively to method.10
At the same time, however, just as Marx never wrote an “On Ethics” he also never wrote
an “On Method.” Indeed, it is only by seeing him apply the dialectical method to
historical conditions that a Marxist can divine just what that method is. Just as Augustine
9. Blackledge: 2012 is an excellent such genealogy.
10. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm
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knew what time was until someone asked him to explain it, so too Marxists with the
dialectical historical method. Lacking the 1844 MSS, The German Ideology, etc.
discerning the relationship Marx had with ethics and, by extension, what relationship
Marxism should have with ethics seems profoundly difficult. With this in mind, this
project will pass over the period of the great upheavals of the early-to-mid 20th century
and pick up scholarship of Marx after the 1959 publication of the 1844 MSS in English.
It is difficult to imagine that such a monumental text was not known until more than 100
years after its composition. With this in mind, I want to turn to an analysis of the post1960 attempts to give a systematic analysis of Marx's relationship with the ethical.

Freedom and its Vicissitudes in Contemporary Marxian Scholarship
Eugene Kamenka was one of the first Anglo-phone philosophers to attempt an
analysis of Marx's thoughts regarding ethics after the 1844 MSS were published in
English. Though, even at that time, texts such as The Grunrdrisse were neither translated
nor part of standard collections of Marx and Engels' works. His 1962 dissertation The
Ethical Foundations of Marxism understands all of Marx's ethical thought, especially the
contradictory elements, to emerge from three fundamental theses. In his Kamenka's
words:
1. The underlying ethical and logical assumptions of Marx's work are to be
understood in terms of a technical metaphysical concept of freedom,
involving the associated philosophical notions of “universality,”
“rationality,” and “self-determination.”
2. The internal logic of Marx's intellectual development is to be understood
as the attempt to realize his concept of freedom by “overcoming” the
dualisms of universal and particular, society and individual, civil society
and state, autonomy and heteronomy.
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3. Marx's work thus reveals no radical break between his earlier
philosophical concern with freedom and alienation and his subsequent
exposition of an allegedly scientific theory of social change and social
development. After his “discovery” of the materialist interpretation of
history in the spring of 1845 we find a certain change in style and a
growing socio-historical concreteness. Marx's concern shifts from
proclaiming the philosophical nature of freedom to ever-deepening studies
of the social and historical conditions that produce alienation, but we do
not find a change of theoretical structure or a major revision of his
philosophical premises.11
For Kamenka, Marx's thought is a badly inherited mish-mash of a Kantian-Hegelian
conception of freedom as radical self-determination with the key impediment to freedom
being “alienation” as worked-out by Marx in 1844. According to Kamenka, and others
such as Bertell Ollman, the entirety of Marx's theoretical work is simply footnotes to the
1844 elucidation of the concept of the alienation of labor. On this reading, Marx has a
hazily worked out conception of human essence ground in an ontology of labor from
which human beings, under non-communist modes of production, are separated. This
separation, on Kamenka's reading, drives a wedge between the universal and the
particulars of human existence (as his notes in point 1) which only the proletariat,
through social revolution, can repair. Kamenka takes Marx as an economic determinist
for whom ethical relations are positive, they can be appropriate given certain determinate
social conditions, but lack any obligatory force ascribed to them by philosophers, etc.12
Marx, on this position, says that we can attain to a kind of descriptive, even
scientific, ethology without falling into the delusion of thinking that there could exist any
system of “oughts” that actually obtains. At the same time Marx inherits the conception
11. Kamenka: 1962, vii
12. Op. Cit., 96
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of freedom as self-determination for which he must appeal to supra-empirical,
philosophical, i.e., metaphysical and not non-scientific, concepts to actually get the free
agency of the revolutionary proletariat off the ground. The two concepts that do this
work are Marx's philosophical anthropology and his conception of history. For Kamenka
the whole edifice, or at least the ethical foundations, of Marxism, trades on Marx
inconsistently shifting from a “scientific” theory of historical-materialism built upon
economic determinism on the one hand, and this supra-empirical, extra-historical
conception of human essence as freedom as self-determination and history as the
metaphysical force which causes freedom to blossom, on the other. On Kamenka's view,
Marx's thinking has as much in common structurally with that of Spinoza as it does with
Kant or Hegel.13
For sure, Kamenka is not a sympathetic reader of Marx and his entire study seems
to have an agenda of showing how Marx's irrationalism has led to the philosophical
dogmatism and philistinism of the Soviet Union. One wonders how his study would have
looked had it been written today (or in 1914) rather than in the height of the Cold War. In
general, I find the position that alienation was the singular core concept of Marx's thought
and that Marx's was a radical economic-determinist unconvincing. In Kamenka's attempt
to fight the monolithic Marx of the Soviets, I find that he often makes Marx into a straw
man. Despite this, I think he is correct to understand something deeply Spinozist about
Marx's thinking about freedom (which, in fact, is actually Spinoza taken up by Hegel
himself). Indeed, Spinoza was a thinker of totality, par excellence.

13. Op. Cit., 97-99
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Stephen Lukes' short but insightful 1985 book Marxism and Morality attempts to
trace moral themes from Marx to Eastern and Western Marxist traditions. Lukes argues
that the apparent “paradox” in Marx's thought between the dismissal of morality as
ideological illusion and his perennial condemnation of capitalism is the result of an
equivocation in Marx's theory of morality. For Lukes, what Marx condemns as
ideological illusion is the “morality of Recht.” Recht, as we saw earlier in the discussion
of Hegel, is a key term in continental jurisprudence with no close analog in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. It simultaneously captures the notion of “rights,” but also
carries with it a concept of legal morality as captured in “obligation,” “fairness,” and
“justice.” To put it in slightly more Hegelian jargon, Recht is the sphere of life where
individuals are mediated through social life with all its emergent rights and obligations.
As Lukes correctly points out, Marx closely links morality with the sphere of Recht and,
from as early as On the Jewish Question, dismisses its “naturalness” by linking it with
state power as summoned by money. Recht, in the sense of rights, can only be called
upon insofar as the state recognizes such a call as legitimate and that legitimacy is, for the
Marx of this period, tied to the flow of money. Of course, Marx will go on to expand his
analysis of how values flow from an economic base throughout the rest of his career. On
Lukes' reading, when Marx dismisses morality as an illusion, he does so because (1) the
morality of Recht is relative to the mode of a production of a given epoch and (2) is
naturalized to justify inter-subjective relations enabling, justifying and extending the
mode of production which gave rise to such values.14 Specifically Lukes contends that

14. Lukes: 1985, 29-34
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previous forms of Recht, specifically Recht as justice, have naturalized four conditions:
scarcity; egoism; varying conceptions of good; and lack of perfect information for acting,
as the ground upon which socio-political systems must be built. Marx either rejects such
conditions as natural or demands that human beings can simply overcome such
conditions by altering their mode of production.15
Recht, in the form of liberal social justice, might help, for instance, to mitigate
massive wealth inequality or provide for a robust welfare state, but ultimately
understands that scarcity, the market, private property, wage-labor, etc., are simply part of
the fabric of social reality. This captures the radical difference between Marx and most of
his contemporaneous socialists. Marx does not demand better wages or even a
completely equal redistribution of wealth. Rather, he argues for the abolition of wagelabor and the elimination of wealth as such. For Lukes, Marx dismisses the “morality of
Recht” because he wants to deracinate the very conditions which give rise to it. The
“morality of Recht,” on Lukes' reading of Marx, is an impediment to actually liberating
people in order that they may relate to each as human-qua-human and not human-quacommodity.
From what position can Marx condemn the morality of Recht and capitalism as its
ground? For Lukes, Marx carried forward and radicalized the vision of the human being
as rational freedom initiated by Kant and Hegel by appealing to a “morality of
emancipation.”16 On this reading, it is only through ending the social contradictions
engendered by capitalism that human beings can actually achieve the freedom only
15. Ibid.
16. Op. Cit., 28-9, 71-76
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imagined by Kant and Hegel. What, then, are the positive contents of this “morality of
emancipation?” As I have pointed out, and also noted by Lukes, Marx nowhere speaks
in abstract principles about morality and rejects speculation about future, post-capitalist,
human relations. For Lukes, these two aspects of Marx's thinking are related. For him,
Marx's thinking is oddly both utopian and anti-utopian at the same time. Its anti-utopian
character is captured by the historical materialist method which, among other things,
rejects speculation about a future world. On this reading, it is precisely because of
Marx's refusal to speculate on future human relations as incompatible with historical
materialism that Marx and Marxism can never have a positive ethical foundation.17
Yet, because of Marx's absolute assurance of the immanent advent of communism,
he can condemn the current state of affairs for its one-sidedness, not-yetness ,and
hypocrisy. Marx's system can only engage in criticism of the present system and cannot
provide a positive theory of morality. Indeed, for Lukes, this inability to provide a
positive platform itself opened the door for the kinds of excesses which characterized the
experiments of 20th century socialism. Because Marxism ultimately trusts that the:
[Vaguely conceived] ends would call forth the appropriate means, it has almost
totally failed to bring social and political imagination to bear upon the solution of
real-life problems – such as the distribution of resources, social policy, economic,
social and industrial organization, political and constitutional structures,
nationalism and regionalism.18
For Lukes, Marx's system self-admittedly does not have “ideals to realize” and to expect
otherwise is to actually misunderstand the point.
17. Op. Cit., 37-43
18. Op. Cit., 46
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Alan Wood's 1981 study on Marx has itself gone on to a kind of canonical status
among intellectuals and academics. His study is encyclopedic, systematic, and a
welcome change from either scholastic debates on the finer points of Marx's work and
from interpretation that were simply slavish to the dogma that Marxism-Leninism
became. Wood addresses the tension between historical materialism and ethics in several
chapters of his study. On this reading, Wood correctly notes that Marx rarely, if ever,
uses the language of “right” as justification (as in “the proletariat have a right to rebel”)
nor does Marx engage attempt to assuage the proletariat through any moral force (as in
“you proletarians ought to rebel because you are alienated and exploited!”). Rather,
Wood takes it that Marx is acting on an implicit distinction between moral and non-moral
goods. Moral goods are those which flow from acting from conscience or duty. They are
the goods done for the sake of the good. Non-moral goods are those which serve to
improve our lot (both individually and collectively) and include health, happiness,
freedom, pleasure, etc.19
On this reading, Marx's criticism of capitalism is that it frustrates access to nonmoral goods despite having them, or the means to them, in abundance. This alone, on
Wood's reading of Marx, would/should motivate the proletariat to struggle for
revolutionary control of the means of production.20 On these grounds Marx compares
Mill, Kant, and Marx. For Kant, moral goods and non-moral goods diverge but moral
goods, given a conflict between the two, triumph. For Mill, however, moral good and
non-moral goods do not diverge (though justice seems to take on a life of its own) and the
19. Wood: 1981, 127-129
20. Op. Cit., 130

107

non-moral good of over-all maximization of pleasure triumphs. For Marx, moral and
non-moral goods diverge but non-moral goods (“self-actualization, security, physical
health, comfort, community, freedom” on Wood's read) triumph.21 Further, non-moral
goods have a kind of objective quality which, ceteris paribus, would allow a scientific
analysis of their production, arrangement, and distribution.
What then of morality and the moral goods? On Wood's reading of Marx, moral
goods are always in service to the distribution of non-moral goods such that the ruling
class could maintain long-term stability. Over time, the correspondence between moral
and non-moral goods becomes detached such that morality takes on a life of its own.
This free-floating subjective morality, though still objectively in the interests of the ruling
class and its mode of production, attempts to ponder the “good” of “pleasure” detached
from history and the material conditions of life is what Marx condemns as illusion,
“fluff,” and ideology. Right, justice, duty, virtue have no other content than the function
they play in relations of production given a specific mode of production.22
What then does Marx mean when he deploys terms like “justice”? Wood proffers
a kind of correspondence theory of morality. On his reading, something is moral if it
corresponds adequately to the forces of production in the service of long-term
management and continued control of the means of production. This is most easily seen
in Wood's provocative and thoughtful analysis of the concept of justice in Marx's thought.
For Wood, a transaction is said to be “just” in the relations of production insofar as it

21. Op. Cit., 131-2.
22. Op. Cit., 143-7
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corresponds or harmonizes to the long-term continuation of the forces of production.
Marx's writes in Capital vol. III:
The justice of the transactions between agents of production rests on the fact that
these arise as natural consequences out of the production relationships. The
juristic forms in which these economic transactions appear as willful acts of the
parties concerned, as expressions of their common will and as contracts that may
be enforced by law against some individual party, cannot, being mere forms,
determine this content. They merely express it. This content is just whenever it
corresponds, is appropriate, to the mode of production. It is unjust whenever it
contradicts that mode.23
Thus, given the capitalist mode of production, when a worker is paid an agreed-upon
wage for x hours of work, a relation that Marx always deems as exploitative, then justice
has been done qua capitalism. If the exploitation is to be condemned, it is not because it
is unjust on Marx's view. In fact, at the very origin of the creation of surplus value Marx
argues in Capital vol I that:
The circumstance, that on the one hand the daily sustenance of labour-power costs
only half a day’s labour, while on the other hand the very same labour-power can
work during a whole day, that consequently the value which its use during one
day creates, is double what he pays for that use, this circumstance is, without
doubt, a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice to the
seller (...ist ein besondres Glück für den Käufer, aber durchaus kein Unrecht
gegen den Verkäufer.).24
And while Marx will often use the metaphor of the vampire or the parasite for the
capitalist, he insists in his more technical analysis that they cannot be condemned for
robbing the worker strictly speaking. Marx notes that “At any rate, in my presentation
even, “profit on capital” is in actual fact not “a subtraction from, or robbery of, the
23. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch21.htm
24. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch07.htm#S2 Some
translators will often translate “unrecht” here as “injury” which seems mistaken to me.

109

worker.” On the contrary, I depict the capitalist as the necessary functionary of capitalist
production and demonstrate at great length that he not only “subtracts” or “robs” but
enforces the production of surplus value....”25
Likewise, Marx never condemns Roman slavery “for them” but only “for us.”
Thus, in an odd way, Marx avoids the charge of radical relativism. There is justice, but
the concept only makes sense in the context of a given epoch and its mode of production.
Indeed his letters and articles about the American Civil War and chattel slavery are often
about how slavery is in contradiction to the capitalism which Marx takes to be
progressive in this context.26 There is very little hue and cry about how slavery is terrible
for people; rather Marx is keen to focus on its “anomalous” reactionary character and
how only northern proletarians must struggle to overthrow it. The same sort of structural
analysis can be found in Marx's analysis of British imperialism in India.27 For Marx,
British railroads are an objectively progressive movement towards the advent of an
Indian proletariat regardless of how unfortunate it is that the bones of colonial subjects
are ground in the process. Marx is quick to agree with Hegel that the “slaughter-bench”
that is history “progresses along the bad side.”28
While I am generally sympathetic to Wood's analysis, especially his analysis of
justice, it strikes me that the distinction between moral and non-moral goods is just what

25. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/01/wagner.htm
26. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx//works/1861/us-civil-war/
27. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm
28. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/hist-mat/pov-phil/ch02.htm
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is at stake in Marx's thinking. In other words, I suspect Wood of importing a distinction
that Marx's theory of historical materialism would strongly contest. Wood writes:
We all know the difference between valuing or doing something because
conscience or the “moral law” tells us that we “ought” to, and valuing or doing
something because it satisfies our needs, our wants or our conceptions of what is
good for us (or for someone else whose welfare we want to promote — desires for
non-moral goods are not necessarily selfish desires). This difference roughly
marks off “moral” from “non-moral” goods and evils.29
To my mind, Marx would deny that Wood's “moral goods,” if they really can be said to
exist at all, are anything other than the ideological features which serve to defend a
specific mode of production. This is also why I think Marx would scoff if an apologist
for capitalism would try to defend the system based on the fact that that specific
transactions which allow for the extraction of surplus labor value are “just.” Just such a
case, indeed an infamous passage from Capital is conspicuously left out of Wood's
analysis of justice. In discussing the most primitive manner of producing and extracting
surplus labor value, the simple extension of the work day beyond what is socially
necessary, Marx writes:
The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the
working-day as long as possible, and to make, whenever possible, two workingdays out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold
implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer maintains his
right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working-day to one of definite normal
duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally
bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides
(Zwischen gleichen Rechten entscheidet die Gewalt). Hence is it that in the
history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working-day,
presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e.,
the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class.30
29. Wood: 1981, 128
30. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch10.htm#S1
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From this specific case of the work day, I think that a general social tendency can be
extracted. That is, class-based modes of production produce contradictions at the
economic register that cannot but find expression at the more broadly social register of
mores, customs, rights, and morality generally. To put it in an idiom that is more
common but I find problematic and over-simplifying: contradictions in the economic
base will produce contradictions in the cultural superstructure. The capitalists justly seek
to maximize the purchase of labor power for the lowest price and workers rightly seek to
minimize their work day and maximize wages. For Marx, this social antagonism, among
others, cannot reach long-term equilibrium peaceably and will, in the long term, break
into open class-war resulting in either “socialism of barbarism.” Justice proves to
provide little in the way of justification if equal rights stand in social antinomy. Justice,
right, goodness, etc. are, for, the Marx of Capital, the various velvet gloves worn by the
iron first of force and historical compulsion. While insightful, I think there is some
degree of question-begging operating in Wood's analysis of Marx's conception of the
relationship of morality to historical materialism.
George Brenkert's 1983 study argues that previous philosophers have not
detected Marx's positive moral commitments for two reasons. The first is that they have
not fully appreciated the very broad sense in which Marx uses the “language of morality”
because they have gone to Marx looking for a “morality of duty.” Brenkert agrees with
previous readings which show that Marx does not have such a position. Rather, Marx is
much more akin to the ancient Greeks who sought to describe the kinds of traits and
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activities which would maximize human flourishing. Marx does not have an “ethics of
duty,” rather, he tacitly embraces an “ethics of virtue.”
On Brenkert's read, Marx operates with a broad conception of human essence as
freedom. From this he can condemn the bourgeoisie and its “morality of duties” as it
only serves to stupefy and enslave human flourishing. Further, he also marshals this
“ethics of freedom” to positively admonish the proletariat to overcome capitalism.
Unlike Aristotle, Marx understands that the human essence can only be discovered and
realized through the development of productive forces as a historical process. Thus,
morality is still derived from the mode of production. Further, and I think more
controversially, Brenkert argues that Marx thinks because these productive forces are tied
to human beings, we can “pick out certain common characteristics, standards, and values
with regard to morality, as well as with regard to systems of production and distribution,
which can be identified in all societies and cultures. Thus...it is possible to identify
certain 'general human laws' of production as well as of distribution.”31 This indeed is a
substantial break with what we have seen before. Yet, given context, the force of may be
significantly weakened. First, Brenkert mines the unpublished Grundrisse for these
nuggets and such sentiments, to my knowledge, do not appear in Capital. This is
significant because the Grundrisse was itself a kind of first draft or dry run of Capital. It
is also clear that Marx changed significant aspects of his theories in the interim. I am
generally willing to discount things said in the Grundrisse but not echoed in Capital
(much less anywhere else). Furthermore, Brenkert admits that Marx takes it that such

31. Brenkert: 1983, 78
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“general human laws” are much weaker operationally compared to the specific moral
ideas corresponding to a specific mode of production. Marx even dismisses these
“general human laws” in the same text, admits Brenkert as “empty phrases” and “chaotic
concepts.”32 Brenkert takes it that Marx thinks these “general human laws,” which Marx
makes no attempt at articulating beyond noting that workers must eat and conquerors
extract tribute, are less valid because they are not linked with any existing mode of
production, but are linked to the one of the communist future. For Brenkert these “general
human laws” are simultaneously the “general preconditions of all production” and the
goal to which the emancipation of labor strives – the dialectic of alpha and omega. It is
upon this rock that Marx's positive ethical program can be built according to Brenkert.
What is this program? Brenkert notes that others, as we have seen above, also
share that Marx's ethical foundation is tied to a robust conception of human emancipation
and freedom. Such previous interpretations can be divided into self-realizationist, the
dominant view (held by Kamenka, Wood, etc) and otherwise (such as that held by Lukes,
MacIntyre, etc). Brenkert rejects the self-realizationist position as he takes it to remain
both liberal in character and because involves some idealist, romantic conception of selfperfection. First, Brenkert separates Marx's notion of freedom, which is social, collective
and positive, from bourgeois freedom which is political (parliamentarian), individual, and
negative (it is freedom from coercion by others and/or the state). Brenkert then states his
vision of Marx's conception of freedom as such:
Stated most concisely, it is for one to live such that one essentially determines,
within communal relations to other people, the concrete totality of desires,
32. Ibid.
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capacities, and talents, which constitute one's self-objectification. ….there are
three different, though interrelated, aspects of Marx's view of freedom: (a) selfdetermination requires self-objectification through one's desires, capacities, and
talents; (b) one's self-objectification must be a concrete self-objectification with
regard to other people and nature; and (c) self-determination is only possible
within harmonious, communal relations to others.....Freedom is the basic virtue by
which people ought to live. As such, Marx's ethics of freedom is an ethics of
virtue.....Moral obligations, duties, rights are not part of Marx's ethics.33
Brenkert then spends the next hundred pages or so of his monograph skillfully unpacking
his vision of Marx's theory of ethics. What is virtuous are those traits, activities, and
tendencies which are adequate to the coming communist mode of production. Despite
Brenkert's very erudite analysis, he gives virtually no examples of Marxian virtues nor
places where Marx praises and blames along these lines (and certainly there is, for Marx,
plenty of invective and blame to go around). For reasons that will be clearer in the next
chapter, I am sympathetic to this position, and feel it could have been developed
concretely in two cases:
While Marx rarely speaks in the language of “virtue” or “vice” there is a telling
commendation to a virtue ethic reading of Marx's ethical foundation. In the spring of
1865, Marx's daughter Jenny polled Marx into filling out a “confession,” a popular kind
of Victorian questionnaire meant to reveal basic character traits about a person
(something similar is still popular online, apparently). Marx answered the “confession”
as such:
The vice you hate most
The vice you excuse most
Your idea of happiness
Your idea of misery

Servility
Gullibility
To fight
To submit

33. Op. Cit., 88-9
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...
Your hero

Spartacus34

Indeed, when Marx and Engels look back to history to prefigure their revolutionary
subject, they turn repeatedly to the French Revolutionaries (specifically Robespierre and
Saint Just), to the leader of the German Peasant Wars, Thomas Müntzer, and the Thracian
gladiator-rebel Spartacus. In an 1861 letter to Engels Marx notes that “Spartacus is
revealed as the most splendid fellow in the whole of ancient history. Great general (no
Garibaldi), noble character, real representative of the ancient proletariat.”35 What is
interesting about this praise is the other places where Marx notes that ancient slave
revolts, insofar as they were not in the business of deracinating slavery for a superior
mode of production (mercantilism or proto-capitalism), were not objectively progressive.
What Marx seems to be praising in Spartacus is not within the realm of consequences
(real revolutionary change was never on the table for ancient slave revolts lacking a
coalition with artisans, etc. to Marx's mind) but the virtue of those who rebels against
“servility” regardless of the epoch. Such a rebellious trait is still adequate, to use
Brenkert's thinking, to the coming communist mode of production and should be praised
as virtuous. On the other hand, if there is one trait continuously condemned by Marx it is
that of “moralizing.” I am sympathetic to Brenket's analysis. Though, as I will develop in

34. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/04/01.htm He leaves blank
the line “The character in history you most dislike” and lists Hegel as one of his favorite prose
writers. The “confession” of Engels has also survived though it he seems to be more
interested in being flippant than providing real answers. These were both filled out in English,
for what its worth.
35. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1861/letters/61_02_27-abs.htm
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the following, I do not think he goes quite far enough in developing this virtue aspect of
Marx's thinking.
Paul Blackledge's recent, 2012, Marxism and Ethics strikes me as important in
three respects. The first is that his text is the best genealogy of Marxism and ethics
produced in English thus far. The second is that he takes up the contribution to
understanding Marxism and ethics from the scattered, and now self-repudiated works, of
Alasdair MacIntyre during his heterodox Trotskyist period. MacIntyre, as is well known,
eventually rejected Marxism as a framework for answering the fundamental questions
raised by the need for communal politics for a Thomist, virtue-based politics of
communalism.36 The third is that Blackledge approaches this task by shifting the
discourse away from purely academic concerns to a study ground in the reality of
contemporary workers' struggles.
Blackledge agrees with Brenkert and MacIntyre that what is ultimately at work in
Marx's thinking is an ethic of freedom as radical self-determination. Further, and he and I
strongly agree here, that to get at an the relation of Marx to the ethical, it is key to return
to a close reading of Marx himself and to be concretely engaged with the actual struggle
of workers, both of which most of 20th century academic, western Marxism failed to do.
Blackledge largely agrees with MacIntyre that various competing forms of ethical
theories are the result of the fractured bourgeois world that cannot be solved by further
theory. Debates about ethics can only be solved by a praxis which removes the
underlying social contradictions that have given rise to the debate itself. The singular
36. Blackledge has edited an important volume on MacIntyre's Marxist period which
is key for understanding the post-Secret Speech period in Insular Analytic Marxism.
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activity or praxis which has the power to resolve this contradiction is, for Blackledge,
revolutionary solidarity among the international working class. Following Lukács,
Blackledge argues that by “contesting the freedom of civil society which revealed the
essence of capitalism as a system of exploitation and alienation and the basis from which
to fight against its egoistic individualism in the name of the virtue of solidarity. He
[Lukács] therefore implied a solution to the separation, characteristic of modern moral
theory, between “is” (science) and “ought” (ethics).”37 Blackledge takes as his
hermeneutical starting point the sentiment expressed by Engels at the graveside of Marx
on March 17th 1883:
For Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to
contribute, in one way or another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the
state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of
the modern proletariat, which he was the first to make conscious of its own
position and its needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation. Fighting
was his element.38
The primary “condition of emancipation” which workers must attain is, before all else,
solidarity, which Blackledge refers to as the “concrete form of freedom taken as selfdetermination”39 and “revolutionary phronesis,”40 clearly invoking the classical flavor of
his thinking. At the conclusion of his work, Blackledge notes that the virtue of solidarity
is not “an abstract moral imperative, but rather the elementary political corollary of the

37. Blackledge: 2012, 15-16
38. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.htm quoted on
201 in Blackledge.
39. Blackledge: 2012, 198
40. Op. Cit., 207
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universal content of the modern class struggle for freedom against alienation.”41 Despite,
what seems very agreeable to me in Blackledge's thought, I am left generally
underwhelmed. His primary task in this work is historical in character, but I find that his
methodological commitments a solid starting point for stating my position on Marx's
relation to the ethical.

Via Negativa
Before moving on to articulating my own position, and by extension what I take
to be the horizon for Marxism and the ethical generally, I want to proceed by a kind of
via negativa. While Marx says very little on just what he takes to be any positive ethical
platform, he does go to lengths to condemn capitalism along two specific lines: that it is
alienating and exploitative. I think that a central clue for getting at Marx's thinking on
the ethical can be revealed by a close reading of just how alienation and exploitation are
condemned.
Alienation
Since the publication of the Economic and Political Manuscripts of 1844 in the
mid-20th century, the literature surrounding Marx's conception of “alienation” has grown
to titanic proportions. Indeed, there is a kind of irony in that what many under-graduates
and others learn about Marx and Marxism emerges from a text which (1) Marx never
intended for publication, (2) was unknown to the Marxist revolutionaries and
philosophers of the early to mid-20th century, and (3) contains ideas that Marx discarded
41. Op. Cit., 208
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or dramatically changed only a year or so after penning them. My sense is that the
popularity of the conception of alienation has more to do with where we find ourselves
than it does our desire to understand the development of Marx's actual thoughts on
society. The concept remains polarizing. Structural Marxism, represented by the Louis
Althusser, argues that the Marx of The German Ideology rejects the concept with the
more scientific notion of exploitation replacing it. While others, such as Kamenka,
Ollman, Brenkert, and many others take Marx's ethics of freedom to be tied directly to
human beings' alienated state under capitalism. For this camp, alienation is the genetic
principle from which all of Marxism flows. Regardless, alienation as a philosophical
concept and the existential-phenomenological condition of human beings under
capitalism, if not before, is now taken as a canonical aspect of Marxism and Marx's
thinking. Given the scope of this project and the enormity of literature on the subject, I
only want to bring out a few features of the concept of alienation, its development and
how it comes to bear on the development and trajectory of Marx's critical project.
Hegel pioneered the metaphysical character of the concept, making it part of the
motivational force of the dialectical process. In Hegel's thinking, an entity undergoes
self-externalization (Entäußerung) where it understands its own essence as other (das
Andere) and alienated (Entfremdung) allowing it become self-conscious with that new,
higher self-consciousness starting the process again. Not only does self-consciousness
arise through this process, but also freedom. For Hegel, freedom is always mediated
through the inter-subjective and institutional other. In that, freedom is “finding oneself in
the other” (In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein) the process of alienation is a
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necessary moment of the dialectic and has no negative valence in the way that it will for
Marx.
That negative valence was introduced primarily by Ludwig Feuerbach in his 1841
The Essence of Christianity where he argues that God is simply the externalization of
human beings' perceived perfections. When we imagine God we are simply taking all the
positive traits we think of ourselves and externalizing them onto a deity. Or, as some
have paraphrased Feuerbach, “all theology is anthropology.” This alienation of human
perfection throws human beings into a state of dejection which stunts their overall
development. By placing the power of human salvation and goodness into an alien, nonexistent entity, humans relinquish their own potential.
Feuerbach himself wavered on the question of atheism and this attracted a
sustained attack by other young Hegelians such as Max Stirner (who would be the target
of The German Ideology), Bruno Bauer (who would be Marx's dissertation director and
eventual opponent), and Arnold Ruge (who would go on to hire Marx as co-editor of the
Deutsch–Französische Jahrbücher). For the Young Hegelians, alienation was not only to
be found in human being's relationship with God but as a central aspect of contemporary
society. Between Hegel and Marx “alienation” will go from a necessary component of
the realization of freedom to a social condition which is the primary impediment to
freedom itself.
By 1843 Marx had arrived at what he thought to be the very ground of social
alienation: capitalism. While too little or too much is made of it, the reality is that Marx
first derives his attacks on capitalism from a blatantly anti-Semitic conception of Judaism
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as a religion, and Jews as a “nation,” with both linked to money-grubbing and
“hucksterism.”42 Arguing with Bauer, who rejected the idea of Jewish emancipation in
Prussia on liberal grounds (to his mind Jews were a distinct, indeed too distinct, nation
and should not be given rights as Prussians), Marx charges that, if the Jews were
emancipated from their own tendency toward private, economic interests, they could
become as Prussian or Germany as any other member of the nation. Marx writes:
What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the
worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money.
Very well then! Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently from
practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time.
An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering,
and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. His
religious consciousness would be dissipated like a thin haze in the real, vital air of
society. On the other hand, if the Jew recognizes that this practical nature of his is
futile and works to abolish it, he extricates himself from his previous development
and works for human emancipation as such and turns against the supreme
practical expression of human self-estrangement.43
Further, it is only if Prussians reject their own “practical Jewishness,” i.e., economic
greed, can they become an actual nation. Emancipation is not only freedom from religion
but freedom from economic inequality. Marx continues:
Selling (Veräusserung) is the practical aspect of alienation (Entäusserung). Just as
man, as long as he is in the grip of religion, is able to objectify his essential nature
only by turning it into something alien, something fantastic, so under the
domination of egoistic need he can be active practically, and produce objects in
practice, only by putting his products, and his activity, under the domination of an
alien being, and bestowing the significance of an alien entity – money – on
them.44
...
42. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/
43. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/
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The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.
By “Judaism” here, in the final line, Marx quite literally means buying and selling such
that social life is mediated by money. Alienation is here linked directly to what Marx
takes to be the fundamental social register of this epoch: the economy. It is often missed,
and I am sure willingly so, that Marx's criticism of capitalism has its origins in the these
vulgar and hateful racist sentiments.45
By 1844 Marx had relocated to Paris and there he began to wed the Young
Hegelian philosophical analysis with the criticism of political-economy and activism of
Parisian socialists, communists, and anarchists. Marx takes it that the political
economists have made a mistake by imagining a “fictitious primordial condition” by
which society emerges and takes it as his task to begin with “actual economic fact.” That
fact, for Marx, is that through the process of monopolization that “whole of society must
fall apart into the two classes – property owners and propertyless workers”46 such that:
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his
production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper
commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of
men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labor
produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity
– and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general.

44. Ibid.
45. Of course, this is all very complicated. Marx himself was descendant from
rabbinical families in his hometown of Trier and his father had converted only in order to
achieve employment as a lawyer. That Marx was Jewish made little difference to him as he
personally “found the Israelite faith repulsive.” There is a great deal more to be said about
Marx, the socio-political character of the “Jewish Question” and the rise of systematic antiSemitism in Europe but it can't be said here.
46. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm
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This fact expresses merely that the object which labor produces – labor’s product
– confronts it as something alien (fremdes Wesen), as a power independent of the
producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object,
which has become material: it is the objectification (Vergegenständlichung) of
labor. Labor’s realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions
this realization of labor appears as loss of realization for the workers;
objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as
estrangement (Entfremdung), as alienation (Entäußerung).47
While this passage is turgid and difficult what seems key here is that Marx has inverted
Hegel's dialectic of freedom. Rather than alienation being the first step in the process
toward self-realization and freedom it has become a downward spiral which only serves
to further enslave the worker. This economic immiseration through alienation combined
with Marx's “discovery” the previous year of how the proletariat's universal class
interests would allow them universal emancipatory power forms Marxism in its most
embryonic form. In fact, it is the concept of alienation which distinguishes Marx from all
others socialisms of his day. While anarchists, utopian and non-utopian socialists were
condemning capitalism, specifically private property, for its abuses in terms of the
distribution of wealth it was Marx, and Marx alone, who argued that was was alienation
that was the problem. From private property Marx deduces what he takes to be the
various forms of alienation or estrangement. They are:48
Alienation of the Worker from the Product of their Labor: From the very
beginning of the labor process alienation is at work. The designers and engineers are
themselves subject to market forces which demand not creative or expressive products
47. Ibid
48. Marx's discussion of the forms of alienation are not straight-forward nor are they
discrete. I parse and explicate them here not necessarily in idiom of Marx but in the interests
of readability and clarity of expression for this project.
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but those which will yield maximum profits. Thus, even in the genetic conditions of
production, profit and not human, expressive freedom are truly in control. Further, the
productive worker is subjected to pre-designed blue-prints and standards which, unlike
the work done by the craftspeople of the previous epochs, cannot be altered in its mass
production. Individual differences and expressions of further human creativity or
individuation by the worker are now deemed imperfections and defects. All of this
occurs in working conditions in which the worker has little or no control. Finally, the
worker produces commodities which are immediately absconded (if, given Fordist
production, the worker even encounters a unified commodity at all) and placed onto the
market purely in the interests of exchange value. Finally, the worker may encounter the
commodities of their own production for sale at rates which they could not reasonably
afford. From start to finish, an alien force compels workers of many kinds to produce
commodities which then become alien products beyond their reach.
Alienation of the Worker from Labor Itself: Work under capitalism has little room
for the creative expression of the worker. In fact, with the division of labor into smaller
and smaller fractions of the labor process the subjectivity of the individual worker
becomes itself fractured. The labor process itself becomes repetitive and mindless. What
once demanded careful attention to detail now reduces the worker to semi-consciousness,
day-dreaming, and escapism through amusement when not at work. What once could
result in a sense of pride or accomplishment becomes an endless cycle of quotas and payperiods. The relationship between tool and worker becomes inverted. Rather than the
careful eye of the craftsperson expertly wielding a tool, the increasingly de-skilled
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worker itself becomes an extension of the tool system. The worker-tool unit becomes a
machine unto itself with subjectivity dissolving in the process. Now longer does the
worker work but “work” increasingly appears to simply occur as the subjectivity of the
worker evaporates under the repetition of button pushing, lever pulling, burger-flipping,
grocery-bagging, paper writing, etc.... Labor and laborer become alien to one another in
proportion to the increase of the homogeneity and speed of commodity production.
Alienation of the Worker from Themselves or from their Species-Being
(Gattungswesen): This is perhaps the most obscure and difficult form of alienation
described by Marx, though it is also foundational to the theory itself. Borrowing directly
from Feuerbach, Marx takes it that the human being is a set of dynamic potentialities, the
central of which is their ability to create their world consciously through their labor.
Capitalism, first and foremost, sets the motive force for working outside the worker. It
conditions the worker to view their labor not as an essential aspect of the shaping of their
own world but as alien force which compels and corrals them to work for others. We
capture this when describe how we get wages as "having to go to work." Further human
beings are parts of nature – we are an animal species within it – which capitalism
increasingly finds inefficient, irrational, and there to be exploited. Marx calls nature the
"inorganic body" of the human being. Insofar as capitalism must transform nature, so too
must the worker shed their relationship to nature. The division of labor in its most
radical, capitalist form, extracts human beings out of the organic totality of nature and
renders them discrete, atomic, rational and exploitable. Pulled into a world of objects, the
once species-being of man is transformed from an organic subject to an inorganic object.
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The body itself, with the need to engage in its natural functions are seen to be
interruptions in work (i.e., lunch and bathroom “breaks,” vacations, etc) or purely
instrumental (i.e., sex as producing more workers). Indeed, even these interruptions can
be monetized (advertisements above urinals) and commodified (packaged vacation deals
and the spectacle of tourism). The human subject as a species-being, for whom creative
labor is potentially world-producing, becomes transformed into a denatured object in the
service of profits and not creative world-production.
Alienation of the worker from others: Finally, the worker is thrown into a world
of others who also must work in order to survive. The capitalists, primarily by the
introduction of machines, are able to push down the amount of workers needed and despecialize any previous craft-character of the type of labor performed. This, in turn,
allows them to keep the conditions of labor miserable because the fired workers, upon the
introduction of machines, can be used as a wedge against workers demanding higher
wages or better conditions. This “industrial reserve army” means that workers are pitted
against each other, both within the work-place (they must compete to keep their jobs),
and without it (they are utterly fungible and others are eager to take their place)
regardless of any social relation, family member, friend, co-religionist, neighbor, etc.,
they may have otherwise. The world of labor becomes a civil war of labor. All the while
the capitalist profits just as worker betrays other worker for just a chance to be exploited.
Even the capitalists themselves, even those that are good-natured, liberal-minded, and
otherwise descent human beings, must engage in such a business lest they be overtaken
by another, more apt member of their class.
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Aside from the above, Marx describes just what he takes to be the wrongdoing in
alienation, in a clear passage from The Holy Family, his attack on the socialism of the
Young-Hegelians:
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human selfestrangement (Selbstentfremdung). But the former class feels at ease and
strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognizes estrangement as its own
power, and has in it the semblance of a human existence. The class of the
proletariat feels annihilated, this means that they cease to exist in estrangement; it
sees in it its own powerlessness and in the reality of an inhuman existence. It is, to
use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement, the indignation at that abasement, an
indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its
human nature and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and
comprehensive negation of that nature. Within this antithesis, the private propertyowner is therefore the conservative side, and the proletarian the destructive side.
From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter the
action of annihilating it.49
This passage is strikingly Hegelian and takes the form of the famous Master-Slave
dialectic. From the worker's feeling of the abasement of their very human nature will
arise an indignation which, given the universal interests of the proletariat as a class, will
produce a radical emancipatory revolution. Here, in early 1845, it is the attack on the
workers' human dignity by private property that will set the conditions for revolutionary
socialism which will end alienation. Just a few months later, Marx will reject human
nature as an essence but declare that, in the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach as “But the essence
of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of
the social relations (ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse).” By 1845 I suspect
that Marx realized that the by accepting the 1844 individual, atomic character of human
essence, he was simply reproducing the kind of subject that he, in fact, had argued that
49. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch04.htm (under
Critical Comment #2)
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private property had created and liberalism enshrined. Though he ascribes this error to
Feuerbach, there can be little doubt that Marx himself is just as guilty prior to that very
sentence. As we have seen just a few months later in 1845, no doubt swinging from one
extreme (the individual essence) to another (the denial of any human subjectivity), Marx
will wholly reject human essence as a category of philosophical or, much less, ethical
analysis.
By 1847 Marx traces the accumulation of private property itself to the coerced
and thus unequal selling of labor for wages. Through the 1850's he will attempt to use
the historical materialist method to the concrete reality of the “social relations”
mentioned above and, at the same time, further trace the mechanism by which the
capitalist mode of production enslaves humanity. Alienation will not totally disappear,
though, it does undergo a radical transformation once paired with the central concern of
Marx's economic writings: exploitation.
Exploitation
The concept of “exploitation” is generally regarded as more empirical and
rigorous when compared to the more abstract, philosophical notion of alienation. In fact,
structural Marxists such as Althusser reject alienation as a mystical, Hegelian hangover
rejected by the mature, “scientific” Marx of Capital. As I have shown above, there can
be little doubt that Marx continued to view alienation as a real phenomenon for workers
under capitalism. Yet, and it makes sense, Marx certainly prioritized exploitation in his
critique of political-economy. To be sure, the concept of exploitation lies at the heart of
Marx's criticism of capitalism, especially from the late 1850's forward.
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To get at what exploitation is, we have to examine the difference between laborpower as a commodity, the power of labor to generate value, and the mediating
relationship of wages. For Marx, capitalism is a mode of production for which
commodity production and exchange are in the interests of private profit. The most
important commodity bought and sold is the labor power of workers. When the capitalist
uses the purchased labor power by which the worker creates a new commodity which can
be sold at a profit. The distinction between labor and labor power is key for
understanding Marx's notion of exploitation.50 Labor power is the commodity purchased
at a fixed rate that becomes value-generating-labor when the capitalist deploys it in the
service of further commodity production, again, in the interests of profits for the
capitalist. Surplus value is what Marx terms the difference between the value of the
wages paid for labor power and the actual amount of value generated by a worker's labor.
It is this surplus, which belongs to the capitalist, that is the necessary condition for the
possibility for profit. Insofar as the surplus value does not accrue to the worker can that
worker be said to be exploited. The worker produces surplus value and the capitalist
appropriates it. What is key here for Marx is that exploitation happens prior to the
production of profit such that better wages and more equal profit redistribution would
only hide what Marx takes as “wage slavery.” The worker must be paid for their labor
power at a rate lower than amount of value created by their labor in order for capitalism
to function as such. The primitive function of capitalism is, for Marx, the creation and
expansion of surplus value in order to then generate profits. It would only be a slight

50. Marx develops this distinction in chapters six and seven of Capital vol. 1
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exaggeration to describe the first half of Capital as working up to the uncovering of
surplus value and the second half explicating the various methods by which the capitalists
create and extract it into profits.51 The capitalist can increase the amount of surplus labor
value produces through extending the work day, intensifying the labor process, improving
productive capacity with machines and other technological improvements. Workers can
resist this through strikes, slow-gos, work-to-rule, sabotage, and organized political
resistance. For Marx, capitalism and the capitalist must efficiently maximize the
extraction of surplus labor value from its worker in order to survive in the market and the
worker must resist this process if they are to have a life worth living. This is the form of
class struggle, the irreconcilable social contradiction, at the center of contemporary
society.
Just what is wrong with exploitation for Marx? Certainly, Marx paints the
exchange in value laden terms. He employs the language of '”robbery,” “extracted
tribute,” “theft,” etc. when discussing just what happens during the process of surplus
labor value extraction and appropriation. As we have seen above, Marx, however, rejects
that the exchange of wages for labor power is unjust. If social values, such as justice,
flow from the mode of production then whatever is adequate to it is said to be just. The
worker and the capitalist both agree to the transaction and it is certainly adequate
(perhaps it is the most just exchange given Marx's understanding of origins of values) to
the capitalist mode of production. If it is unjust then justice must have its origins in
something outside of or beyond the mode of production, clearly a violation of historical
51. With the exception of the last chapter which deal with the primitive accumulation
of capital before the capitalist mode of production achieved hegemony.
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materialism. While odd, given Marx's commitment to anchoring all values in the mode
of production, one realizes why he is willing to allow what seems to be the central crime
against workers to labeled “just.”
Alan Wood suggests that “to exploit” and “to use” are synonyms and both admit
of two senses as regards others.52 In the first sense, exploitation simple means to make
use of an activity or trait of a person or thing in order to derive benefit from it. In this
sense, I can exploit the fact that my roommate has a suitcase he is not using so I can carry
more books while traveling. However, when we exploit someone in such a way that we
benefit and we gain an advantage over them by exploiting a weakness or a vulnerability,
then Wood takes it that something very different is happening. It is a very different thing
to “exploit” a humorous friend by asking them to re-tell a funny story from your shared
past for a laugh versus asking a person with a mental disability to embarrass themselves
for your amusement. If the capitalist were actually to pay the worker wages equivalent to
the value actually produced by the worker, it would be exploitation but of the first type
Wood describes. In fact, this is the myth that the capitalists uses to justify what they do:
the capitalist invested in the factory, which the worker “exploits” in order to make a
wage, and the workers works in the factory which the capitalist “exploits” in order to
produce a profit which they split between the workers and themselves such that the
factory can continue to produce commodities.
For Marx, according to Wood, this myth hides something far more sinister. What
is actually happening is that the capitalist is exploiting the worker in the second sense by

52. Wood: 1981, 245-6
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taking advantage of a vulnerability: the workers are vulnerable because if they do not sell
their labor-power to some capitalist they will starve. Further one might wonder why any
worker would agree to such a system in the first place? The answer is they didn't. Marx
describes just the historical process by which peasants and artisanal workers were
systematically corralled into cities and factories through the closing off the commons,53
the political crushing of the guilds, reprisals following peasant insurrection, etc. The
ahistorical myth of the autonomous, rational, contract-making agent told by the capitalists
hides the fact that the “justice” of the transaction between worker and capitalist was built
upon a foundation of violent coercion. Further it is agreed to under the implicit threat of
starvation for the worker and their family with the capitalist system being so total that
there are only three alternatives for workers: starvation, wage-slavery, or the overthrow of
capitalism itself. For Wood, what is wrong about exploitation is that it exploits the
vulnerability of the worker while naturalizing this process by effacing the history which
has made it possible. Wood takes it that such a relation is harmful, degrading,
humiliating, etc.
Further, and to make matters worse on Wood's reading, is that the, self-conscious,
creative productive labor is an essential aspect of just what makes a human world
distinctly human. The capitalist transforms what is the essence of what it is to be human
into a vulnerability to be used in the service of profits. In order to survive and thrive as
such the capitalist must increasingly treat the worker like an object or a thing rather than
a person. Indeed, Marx thinks that insofar as the capitalist mode of production is the

53. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch27.htm
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ground for society, such an objectification, or reification (Verdinglichung) in the Marxist
technical language, becomes the mode of all social relations. Capitalism forces subjects
to relate to each other as objects. This will prove key in the analysis. Indeed, I think that
Wood downplays its important.
The problem with this reading is that, as Wood admits, Marx virtually never
speaks in these terms. He will describe at length what is “bad” about capitalism but
rarely will Marx note what is “wrong” about it such that the capitalist ought to stop what
they are doing. Beyond the fact that Marx rejects moralizing as a mode of changing
people, I think another reason is at work in Marx's condemnation of the bourgeoisie.
Socialism is only possible when the productive capacities of the given society have
reached a point in which they can provide for the needs of all persons in that society. It is
capitalism and capitalism alone that has the ability to “continuously revolutionize the
means of production,” as Marx describes The Communist Manifesto, so as to produce the
conditions for the possibility of socialism and the proletarian agents which will usher it
in. It is perverse, but one could imagine a self-consciously Marxist capitalist telling the
equally Marxist worker that they were just doing their part in helping to build socialism!
What then explains the moralizing language to be found in Marx's condemnation
of capitalist exploitation? My sense is that Marx's moralizing language for describing
exploitation as “vampiric,” a form of “robbery,” “extortion,” etc does not originate
primarily form his own moral thinking. That is to say, I do not think that Marx is
condemning capitalist exploitation, profiteering from extracted surplus labor value
strictly speaking, from his own moral point of view or implicit ethical position. Rather,

134

he is engaging in a kind of immanent critique of the capitalist mode of production to
show that the 'justice' of its transactions is anything but and to do so on its own terms.
For Marx himself, the capitalist can do no other than exploit to thrive as a capitalist but
does so under the historical compulsion of the developments of the means of
production.54 The historical certainty of socialism is predicated upon the very same
process which gave rise to the bourgeoisie. That the system hypocritically relies on an
occluded coercive violence is only a symptom of a fundamental contradiction at the heart
of the system itself which will prove its undoing. The system itself would come under
attack from two sources. The first would be the proletariat as a class making increasingly
destabilizing demands for which capitalism, as such, cannot provide, leading to
insurrection and revolution. Further, Marx argued that internal to capitalism itself is the
tendency of profits to fall and for the system itself to thrown, from time to time, into
crisis which only debt, inflation and, finally, war could forestall. For Marx, society had
before it only two options: socialist revolution or barbaric, global warfare.

Exploitation alone is not sufficient, to my mind, to being the task of robustly
capturing Marx's thinking on the ethical. For that, I think we must turn to a final concept
which, to my mind, is a dialectical resolution of both Marx's humanism captured in the
concept of alienation and his structural analysis captured by exploitation. What I do take
him to discover, though he does not explicate at any length is that reification, the
54. I think that Marx's discussion about how no adequate punishment can be rendered
to a criminal under capitalism would also apply to the capitalists themselves. It is conspicuous
that Marx rarely, if ever, discusses post-revolutionary reprisals or punishments for individual
capitalists. Kain: 1991, 97-9 has an excellent analysis of Marx on crime, punishment and the
law.
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transformation of subjective human relations into relations between objects, is the central
social pathology of capitalism. As I will discuss at the beginning of the next chapter,
reification is a concrete, non-essence based form of alienation brought on by exploitation.
By completing this via negativa I will argue that we can discover a central, perhaps, the
central, virtue upon which Marxism is to be built: the virtue of solidarity in class struggle
as freedom.
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Chapter 4 - From Reification to Solidarity
In this final chapter, I want to arrive at what I take to be the central social
pathology of capitalism: reification. To do so I will turn back to Marx once more and
develop his theory of "fetishism of the commodity form" and along with the social
ramifications of this process. While Marx's comments here are difficult and brief, I argue
that they hold the key to understanding capitalism in a way that overcomes the onesidedness of alienation and exploitation. This process is reification (Verdinglichung).
This moment will also represent the limitations of looking to Marx for grasping the
relationship between Marxism and the ethical. Instead I will turn again to Lukács for his
analysis of this process in his landmark 1922 History and Class Consciousness. While
Lukács provides the sharpest diagnoses of this social pathology, I will argue that his dual
solutions are themselves incomplete and marred by the twins errors of workerist
spontaneism and Proto-Stalinist Substitutionism. This will end the process of the via
negativa begun in the previous chapter. Finally, I will turn to freedom as solidarity
mediated through “the actuality of revolution”as the central process by which Marxism
and the ethical relate.

Reification - Marx and the Fetishism of the Commodity Form
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Marx details two social pathologies
brought on by the capitalist mode of production. The first, alienation, seems to be an
existential-phenomenological mood1 brought on by the forced separation of the worker

1. Here I am thinking of “mood” in a kinda of Heideggerian sense.
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from the, otherwise, organic totality of production. The process by which human beings
creatively produce their world, labor, becomes a force by which workers are alienated
from themselves, others, nature, production and the products of production. Labor as an
alien force compels them onward, to further productive capacity all the “annihilating”
them in the process.
Two real limitations to this critical approach are (1) just how radically indexed the
harm is to individuals and (2) how dependent it is on a concept of substantial human
essence. Indeed, alienation seems to require a robust account of human essence which
individuates subjects in a way that Marx will reject beginning in 1845. “Human
essence,” at first, becomes an “ensemble of social relations” by 1845 and by the first
German preface to Capital in 1867 “individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are
the personifications of economic categories, bearers (Träger) of particular class-relations
and class-interests. ”2 The one-sidedness of alienation is that it leans too heavily on an
existential-phenomenology of the subject. That very subject will be called into question
by Marx's historical and economic analysis. Alienation prioritizes the subjective
condition over the objective, economic, and historical conditions. This tendency breaks
towards what has come to be know as “volunteerism,” an ultra-left leading ultimately to
anarchism through its focus on subjective, revolutionary immediacy.
The second category, exploitation, is thought to be more objective and scientific.
A worker is said to be exploited insofar as they create surplus-labor value that does not
accrue to them. Rather, it goes on to become profits for the capitalist class. All of this is

2. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htm

138

done under the direct or indirect application of coercive violence. Unlike alienation,
which seems to rely on the phenomenological affirmation of the worker, a strength of
leaning on exploitation as the central social pathology of capitalism is that it seems to
occur regardless of whether the workers know it – in fact, capitalism's greatest feat is
hiding this reality – and it can actually be manifestly calculated.3 Certainly, the
exploitation of workers is the cornerstone of the capitalists mode of production.
Unveiling its reality to workers, along with the crisis cycles brought on by the decline in
the rate of profit, must motivate them, it seems to the mature Marx, to organize and
overthrow capitalism.4
Yet, this structural analysis, along with the idea that it is historically necessary for
capitalism to collapse, produced a kind of economic quietism. This quietism took the
form of the “obstetric theory of revolution,” to use the language of Cohen. That is, it is
the task of revolutionist is to simply act as a mid-wife, delivering socialism from the ruins
of capitalism. This whole idea calls to mind the macabre phenomenon of coffin-birth.
The one-sidedness of this analysis is that it places agency into the hands of the system
and its dynamics rather than in the hands of the actual producers of society and its
revolutionary vanguard. Economism, as this error would come to be know, overprioritized objective over subjective agency. This tendency would break to the right and
become what Lenin would declare the “tailism” of democratic-socialism, with its focus
on revolutionary gradualism.
3. Marx provides these metrics in chapter 18 of Capital vol. 1
4. In fact, it seems like the kinds of study groups that Marx actually led with workers
was directly attempting to reveal to them the fact of exploitation.
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Both of these social pathologies have a one-sided character to them and appear at
divergent periods of Marx's analysis of capitalism. Indeed, they grow out of distinct
moments in the dialectic of Marx's critical project. It is my conjecture that Marx actually
provided a reconciled vision of these harms in the early sections of Capital vol. 1.
Though, he provides little more than hints at this reconciliation. This new, synthetic
harm, known as reification (Verdinglichung), is the process by which subjective, human
relations (productive and self-conscious) and objective, commodity relations
(consumptive and unconscious) are inverted, along with the accompanying naturalization
of this inversion. It occurs in capitalism because subjective, social existence
(consciousness) is mediated by objective, social existence (production) under the
hegemony of the commodity form.
Marx describes the process by which reification takes hold in section four of the
first chapter of Capital, though, it was originally an appendix in the first edition. The
section is difficult, turgid and Marx seems to assume that the process he is describing is a
well known fact to the reader when, in fact, it is one of the most creative and novel
aspects of his entire analysis. He begins with a discussion of the transformation of the
commodity and its effect on social relations. The commodity while, initially produced
for its use-value, eventually becomes exchanged and, by extension, produces society.
That is, society, for Marx, is the sphere which emerges around the production,
reproduction, and exchange of the use-values necessary for human beings. Specifically,
he argues that, given that social form is always a manifestation of the mode of
production, exchange-value has a dramatic, almost mystical effect on social relations. In
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this first instance, the production of things is mediated by their use-value with them
having a kind of immediate quality. Marx writes:
So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we
consider it from the point of view that by its properties it is capable of satisfying
human wants, or from the point that those properties are the product of human
labour. It is as clear as noon-day, that man, by his industry, changes the forms of
the materials furnished by Nature, in such a way as to make them useful to him.
The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making a table out of it. Yet, for all
that, the table continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood.5
Yet, when objects are produced so as to transfer hands via by their exchange values, i.e.,
when society adjusts to exchange-society, Marx takes it that something very strange and
ominous happens. Marx famously describes it thus:
The mystery of the commodity form, therefore, consists in the fact that in it the
social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective characteristic, a
social natural quality of the labour product itself ... The commodity form, and the
value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities,
have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material
relations arising therefrom. It is simply a definite social relation between men, that
assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things ... This I call
the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are
produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production
of commodities ... To the producers the social relations connecting the labours of
one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between
individuals at work, but as what they really are, thinglike relations between
persons and social relations between things.... To them their own social action
takes the form of the action of things, which rule the producers instead of being
ruled by them.6
First, when commodities appear on the market, they are there primarily for
exchange. To maximize the efficiency of this exchange a universal unit of exchange is
introduced, i.e. the money form. In this process of universalized exchange through the
5. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4
6. http://www.marxists.org/archive/petrovic/1965/reification.htm
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mediation of money, Marx takes it that the origin of value, labor, is obscured.7 The
commodity, rather than being seen for what it is it (the average, necessary time for the
reproduction of an use-value), appears on the market as having its value as innate in the
object of exchange itself. Price becomes confused with value. The exchange value of the
commodity appears as its primary, if not sole value. In other words, the commodity seems
to take on a life of its own. Real value, a subjective8 relation of production, is
transformed into an objective identity of value as exchange. The social relation of
production is effaced by the social relation of exchange. Rather than turn to the social
relation of production as the concrete ground of social reality and its power, we turn
towards the commodity as as if it were independent and innately valuable. The
commodity form, rather than the social relation of production, becomes seen as the
genetic condition for the reproduction of society. Indeed, the central ideological form of
capitalism is that commodity-price, as generated by the inner mysteries of the market, is
the jumping off point for political-economy. This first movement of the capitalist social
dynamic is what Marx terms the “fetishism of the commodity.”
As this process ramps up, there is a generalized, social forgetting or disavowal of
the actual source of value. Increasingly, as society is organized around the acquisition of
profits via the exchange of commodities produced through the exploitation of surplus
value – i.e., as the capitalist mode of production achieves social hegemony – social
relations (relations between subjects) become increasingly mediated through commodity
7. Surely this process is only exacerbated by the rise of mercantile agents which
further remove buyers and sellers from the process of production.
8. Subjective here in the sense as “having its origin in subjective labor” not as in the
value being assigned arbitrarily by subjects.
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relations (relations between objects). Society, being fundamentally the exchange of
values, becomes organized such that transactions of exchange values become the central
driving force. Social relations are, at first, radically subjected to exchange relations and,
over time, the two are conflated. That is to say, capitalist society is not organized around
what actually produces value (interdependent, subjective relations of labor which
produces value) but around the exchange values in the commodity form (independent,
objective relations of value as profit).
As subjective relations (which are fundamentally productive relations) are
mediated by objective relations (exchange relations under the commodity form) an
inversion occurs. Human relations, as they accommodate to this capitalist social
arrangement in its “phantom objectivity,” begin to take on the form of relations between
commodities. Not only do we worship the commodity fetish in the form of the brand, for
instance, but we seek to brand ourselves, and relate to each other as such. As capitalism
becomes total, i.e., it becomes the mode of social production, the inversion is nearly
completed: objects rule the lives of subjects and subjects relate to each other as objects.
Reification is this double process.9

9. An example of all this can be seen, among other realms of social life, in the
phenomenon of branding. Two exact commodities, produced by the same workers in the same
conditions, can command two different exchange values in that one is branded differently (by
a logo, etc). Further, and in some ways even more insidiously, we can be trained to actually
desire the branded item despite knowing that they are otherwise identical. This captures the
two senses of “fetish” used by Marx. In the first sense, the item mystically takes on the ability
to command an exchange value without there being any real difference in the use-value or
labor used to produce it. Secondly, we come to actually appreciate this mystical power and
actually acquiesce to it as if it were anything other than the result of human hands. Finally,
this process is naturalized or becomes "second-nature."
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Marx, tends to focus on the first movement of the process (the fetish-like power of
commodities) while dealing very little with just how this effects social relations. For
instance, he describes this first movement of reification in the third volume of Capital
chapter 48:
In capital-profit, or still better capital-interest, land-ground rent, labour-wages, in
this economic trinity represented as the connection between the component parts
of value and wealth in general and its sources, we have the complete mystification
of the capitalist mode of production, the reification (Verdinglichung) of social
relations and immediate coalescence of the material production relations with
their historical and social determination. It is an enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy
world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their ghost-walking
as social characters and at the same time directly as things.10
Curiously, neither Engels nor the Marxists of the First or Second International take up an
analysis of reification at any length, to my knowledge. Despite this, I take it that
reification is the central social pathology of capitalism in that it overcomes the one-sided
aspects of both alienation and exploitation. Specifically, it captures alienation as a
relation between subjects qua objects and it captures exploitation as mode by which
objects come to rule over subjects. Indeed, it strikes me that reification may prove to be
the condition for the possibility of both exploitation and alienation in their particular
forms. It resolves the one-sidedness of both harms by understanding that the basic
character of capitalism is that the totality of social relations is mediated through the
commodity form. It is here that, while Marx does provide the mechanism for
understanding the central social pathology of capitalism, he provides us virtually no
sustained analysis of the social impacts of this phenomenon. If we are to proceed further,

10. http://www.marxists.org/archive/petrovic/1965/reification.htm
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and we must, then here we must leave Marx behind. While Marx primarily focuses on
how commodities take on this mystical, fetish-like character, it was Lukács who wrote
the most systematic account of discrete character of reification in his monumental 1922
History and Class Consciousness. I want to turn now to an exploration of these harms
and how Lukács thinks that reification provides the conditions for overcoming it.

Reification – Lukács and the World of Fragmentation
Lukács agrees with Marx that the riddle of the commodity form, as the basic
structure of capitalist social relations, is the key to understanding both the inner dynamics
of social reproduction, but also just how it is we can achieve human liberation through
socialism. Marx's Capital is the key to understanding this process on the objective,
economic side. The mystery of the commodity is answered by unveiling the reality of the
production and extraction or surplus labor value. Lukács' question is the one Marx, and
subsequent Marxists, more or less ignore. “What is at issue here, however, is the
question: how far is commodity exchange together with its structural consequences able
to influence the total outer and inner life of society?”11 In order for the commodity form
to be able to influence the internal, subjective aspects of society, it must be the sole mode
by through which society reproduces itself. Capitalism is just the name for this total
reign of the commodity form. The production of commodities qua the commodity form,
for Lukács, means an ever-intensification of the quantitative speed and specialization of
the labor process. He describes it as follows:

11. Lukács: 1972, 84
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If we follow the path taken by labour in its development from the handicrafts via
cooperation and manufacture to machine industry we can see a continuous trend
towards greater rationalisation, the progressive elimination of the qualitative,
human and individual attributes of the worker. On the one hand, the process of
labour is progressively broken down into abstract, rational, specialised operations
so that the worker loses contact with the finished product and his work is reduced
to the mechanical repetition of a specialised set of actions. On the other hand, the
period of time necessary for work to be accomplished (which forms the basis of
rational calculation) is converted, as mechanisation and rationalisation are
intensified, from a merely empirical average figure to an objectively calculable
work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and established reality.12
This dual increase means that the commodity is fractured into specially produced parts
within a temporality which is equally capable of rational calculation and prediction. With
the fragmentation of the object of labor follows the fragmentation of the worker
themselves:
Neither objectively nor in his relation to his work does man appear as the
authentic master of the process; on the contrary, he is a mechanical part
incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it already pre-existing and selfsufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws
whether he likes it or not. As labour is progressively rationalised and mechanised
his lack of will is reinforced by the way in which his activity becomes less and
less active and more and more contemplative.13
Rather than rationality taking the form of creative, productive power in the interests of
lowering overall labor time and increasing leisure, it takes the form of passive
“contemplation” and systems of calculation in the interests profits. Productive capacity,
rather then serving to improve the human condition, is used to transform the worker into
a machine. While human needs are finite, profits can be infinite. In Lukács' thinking, the
12. Op. Cit., 88.
13. Op. Cit., 90.
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fragmentation of the commodity is followed in pace by the fragmentation of the worker.
The atomizing of the objects of production results in the atomizing of productive
subjects. And, by extension, “The fate of the worker becomes the fate of society as a
whole; indeed, this fate must become universal as otherwise industrialisation could not
develop in this direction.”14 In order for industrial capitalism, much less imperial, finance
capital, to persist at all, it must do so in an ever expansive and intensifying manner.
Capitalism, social mediation through the commodity form, becomes total only insofar as
its social base fragments, atomizes, and comes to accept this situation as natural.
Reification means that the ascendancy of capitalism ensures the fragmentation of
its social base. This fragmentation, according to Lukács, produces an epistemological
impediment for grasping what is actually happening. The various disciplines which seek
to understand society do so only in the isolation of their field. They are left to frame
questions of social formation and criticism while increasingly unable to grasp society in
its totality. They attempt to derive laws in their various regions without an attempt to
grasp the whole. Indeed, if the various fields of bourgeois investigations were to turn to
the center of the system they would be faced with an immense irrationality. While the
various fields of social and scientific investigation attempt to produces laws which
govern their own regions of investigation, at the center of the whole social system, is as
market ruled by the fetish of the commodity whose rules must necessarily remain
inscrutable and unpredictable if the system is to work at all. Lukács writes “It is evident
that the whole structure of capitalist production rests on the interaction between a

14. Op. Cit., 91.
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necessity subject to strict laws in all isolated phenomena and the relative irrationality of
the total process.”15 As capitalism becomes universal, the human system of knowledge
also fragments, unable to grasp society in its totality. Science itself fragments and is
atomized such that it is increasingly “debarred from comprehending the development and
the demise, the social character of its own material base, no less than the range of
possible attitudes towards it and the nature of its own formal system.”16
Philosophy, in that it springs from this reified, contemplative consciousness, can
only helplessly express such relations: it descends into either an embrace of the totality
through formal, even mathematical approaches, to trans/non-historical problems of
essences or substances, or romantically rejects it and turns toward mysticism,
obscurantism, kabbalistic plays of language, and poetry. Either turn produces antinomies
philosophy cannot resolve, things-in-themselves it cannot know, essences and subjects
without histories, structures without subjects, or dilettantish relativism which does not
even pretend to knowledge of the world. From the fragmented standpoint of the
bourgeois world, grasp of the totality is both necessary and impossible.17

The Proletarian Standpoint of Totality
For Lukács, the capitalist mode of production, its supporting social relations, and
the historical forces which gave rise to it form an interlocking system which he and later

15. Op. Cit., 102
16. Op. Cit., 105.
17. Op. Cit., 148-9.
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Marxists will refer to by the categorical term “totality.”18 It this category, and the appeal
to it, that will make Marxism distinct from virtually all other modes of knowing and
doing in the world. In fact, all of his project can be summarized:
It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes
the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of
view of totality.19 The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the
whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from
Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science.
The capitalist separation of the producer from the total process of production, the
division of the process of labour into parts at the cost of the individual humanity
of the worker, the atomisation of society into individuals who simply go on
producing without rhyme or reason, must all have a profound influence on the
thought, the science and the philosophy of capitalism. Proletarian science is
revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which it opposes to
bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. The primacy of the
category of totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in science.20
There are important aspects of understanding Lukács thinking on totality and how it will
come to bear on the relation between Marxism and ethics. The first is that while the
totality is material, complete, and closed, it is marked by internal antagonisms and social
contradictions. There is no “outside” of the totality but the totality itself marked by
internal convulsions which threaten its coherence (e.g., the fight for the work day is a
central such contradiction for Marx) which the present mode production necessarily
produces but, for which, it can offer no resolution. The inversion of this aspect of the
18. “Totality,” like many of the other concepts in Marxist thought, have their origin in
Hegelian thinking. Martin Jay's 1984 Marxism and Totality does a thorough, though often
thin, genealogy of “totality” in Marxist thinking.
19. Lukács will recant of this position in the 1967 declaring it idealist for not putting
economics first and foremost. My sense is that economics is still the “structure in
dominance,” to use Althusser's language, in this discussion of totality. Tracking the
vicissitudes of Lukács' criticism/self-criticism is itself an adventure in dialectics.
20. Lukacs: 1971, 27
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totality is that the potential for revolutionary socialism is actually immanent to the totality
itself. The class struggle is not only a symptom of the irreconcilable contradictions of
capitalism but the very mechanism through which it will be overcome. We have already
seen his initial thoughts on this process in the 1919 essay “Tactics and Ethics.” He will
develop this idea, as I will discuss below, in his short 1924 book on Lenin as “the
actuality of the revolution.”
Secondly, and equally crucial for Lukács, is that all social relations (including
what we take to be our self-relation) are mediated through these social antagonisms. We
all relate to the totality as such, but we always do with with a consciousness shaped by
our position in this system of power. The material contradictions of production forms the
horizon for consciousness, which is then mediated through further contradictory
institutions and social relations. In other words, the mode of production produces in
consciousness the condition which will count for truth and the modes which such a truth
can be had. This forms an interlocking system of mode of production, Marx's “ruling
ideas,” and, the role of “ideology” as/in consciousness. Furthermore, the position within
this system of power also forms the conditions by which immediate or objective truths
appear to a subject. Immediacy and mediation in relation to power over the means of
production become the standpoint through which the forms of subjectivity appear and
recognizes objectivity as such. Lukács puts it:
Immediacy and mediation are therefore not only related and mutually
complementary ways of dealing with the objects of reality. But corresponding to
the dialectical nature of reality and the dialectical character of our efforts to come
to terms with it, they are related dialectically. That is to say that every mediation
must necessarily yield a standpoint from which the objectivity it creates assumes
the form of immediacy.

150

We confront the objective reality of productive forces from the standpoint of a
consciousness mediated by, i.e., produced, by a relation to the contradiction inherent in
those forces. If Marx is correct, and Lukács certainly thinks that he is, social forces in
this epoch are fundamentally organized around the ability or inability to produce and
extract surplus labor value. In this sense, the primary social contradiction breaks in two
directions. This break, in turn, produces two fundamental and opposed standpoints
through which consciousness can confront, interpret, and transform the totality: the
reified, fragmented standpoint of the bourgeoisie and the class-conscious, unified
standpoint of the proletariat.
I have already discussed the standpoint of the bourgeoisie in the sections about
fragmentation above. The bourgeois standpoint fundamentally rejects the category of
totality. In that it fundamentally understands value to be exchange value, and is therefore
an acolyte of the commodity-fetish, the bourgeois standpoint is marked by a
fragmentation which it cannot see past:
Now this is the relation of bourgeois thought to the social and historical reality of
bourgeois society – illuminated and made transparent as it has been by a
multiplicity of mediations. Unable to discover further mediations, unable to
comprehend the reality and the origin of bourgeois society as the product of the
same subject that has ‘created’ the comprehended totality of knowledge, its
ultimate point of view, decisive for the whole of its thought, will be that of
immediacy.21
From the bourgeois standpoint, reality is a immediate, brute fact of atomic, competitive
social particles, and their essences driven on by timeless, mechanical, and necessary laws.
21. Op. Cit., 156.
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The immediate is taken as the real and social contradictions are disavowed as momentary
blips which will be balanced by the invisible hand of the market. Class, the social
category of antagonism, is central in this disavowal. From the bourgeois standpoint,
there are no classes, per se. There is, rather, a continuum in the accumulation of
exchange values which arbitrarily corresponds to “lower,” “middle,” and “upper classes”
that is tracked by aggregates of individuals. For the bourgeoisie, there are simply better
or worse off bourgeoisie. History has no bearing upon social relations, philosophical
problems, or the production of scientific facts. In its decadent form, there are no facts,
only atomic, subjective interpretations. In its positivist form, there are no subjects, only
objects ruled by mechanical necessity. For Lukács, both one-sided bourgeois variants
result from the irrationality of the market and the mystifications it produces in/as
consciousness.
The social position within the concrete totality of history and production throws
the proletariat into a rather contentious position. One the one hand, the bourgeoisie
control the mode of production and their ideas, what Marx's “ruling ideas,” are taken to
be both the immediate facts of the world and the criteria by which truth is established.
Hegemony over the means of production entails, to a significant degree, a hegemony on
truth and facts. Social power, in its many macroscopic (physically coercive via violence)
and microscopic (mentally coercive via ideology) forms, is consolidated into the hands of
the bourgeoisie.
Indeed, this period, in Marx's language, is just the “dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie” insofar as they, as a class, dictate the scope and direction of the reproduction
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of social and productive relations.22 Politics, liberal-parliamentary or otherwise, is simply
civil war between proletariat and bourgeoisie carried out by another means, namely, via
the state apparatus. Given the hegemony of the bourgeois control over the means of
production, voting is, as Lenin put it, the masses selecting every few years which faction
of the ruling class will oppress them. Despite this hegemony, the standpoint of the
proletariat has a kind of epistemological privilege in the process of understanding the
world in order to change it. That it must, as a class,23 abide this contradiction gives it the
chance to grasp it as such.
Despite the illusions hoisted onto the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, Marx and
Lukács take it that the proximity to production and its accompanying immiseration
provides the proletariat with the kind of mediated consciousness that will reveal to them,
not only the existence of the historical and social totality in its concreteness and
contradictions but, also, the means by which to overcome it. In fact, it is precisely this
contradictory, dialectical place in social and productive relations and it expression in
22. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” has been a term of great misunderstanding
and abuse. Balibar's 1977 monograph on the subject is among the clearest and best. I lean on
his understanding of “dictatorship” here.
23. Lukács' analysis is almost always at the register of the class, even when he speaks
of a "subject." Individualist misreadings have led some to think that Lukács has a
volunteerist, ultra-left tendency operating just below the surface of his analysis. I don't have
the desire to psychologize his work and I think that when he writes (on Op. Cit., 193):
The individual can never become the measure of all things. For when the individual
confronts objective reality he is faced by a complex of ready-made and unalterable
objects which allow him only the subjective responses of recognition or rejection. Only
the class can relate to the whole of reality in a practical revolutionary way. (The ‘species’
cannot do this as it is no more than an individual that has been mythologised and stylised
in a spirit of contemplation.) And the class, too, can only manage it when it can see
through the reified objectivity of the given world to the process that is also its own fate.
It is a rather definite statement of the register at which his analysis is operating.
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proletarian consciousness that will form the necessary conditions for the liberation of
human, and not merely, proletarian labor. Unlike the consumptive-consciousness of the
bourgeoisie, the proletariat is less able to be perpetually fooled by the fetish-like
character of the commodity form. Because their labor is actually used to produce value,
the confrontation with the stark reality that there is nothing near a labor-wage-commodity
isomorphism is inevitable. The proletariat is simply more likely to hate their jobs and
revolt at their exploitation. In the first place, the proletariat, on Marx's and Lukács' view,
is more likely to see through the mystification of the commodity form. In the second
case, the proletariat is more likely to encounter their existence as a problem for them for
which only a historical answer will suffice. For the proletariat, the “present is a historical
problem.”
Unlike the bourgeoisie, the proletariat as a class can overcome the fragmentation
and atomizing of social life, turning from the passive “contemplative attitude” to active
theoretical investigation (the historical and social forces of their shared immiseration) and
practice (the economic and political struggle). For the proletariat, it is neither possible to
investigate without practicing (to know the truth about the origins of their predicament
without action is unthinkable) nor can they, in the long them, practice without
investigation (actions like burning a factory or rioting merely further to root them in the
very situation they seek to escape). The immediate facts of social existence are a thing to
be overcome through the mediation of theory and practice. In general, Lukács takes it
that the bourgeois world of atomic objects driven by eternal, mechanistic laws will be
epistemologically reshaped (i.e., seen from the standpoint of the proletariat) into a system
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of processes propelled at their root in deeply protean social relations. While the
bourgeois news reports the rise in barometric pressure, temperature, the rise and fall of
stock prices, and the value of gold as equally natural and unstoppable, the proletarian
may very well revolt if a drop in stock prices means the evaporation of their pension.24
While for the bourgeoisie, consciousness and subjective relations are to be brought into
harmony with objective facts about human nature or an a-historical veil of ignorance, the
proletariat will understand that history just is the overcoming of these objective facts
through revolutions in productive forces. For the proletariat, as Lukács puts it, “The
absolute is nothing but the fixation of thought, it is the projection into myth of the
intellectual failure to understand reality concretely as a historical process.”25 All of this
culminates towards the end of the third and final section of History and Class
Consciousness:
Reification is, then, the necessary, immediate reality of every person living in
capitalist society. It can be overcome only by constant and constantly renewed
efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to the
concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by becoming
conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total
development.26
Lukács was quite clear what form this revolutionary proletarian praxis was to take: the
revolutionary party of Lenin. Indeed, the last chapter, often unread and rarely quoted

24. The bourgeoisie have given over sovereignty to the market and, by extension, have
sacrificed their consciousness to the commodity-fetish such that they cannot question the market
at all. When the market falls they have no other choice but to accept given the pact they have
made. The proletariat has made no such pact.
25. Op. Cit., 187.
26. Op. Cit., 197.
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though Lukács himself thought it the culmination of the entire text, of History and Class
Consciousness is a philosophical analysis of the practical question of party organization
of which he would conclude:
The party as a whole transcends the reified divisions according to nation,
profession, etc., and according to modes of life (economics and politics) by virtue
of its action. For this is oriented towards revolutionary unity and collaboration and
aims to establish the true unity of the proletarian class. And what it does as a
whole it performs likewise for its individual members.27
This attitude toward the organizational question would eventually lead to Lukács
becoming kind of liminal figure in the history of Marxist thought. On the one hand, he
would be attacked as a “professor,” along with Karl Korsch (the two most responsible for
the revitalization of Marxist philosophy), by none other than Zinoviev at the 5th congress
of the Comintern in July of 1924. The criticisms by Rudas and others of History and
Class Consciousness would be taken as the official position. Sadly, Lukács would selfcriticize and become a lukewarm supporter of Stalin.28
Despite this, his insistence on these “constant and constantly renewed efforts” as praxis
against the fragmentation brought on by the central social pathology of capitalism,
reification, that will form the core of what I take to be the core answer to the social
pathology of reification.
Lukács would remain too intellectual for the East and too dogmatic for the West.
I would agree with and expand the analysis of Lucien Goldmann on the role of Lukács'
27. Op. Cit., 339.
28. We now know that Lukács had a kind of “eppur si muove” attitude to his critics
even through the mid-20's. His defense of History and Class Consciousness, especially the
defense of his attack on Engel's theory of nature and the still-contentious notion of “imputed
class consciousness,” would be published in English in 2002 as Tailism and the Dialectic.
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influence. In his 1973 study Lukács and Heidegger, Goldmann argues that philosophy in
the 1920's was set to more or less fracture along two lines. Either, it would have broken
to the left and followed the analysis of the category of totality led by Lukács, or it would
broken to the right and followed the analogous category of Heidegger, Being (Sein).
Indeed, it is hard not to read into Heidegger's conception of Dasein in Being and Time
(1927) as “that being for whom its being is of concern to it” as a response to Lukács
conception of the proletariat in History and Class Consciousness (1922) as “that class for
whom the present is a historical problem for it.” Further, at the very end of Being and
Time Heidegger asks, though without naming Lukács:
It has long been known that ancient ontology works with 'thing-concepts' and that
there is a danger of 'reifying consciousness.' But what does this 'reifying' signify?
Where does it arise Why does Being get 'conceived' 'proximally' in terms of the
present at hand...What does this reifying always keep coming back to exercise its
domination?"29
While the “forgetting of being” forms the exoteric answer to this question for Heidegger,
I am taken with Goldmann's vision that Being and Time is itself, among other things, an
attempt by Heidegger to dispel the revolution of Lukács at the register of theory. The
two, divergent paths still leave their imprint on continental philosophy30 and “reification”
has made a recent comeback in the works of critical theorist Axel Honneth.31
29. Heidegger: 1964, 369
30. Sartre is the notable attempt to reconcile the two positions. He will try to wed
Lukács' commitment to the category of totality with the existential analytic of Dasein in his
Critique of Dialectical Reasoning. I can't admit to being able to make heads or tails of it,
however.
31. Though interesting in its own right, Honneth's mis-recognition theory of
reification strikes me as having little in common with Lukács' theory, despite the former's
desire to reinvigorate the concept.
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The Limitations of Lukács
Just how did Lukács imagine the path out of capitalism and its reifying force?
Again, I take it that philosophy is the result of its time and material position. We must
turn back to the period of History and Class Consciousness in the life of Lukács and the
world around him to grasp the strength and limitations of his answer. First and foremost,
Lukács' world was one of unimaginable social upheaval. In Hungary alone, hundreds of
thousands of workers were joining Bolshevik style soviets in what appeared to be the
beginnings of worldwide social revolution. The same had just happened in Russia and
revolutionary fighting was beginning in the streets of Berlin. A general strike called by
far-left workers was racking France. It must have appeared that imperialist war and the
harshly lived reality of labor alone had produced a proletariat ready for a final fight with
capitalism. The reality is that years of organizing, much of which had been done
haphazardly by anarchists and populists, had sewn the seeds of revolution within the
working class and peasantry. Further, the cadrefication of the revolutionists by the
Bolsheviks had produced a tight network of professionals who had experience in all
levels of organizing: from producing leaflets, managing strike actions, street protest, all
the way to robbing banks to fund the revolution (a young revolutionary initially named
Koba was the most famed Bolshevik bank robber – he would later call himself Stalin).
Tight organizational structure, the material conditions of Russia, and a program which
directly addressed the needs of workers (all power to the soviets) and peasants (all land to
the peasants) resulted in a base of support which was often much further to the left than
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the Bolshevik leadership. Lenin himself was decried as an adventurist anarchist by other
Bolsheviks. It is too often forgotten that on the eve of the October Revolution there were
only three subjects who supported armed insurrection: Lenin, Trotsky, and the masses of
workers and peasants. The seizure of power by the armed masses was anything but
spontaneous, mechanical, or inevitable.
It is my sense that the Lukács of the earlier sections of History and Class
Consciousness, a text written from 1920-22, was still under the spell of a kind of
“romantic” theory of revolution. This would include the most well-know and widely read
essays “Class Consciousness,” which Lukács had actually re-worked to remove previous
ultra-left errors, and the text under consideration above, “Reification and the
Consciousness of the Proletariat.” In these essays Lukács seems to maintain that there is
a mechanical relationship between the standpoint of the proletariat and their automatic
tendency towards revolutionary socialism. The epistemological privilege of the worker is
sufficient for them to grasp the totality. This will, in turn, result in their class conscious
turn to revolutionary politics. This strikes me as neither theoretically, much less,
empirically, the case. Again, it is not difficult to imagine why Lukács would have
thought such a thing. From his point of view, from his standpoint, it appeared as if
precisely this was occurring.32

32. Lenin, by 1901-2, had already foreseen a variant of this error. He writes in What
is to be Done:
Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without; that is,
only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between
workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this
knowledge is the sphere of relationships (of all classes and strata) to the state and the
government, the sphere of the interrelations between all classes.
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While convinced by the successes of the Bolsheviks in Russia, Lukács must have
been hardened by the crushing of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by Romanian forces in
the summer of 1919. The Lukács of 1922-4 seems crucially distanced from the
romanticism of 1919 or the workerist spontaneism of 1920-1. The messianism, however,
remains firmly in place and by 1924 reaches its high-point immediately following the
death of Lenin. During this period, Lukács begins to turn away from the workerism of
“Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” and tempers it with the Leninist
focus on organization and the party apparatus as the means by which socialism will be
achieved. “Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization,” the last essay of
History and Class Consciousness, begins this turn and the short Lenin text of 1924
completes it. Indeed, I would argue that Lenin should be read as a corrective to the onesidedness of the earlier texts. Yet, without those texts, Lenin itself has a cultic and protoStalinist character. Rarely are the two studied in unison: the 1924 Lenin was disavowed
in the West and the 1922 History and Class Consciousness faced the same fate in the
East. Even read in in unison, neither is quite sufficient to ground a Marxist relation to the
ethical.
While I think that Lukács has done more than anyone else to diagnose reification
as the central social pathology of capitalism, his answers for just how to overcome it
suffer from two limitations. The 1922 solution is marked by workerist spontaneism and
The error here would later go on to be deemed “workerism,” the idea that the worker, lacking
the revolutionary theory of Marxism, could spontaneously come to class consciousness and
overthrown capitalism. The most they could achieve, according to Lenin, was “trade-union
consciousness.” Lars T Lih has recently and convincingly argued, however, that the Stalinist
English translations of “What is to be Done” have actually contributed to a deep misreading of
this text and that Lenin's position is actually far more subtle than is usually appreciated.
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the later 1924 position is marked by proto-Stalinist substitutionism.33 Neither of these
will suffice to beat back the process of reification, nor the capitalist system which gives
rise to it. Yet, both of these positions make sense given the specifics of Lukács's personal
and historical position. What, then, did Lukács lack? Many revolutionaries, especially
though whose personal maturity corresponds with a situation of revolutionary maturity,
often inherit power without having done the organizing work which gave rise to it. One
wonders how many commissars gained their position because they happened to be a
Marxist at the right time and place versus how many Marxists actually organized their
way to power? Lukács certainly inherited more power, both political and military, than
he organized. Here we are close to a positive position. If reification is the process by
which subjects become objects and vice versa, we can then come to the end of this via
negativa. That is, we can wonder what relationship between subjects resists this process
and positively organizers worker power. I forward the view that the relationship in
question is nothing other than that of proletarian solidarity.

Marx and the Ethical
As a way of concluding, I want to draw out what I take to be the central building
blocks for thinking about the relationship between Marx, Marxism, and the ethical. I do
not say “Marx's ethics” for a reasons which I hope are clear enough by now. Given that
33. Substitutionism, a criticism initially developed by Trotsky in response by what he
took to be the autocratic tendency he predicted would result from Lenin's position in “What is
to be Done?” in which “the organisation of the party substitutes itself for the party as a whole;
then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organisation; and finally the ‘dictator’
substitutes himself for the Central Committee.” Needless to say, his criticism was prescient
though I am reluctant to pin the blame on Lenin's theoretical position.
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his project is primarily critical, coupled with his anti-utopian commitments, it is my
opinion that Marx himself nowhere provides a positive ethical framework for his project.
In fact, he actively resists doing so. This is unsurprising for several reasons. I think the
two most important of which are Marx's commitment to what he took to be a scientific
analysis of capitalism as a unsustainable mode of production. The resultant social
pathologies were, by his later writings, of a more of less secondary character, something
akin to symptoms of a disease. It seems to me, to continue this metaphor, Marx simply
did not think it possible to cure the disease of capitalism by morally condemning its
symptoms. Further, he likely also avoided such a tactic in the service of separating his
criticisms of capitalism from what he took to be his “moralizing” counterparts in the
radical left scene of the mid to late 19th century. I think that Marx made a strategic
decision to forgo, a much as possible, ethical language because it took it to be counterproductive for his critical project in that it fed into a discourse which he ultimately felt
was a historical dead-end. Condemnations of capitalism along ethical grounds either had
no teeth, i.e., they were idealist in character, or they played into a discourse which only
helped to strengthen the kind of values which capitalism itself created and endorsed.
When Marx does engage in moralizing language, it seems primarily for engaging
in an immanent criticism of bourgeois society and its disavowed reliance on capitalism.
He uses liberal, bourgeois ethical thinking to show that liberal, bourgeois capitalism
undermines those very ideals and values. Not only does capitalism mean the inevitable
future of socialism for Marx, it also means the inevitable end of liberalism. For as
capitalism goes into decline, rocked by crisis after crisis, it will require more and more
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authoritarian regimes to revive and sustain it. While liberalism dreams of rights and
freedoms, capitalism secretly wait to devour those ideals if need be. For the Marxist, the
decline in the rate of profit is simply a countdown to fascism and war. While, for Marx,
this inevitable, grand catastrophe would simply be the birth-pangs of an equally
inevitable socialism, such a position is simply untenable after Hiroshima and Auschwitz.
At this juncture of history it is just as naïve to hide behind “the inevitable triumph of
socialism” as it is to think that liberalism and its bourgeois ethical foundations will
forever forestall a plunge into a civilization-ending catastrophe. Marx did not, and
Marxists must not, criticize society from a standpoint removed from actually existing
conditions. Rather, he assumed the very values of the class in dominance and worked to
show how capitalism does not and cannot deliver on those high ideals. Marx is often
painted as the grand enemy of bourgeois society and its values. I think the reality is
much more subtle. Buried infamously in the Marquis de Sade's Philosophy of the
Bedroom is the revolutionary tract “Frenchmen, One More Effort, if You Want to be
Republicans!” where the divine marquis argues that if the revolutionaries are to realize
their aims they must not only remove the aristocrats but also religion and all its
superstitious trappings. Only Robespierre was willing to go so far with his desire to
transform religion in France to the “cult of supreme reason.” Of course, this was too
much and he had to settle for the “cult of the supreme being.” Marx's project has a
similar flavor. It could be thought of as a “Bourgeoisie, one more effort, if you want to
be Liberals!” That one more effort through which liberals ideals like “freedom,”
“equality,” “fraternity,” “reason,” “dignity,” etc. could be realized is by the overcoming of
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the capitalist mode of production. It could be said that Marx did not come to destroy
liberal values but to fulfill them.
Regardless, we are left with little to grasp of Marx's positive project. Even
practically, we only have his criticism of plans, such as the Gotha Program, for actually
building socialism. Yet, as I hope to have shown, Marx does provide some clues which
can be gleaned via negativa in the development of his criticisms of capitalism. From
reification, what I take to be the most cogent form of his criticism of the capitalism, I
think we can glean that solidarity is a key building block for a Marxist relation to the
ethical. I will sketch this out more clearly below. Beforehand, however, I want to extract
what I take to be some genetic principles for framing that discussion.
My sense is that the conversation can break in two fundamentally different
directions because Marx equivocates on what he takes communism to be. There are
many places in which Marx takes it that communism will a state of affairs which will be
established sometime in the future. This is what I would term the “substantive theory of
communism.” In this version, communism is the mode of production in that period
following the resolution of the contradiction between forces and relations of production
through socialism. Communism, on this model is “the end of history,” recalling, for
Marx, that history is just class struggle, and classes as such will have vanished. If one
accepts this model of communism, for which there is ample textual evidence, a Marxist
consequentialism is directly deducible. This is the position taken by Steven Lukes34 and I
think a great deal of Marxists who invoke a kind of “only history can judge” mentality.

34. Lukes: 1985, 139 and following
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To my mind, this model of communism is a straightforward inheritance of Hegelian
formalism and retains a utopian character which, if followed out, results in a rejection of
historical materialism. It is also my contention that the “actuality of revolution,” the very
condition which ensures for the possibility of socialist revolution, actually forecloses
upon the possibility of a Marxist consequentialism. History may be the judge, in the
longest of terms, but the Marxist revolutionary must forgo its judgment if they are to
avoid falling into the dead-end of utopian idealism.
This formal-Hegelian conception of communism as a future state of affairs can be
answered by an equally supportable position that first originates in 1845 where Marx
writes, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to
which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which
abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the
premises now in existence.”35 Though, rather than merely quoting Marx to discover what
position is the most properly Marxist, I think we must turn to his method. What I want to
tease out is a theory of communism as a process grounded on what Lukács' termed “the
actuality of the revolution”36 in the thinking of Lenin.

35. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm
36. He develops what strikes me as a crucial insight into Marxism in just a few short
pages of the 1924 Lenin text though the nucleus of it can be found as early as the 1919
“Tactics and Ethics” text this project began discussing. Indeed, this whole project has taken
on a kind of parabolic arc with a discussion of Marx bookended by questions raised and
solved by Lukács.
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Historical Materialism, Virtue, and “The Actuality of the Revolution”
Marx never wavered on his commitment to the method of historical materialism.
Indeed, I think he often overly simplified his own discovery and prematurely attempted to
derive predictions for the future of society. The means of production and the relations of
production that maintained it form the well-spring and horizon for the specific contents of
human consciousness and their expressions as culture. Historical materialism implies
that a given epoch's mode of production forms the horizon of human consciousness
which is thereby mediated by the various relations of production to form a historical
circuit: the concrete totality. Concepts such as duty, happiness, rationality, utility and
their accompanying psychological motivations are, according to historical materialism,
only ultimately given content in terms of the mode of production and the social relations
which sustain them. For Marx, the “subject” is a kind of container given shape by the
mode of production and filled in by the relations of production. The subject is a “bearer
of social relations” not an essence in itself. While it is possible to go in the direction of
philosophical anthropology, I am highly resistant to this track. Specifically, it is my
contention that attempts to divine the a priori nature of the “human” always already is in
the business of unconsciously re-inscribing the current predicament of the subject back
onto a supposedly a-historical entity. Despite this concern I suspect that a classconscious phenomenological analysis of proletarian subjectivity is in order. I am not,
however, able to perform such an analysis here.
The historical character of the subject means at least two things for the category of
the ethical for Marxism. The first is it, like all expressions of human consciousness, is a

166

historical artifact. The ethical is, in the final analysis, the result of a process and not a
thing-in-itself for which a-historical truths are possible. There can be no study of the
ethical or ethics in itself and attempts to do so are ideological. The ever-becoming of
history means that there are no human beings only human becomings. Indeed, this is just
what Marx takes to be so devilish about the category of the ethical: no other category so
desperately attempts to pass itself off as a-historical as does that of the ethical.
It is not difficult to surmise why. A sculpture may or may not be “graceful,”
reality may have four or ten categories, God may or may not know particulars, but the
moment slaves tell masters “No, and never again!” despite ethical imperatives like
“honor” or “duty,” the very structure of social reality convulses. The ethical has an odd
double-duty in Marx's thinking. It must at the same time (1) maintain enough harmony
between the relations and the forces of production that serious insurrection does not break
out (i.e., it must actually make people think that enough “justice” and “fairness” persists
in society) and (2) it must stack the deck of values such that the dominant values
ultimately legitimate the oppressions and means of control for that epoch's ruling class. It
is akin to a casino that must allow people to win from time to time while remaining
profitable in the long run.
For this to work, the historicity of the ethical must be disavowed if people are to
readily internalize it. Moral internalism is always a triumph for the ruling class.
Philosophers may even be allowed to debate its finer points, or even write dissertations
calling the whole matter into question, just so long as the entire affair is quarantined by
academic irrelevance and commodified through publications, professionalization,
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enrollment, and “success rates.” The “ethical” may37 be a social fact, both in the sense
that there may never be a society for which there are no norms, and in the sense that those
norms are produced to support a given mode of production, and its accompanying
relations. This is as true for feudalism and capitalism as it will be for socialism. The
only difference is that, for one reading of Marx, under communism there will be no
contradiction between relations of production, and its social demands, and the forces of
production and their ability to actually deliver on those social demands.
If historical materialism is the case, ethical systems are to be evaluated by their
adequacy to the ruling mode of production, and it supporting relations. By extension, it
seems to me, that a Marxist must understand the category of the ethical similarly to how
“ethos” functioned in the ancient Greek world, though, for very different reasons. For the
Hellene the question of “ethos” was one of having the right kind of character, doing the
correct thing, at the correct time, in the correct way, for the role one played in a given
milieu. The “ethos” of the solider need not, and should not, be that of the slave, or the
gentleman. Each role had it own virtues: the wife should not act like a hetaira nor a
hetaira like a wife. Even Aristotle's attempt to systematize the various “ethoi” did so
under the rubric of creating a certain kind of citizen for the continuation of the polis. I
suspect that Aristotle's commitment to the longevity of the polis (degenerate regimes
simply do not last), his proximity to power, and the reality of Athenian realpolitik,

37. I say “may” here because I think Marx may have thought that the notion of something like
“ethical” imperatives may actually vanish under communism. That is, with the productive
contradiction removed there will be no need for social pressures for people to do the “right”
thing.
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actually inform his more materially grounded thinking about the ethical and its relation to
the political as existing on a spectrum.
I suspect that the infamously parochial character of Aristotle's thinking stems from
his own inability to see through Greek chauvinism, despite his being Macedonian, the
slave mode of production, and the revanchist imperialism that supported it.38 Marx's
position on Recht, and justice specifically, indicate that Marx takes it that the ethical, if
the concept is to be grounded on historical materialism, can only make sense in relation
to its emergence from and adequacy to its contemporaneous mode of production. For
Marx, “justice” is always “feudal justice,” “primitive-communistic justice” or, now,
“capitalist justice.” Something is “ethical,” strictly speaking, in virtue of its adequacy to
the mode of production contemporaneous to an action, behavior, intention, etc. It is my
contention that, if historical materialism is the case, then all ethical systems are always
already ethics of virtue. In the present epoch, capitalism, given its dynamic character, can
support multiple, even theoretically mutually exclusive, ethical systems, just so long as
they ultimately adequate themselves to the capitalist mode of production. I think Marx
could argue that regardless of what Utilitarians and deontologists think they are doing
what, in fact, is happening, is that they are being used to produce subjects whose thoughts
and behaviors are adequate to the capitalist mode of production.
It is also my contention that historical materialism implies that the development,
change, and uptake of ethical systems must ultimately be traced back to revolutionary
changes in the means of production or significant insurrection in the relations of
38. The universalization of an “ethos” which serves “the good” in itself can be traced
to the cultic mysteries of Pythagoras, its uptake by aristocratic Athenians like Plato, its
naturalization by the Stoics and the soteriological imperialism of Christianity.
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production. The first should be unsurprising. While it is impossible here to give a class
analysis of the conditions in which modern ethical thinking emerged, I forward that it is
the case that changes in the mode of production, and its ruling class, beginning in the 13th
century, and consolidated by the mid-17th, produced the secular, humanist values more
amenable to mercantile and capitalist interests. This revolution in the mode of production
echoed at the political and ethical registers. As mercantile capitalism uprooted and
transformed the feudal mode of production, its class bearer, the bourgeoisie, necessarily,
though unconsciously, derived their values from the very economic base which
empowered them. Again, for Marx, if this is not the case, then historical materialism is
false. What was unconscious for the bourgeoisie passed for being “natural” to them and
so began a feedback loop in which the contradictions at the core of capitalism formed the
horizon for the ethical systems of the bourgeoisie and, by extension, their necessary
counterpart, the proletariat. The ethical systems which have since emerged can be traced
back to this revolutionary process in the mode, means, and relations of production and the
innocuous survivals from previous such revolutions.
To be sure, capitalism is no stagnant system. In fact, Marx almost seems to praise
its ability to “constantly revolutionize” and has to warn readers of Capital that he does
not mean to paint it in a “rosey light.” It is this very dynamism that means that new
forms of ethics can emerge as capitalism itself transforms and expands. For instance,
while the family remains a crucial aspect of capitalist reproduction, just what that means
has changed as capitalism seeks new markets. The family unit needed after wars or
famines is very different than the one needed in the consumerist 21th century core of
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capitalist production. Thus the family form and the ethics attached to it are directly
shaped by productive needs. In turn, the same Kantian and Utilitarian who would tell
you that gay or inter-racial marriage, for instance, was unethical will now sing another
song as capitalism itself is happy to include a whole other market into the marriageindustrial complex. Capitalism itself has often advanced far before its acolytes follow
suit. Indeed, Marx notes how this tension haunts not just capitalism but all class
societies. Often the revolutionary relations of production are far astride the more
conservative social relations of production. This tendency, when it hits a certain
threshold, brings about a change in the social character of the forces of production. A
sufficient alteration of the forces of production, i.e., when the means of production
substantially change hands, is just what Marxists mean by “revolution.” The rest,
changes in culture, mores, political forms, etc. are more or less just window dressing to
the former.
This dynamism inherent to capitalism not only produces new values which
support it, or are innocuous to it, but also engenders a fightback from various sectors of
the population which it oppresses in order to maximize the overall extraction of surplus
labor value. Not only does a novel mode of production carry with it survivals which are
innocuous to it, but it may also allow survivals which aid it in consolidating, maintaining,
and extending power. For instance, sexism and patriarchy are likely the oldest form of
oppression and were values ushered in by the agricultural revolution and its division of
labor. In so far as it was useful to subsequent modes of production, the patriarchal system
of power survived and thrived. Its survival has also generated a fightback, especially as
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women and traditionally oppressed genders and sexualities were proletarianized.39 This
fight back has produced values which are hostile to capitalism, if only accidentally. This
is what I mean by an “insurrection in the relations of production.”40 One such set of
values which I think offer a real threat to the core logic of capitalism are the feminist
ethics of care. While I cannot flesh it out here, it is my prediction that care ethics and my
discussion of solidarity below may well dovetail in a helpful and mutually enriching
manner. Though, capitalism certainly has shown itself to have the power to co-opt such
insurrections. I am sure that even on its deathbed the capitalists will attempt to sell the
revolution to revolutionaries.
If modes of production are total, and capitalism certainly seems totalizing in its
expansive character, then how do spaces of criticism, much less a positive revolutionary
program, open up? For Marx, class society is marked by a continuous contradiction
between forces and relations of production. While, as Lukács has argued, capitalism
produces a social totality in the sphere of a larger historical totality, it is in no way
homogeneous. It is rife with glitches, so to speak, which reveal the underlying
contradictions by which the system can be challenged and internally overcome.
However, such a overthrow is not possible until a certain mode of production reaches a

39. The rise of 20th feminism is, perhaps, one of the greatest examples of the
contradictions of capitalism creating the very conditions for its undoing. Having produced a
war in which enough working men were sent off to fight to actually destabilized the forces of
production, capitalism was forced to employ women in heavy industry for the first time.
Feminism, as social movement, arose precisely from the daughters of the women who, given
the chance to work, were forced back into the home afterward. This generation of
proletarianized women would go on to form the backbone of second wave feminism.
40. Such a fightback has emerged from all sectors of capitalist oppression from racial
to ecological questions, etc.
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sufficiently high productive capacity. This is why it was simply impossible to “jump”
from the slave mode of production, for instance, to communism or, for that matter, from
the capitalism mode of production to communism without socialism in between. Indeed,
this is the key difference between anarchist and Marxist theory.
Marx seemed to have thought, and I agree, that capitalism reached this point
sometime in Western Europe by the mid-to-late19th century. However, due to the
economist error of the Second International, Marxists of the period just after Marx lost
their chance to actually organize revolution in the core areas of Western Europe, the
United States, and Britain. Despite revolution breaking first in the “weak-link of
imperialism,” to use the language of Lenin, it was first actually possible in that core.
That is, productive capacity was high enough and the contradiction between forces and
relations of production were sharp enough for a revolutionary event. The objective
conditions were present for proletarian revolution. What was missing, and what Lenin
provided, was the revolutionary subjectivity by which to realize it. Lukács terms this
interlocking of objective revolutionary conditions and the development of subjective
revolutionary organization “the actuality of revolution” and looks to Lenin as the first
Marxist to actually realize it.41 The “actuality of revolution” means that, for Lukács, the
proletarian revolution is immanent to capitalist society in the form of the class struggle.
The proletariat, self-conscious of its place in the totality, struggles not to build socialism
in se but to extend, realize, and maximize worker power over the means of production,
i.e., to build socialism per se. Socialism is not built like a house where materials from
41. The truth of the matter is that Lenin took this position from Trotsky's notion of
“permanent revolution” developed by 1905. Of course, Lukács either through Machiavellian
foresight, ignorance, or luck did not mention this in his 1924 Lenin.
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elsewhere are brought to a building site. Rather, socialism unfolds from the classstruggle immanent to actually existing social conditions. Given this “actuality of
revolution,” socialism is real though not maximal, a goal but not an ideal, concrete
though not present. Indeed, the anarchist Durruti captures this very poetically:
We have always lived in slums and holes in the wall. We will know how to
accommodate ourselves for a while. For you must not forget that we can also
build. It is we who built these palaces and cities, here in Spain and America and
everywhere. We, the workers. We can build others to take their place. And better
ones. We are not in the least afraid of ruins. We are going to inherit the earth; there
is not the slightest doubt about that. The bourgeoisie might blast and ruin its own
world before it leaves the stage of history. We carry a new world here, in our
hearts. That world is growing in this minute.42
It is this liminal space, these glitches, wherein criticism emerges and where a positive
program for socialism emerges concretely through the class struggle and through the
class struggle alone. At the class struggle mounts, a critical threshold obtains, the means
of production switch hands, and there results a cascading symmetry break in social
relations: the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist revolution.
I think this concept of the “actuality of the revolution” can do some work to
explain why a Marxist who takes this processual view of communism can sound like
consequentialist. The closer a decision is made, or imagined to be made, in relation to
this revolutionary threshold the more instrumental and immediate its results can be taken
back up in the collective struggle for analysis, sharpened, and deployed again. Meansends thinking is only possible when one thinks one has an end in sight. In periods of
revolutionary ebb this simply is not possible and doing so has an idealist, utopian

42. http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/spain/sp000069.txt
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character and Marxists will tend to urge virtues like solidarity. However, as the
revolutionary threshold mounts, and a period of revolutionary flow begins (or one
imagines decision-making in such a situation), instrumental, consequentialist reasoning
becomes more and more the case. Indeed, it is a a kind of revolutionary phronesis. There
emerges a temporary “dialectic between means and ends,” to use the language of Trotsky,
that was objectively idealist up until that point. In fact, for the radical revolutionist, I
suspect that at the apex of this revolutionary fervor this dialectic collapses: virtue, ends,
and means become indistinguishable.
Here my thinking dovetails with that of Slavoj Žižek, especially in his important
text In Defense of Lost Causes. To illustrate this point I want to turn to Robespierre, one
of history's purist revolutionaries to my mind, in his speech of 18 Pluviôse Year II (5
February 1794) which captures his increasing collapse of virtue, means, and ends as the
revolution requires greater and greater defense while simultaneously appearing to reach
its zenith:
The two opposing spirits that have been represented in a struggle to rule nature
might be said to be fighting in this great period of human history to fix
irrevocably the world's destinies, and France is the scene of this fearful combat.
Without, all the tyrants encircle you; within, all tyranny's friends conspire; they
will conspire until hope is wrested from crime. We must smother the internal and
external enemies of the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first
maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people's
enemies by terror.
If the spring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of
popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without
which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing
other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of
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virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general
principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs.43
At this point it is customary to invoke Danton and cynically remark that this "passion for
the universal," to use Hegel's term for it, simply means that “La revolution devore ses
enfants.” I forward that the revolutionist actually accepts this logic with a saintly candor.
In fact, they must be willing to take it to the very end. Revolutionists must work to
produce a revolutionary situation in which they themselves will be overcome. Again,
recall The German Ideology, "Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the
real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this
movement result from the premises now in existence." This rejection of utopianism and
its overcoming of the present state of things must include not just elements of reaction
but the present strata of revolutionaries themselves if the revolution is to have any chance
at success. At the revolutionary apex either the old revolutionaries will themselves be
overcome by more advanced forces or the entire revolution will be handed into reaction:
For France, Napoleon; for Russia, Stalin.
When does one know when such a threshold is at hand? In periods of ebb it
seems easier to say: the threshold is simply nowhere in sight. Yet, the “actuality of
revolution” is in no way diminished. This is why I think that, while misguided,
revolutionary cells such as Rote Armee Fraktion, Brigate Rosse, Carlos the Jackal and
even Sendero Luminoso must be defended even if they must not be encouraged. They

43. Robespierre: 2007, 115.
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cannot be condemned by a logic of “not yet,” a logic which serves to deny the actuality of
the revolution. The logic of “not yet” is ultimately liberal in character. Rather, they must
be supported through criticism and defended from imperialist suppression.
Even for the Marxist consequentialist, in period of flow it becomes more and
more impossible for any individual to know how an action will link up to the future
communist state of affairs. At some point a wager is made, indeed, I would suspect that
wager is always being made. Recall that Lenin himself was derided as an anarchist
adventurist when he urged the immediate seizure of power. No one does know yet one
much act, sub species totalitas, with history itself judging the success or failure at a
lonely hour, a lonely hour that never comes, to use the language of Althusser. This
solitary action might be a kind of “Lenin's wager.” Despite my skepticism of Marxist
consequentialism, it is my contention that an ethics of revolutionary virtue is
indistinguishable from an ethic of consequences at a sufficiently advanced period of
revolutionary social change. Lenin's own wager seems to have failed, but, for the
Marxist-Leninist, it will and must always be too early to tell. Indeed, it should be clear
by now that I do not share Marx's formalist thinking that communism will simply be the
final reconciliation between the forces and relations of production. Communism is a
limit, a social trajectory established by the actuality of the revolution, qualitatively
accelerated by the dictatorship of the proletariat and expressed by the socialist mode of
production, for which a revolutionary permanence means it must never arrive.
Communism will never be but it is always becoming. The slogan “Long Live the
Revolution!” will eternally be on the lips of revolutionaries, even as the last stars dim.
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Solidarity, Freedom, and Revolution
The test of the strength of any element of Marxist philosophy is that it poses a
problem for which no further philosophy will suffice as a solution. Yet, the turn to
practice can never merely be the turn away from philosophy. This anti-intellectualism
plagued the period of the Second and Third Internationals just as over-intellectualism
plagues this one. Marx captures the need for this dual movement in 1843 when he wrote,
“The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot
realize itself without the transcendence (Aufhebung) of the proletariat, and the proletariat
cannot transcend itself without the realization (Verwirklichung) of philosophy.”44 That
task remains as true now as it did then. Indeed, this project emerged out of what I take to
be both a real gap in Marxist philosophy that has lethally echoed into the actualization of
revolutionary socialism. Given what has been said above, given the philosophical work
done so far, the old question must again be asked: What is to be done?
When I left off the discussion of the central social pathology of reification I
forwarded that solidarity is the remedy. I need to be a bit more specific. Indeed, this is
the jumping off point for a wholly new project. While I think that solidarity relations
between oppressed peoples are necessary for the overthrow of capitalism, only solidarity
among proletarians will, in the end, prove sufficient to that task. Deviation from this
position is eclectic revisionism in character. Until the extraction of surplus labor power
in the interests of profits is ended, slavery will forever remain the condition for human

44. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm

178

beings, non-human animals, and nature more broadly. If capitalism is a process by which
society is divided among economic competitors populated by inverted subjects-objects on
the other, then solidarity is a simultaneous blow to both. Solidarity is an insistence on
subjectivity (the 1968 sanitation worker's strike placards that read “I AM A MAN”
capture this) and active resistance to fragmentation. Proletarian solidarity is inimical,
poisonous to the very structure of capitalism and the bourgeoisie.
Indeed, if freedom is to be understood in the light of historical materialism, it can
only be the mediation of social forces through active participation in the class struggle
through relations of solidarity. Solidarity, to my mind, is genetic virtue through which
the class-struggled is waged and by which class-freedom can be achieved. This is all
well captured in Ralph Chaplin's 1915 labor hymn "Solidarity Forever:"
They have taken untold millions that they never toiled to earn,
But without our brain and muscle not a single wheel can turn.
We can break their haughty power, gain our freedom when we learn
That the union makes us strong.
Solidarity is the foundational virtue adequate to the actuality of the revolution. While it
is not directly self-realizationist, contra Wood, Brenkert, etc., it is not self-effacing as
some caricatures of Marxism would have it. Indeed, if this project were extended, the
next step would be to produce a more robust theory of solidarity given what I have
developed thus far.
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Marx himself theorized very little specifically about solidarity.45 Yet, I forward
that it is the central virtue driving his mature work. In a speech given in 1872 in
Amsterdam to the International Working Men's Association he said:
Citizens, let us think of the basic principle of the International: Solidarity. Only
when we have established this life-giving principle on a sound basis among the
numerous workers of all countries will we attain the great final goal which we
have set ourselves. The revolution must be carried out with solidarity; this is the
great lesson of the French Commune, which fell because none of the other centres
-- Berlin, Madrid, etc. -- developed great revolutionary movements comparable to
the mighty uprising of the Paris proletariat.
So far as I am concerned, I will continue my work and constantly strive to
strengthen among all workers this solidarity that is so fruitful for the future. No, I
do not withdraw from the International, and all the rest of my life will be, as have
been all my efforts of the past, dedicated to the triumph of the social ideas which
-- you may be assured! -- will lead to the world domination by the proletariat.46
It seems that Marx took it that solidarity would straightforwardly emerge in the fight
against immiseration and the bourgeoisie. History has shown time after time that there is
little theoretical or practical reason to think that is necessarily the case. In fact, any
Marxist theory of solidarity must provide a for just how ideology interferes with its
development and must emerge from practice to speak to practice. Indeed, history teaches
that solidarity does exist so much as it must be organized. Such organization not only
objectively forwards the class struggle but also transforms the subjective conditions of
those in struggle and may prove to be a hedge against ideology. Further, any Marxist
theory of solidarity must necessarily involve a class analysis whose universalizing
tendency would render it useless, though perhaps academically interesting, but whose
45. In fact, the word seems to have only entered the English language from French in
1848.
46. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/09/08.htm
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specificity would certainly take it out of the scope of a project like this. Finally, perhaps,
a properly Marxist notion of solidarity can only emerge from the lessons learned from
building it, from organizing resistance to reification, and from the day to day class
struggle that marks the actuality and permanence of the revolution.
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Conclusion – A Dissertation is a Thing to be Overcome
This project is very much the product of its time. It is a project marked by a
crisis. Liberal, bourgeois capitalism is currently in the throes of a serious crisis which has
caused fascism to reappear in Europe, stoked wars which have created legions of militant
religious fundamentalists, all the while maximizing profits so as to increasingly polarize
society, again, into two great, hostile camps. The only thing more worrying than all of
this is that the left is utterly unprepared to answer it. Socialism, too, is in total crisis. The
revolutionary socialist left faces the need for a radical and urgent re-foundation on both
theoretical, practical, and organizational fronts. This project has been written with this in
mind and to serve in that process. No doubt, it is surely too late – minerva's owl and all
that.
I have attempted to remain true to the dialectical method which I think is at the
core of Marx's thinking. That is, I have proceeded not arguing for the correct or
incorrectness of positions but to understand them as one-sided, limited and in need of
renovation as much as possible. Dialectical thinking rejects a strategy or “either/or” in
favor of the possibility of “both/and.” Regardless of its usefulness, and I hope it is, I am
also convinced of the need to overcome the one-sidedness, among other problems, from
which it, no doubt, suffers. The struggle for revolutionary theory through criticism is a
mighty showing of solidarity. I await it.
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Appendix: The Stoic Conception of Oikeiȏsis:A Case Study of Solidarity and Totality in
Pre-Marxist Thought
The relation of totality and solidarity has previously emerged in the history of
philosophy. Indeed, I think there is a kind of structural homology of Marx's implicit
positive project and that of the Stoics precisely along these lines. I want to trace how the
Stoics, understanding human solidarity as an extension of the structural totality of reality,
prefigure in an ideal form the kind of reasoning found both in Hegel's thinking and
Marxism. Specifically, I want to show how the Stoic concept of oikeiȏsis, usually
understood variously as “appropriation” or “familiarization,” is actually a relation of
solidarity which forms the sub-structure for the famed Stoic cosmopolitanism. While I
think that Stoic solidarity relations would ultimately be considered “idealist” in character
by Marx, I think that they are representative of the kind of ethical program to which
flows from thinking human relations from the position of totality.
In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle held that ethics was a kind of propaedeutic
for political and civic life.1 For Aristotle and many of the ancient Greeks, ethical and
political life were on a continuous spectrum. Aristotle's account of human flourishing is
always an account within the polis (outside of which are only “Gods and beasts”) and
with the political subject, citizen, as the ideal ethical subject. The virtues that Aristotle
generates are just those fit for such a subject in the shadow of Athenian political life.
This begins to reveal their one-sidedness. The central limitation, to my mind, in
Aristotle's political and ethical thinking is how the horizon of his system is parochially
tied to the polis and its slave mode of production. Aristotle simply could not see past his
1. This discussion occurs at both the very beginning and end of the Nicomachean
Ethics.

183

own world. This is not as obvious when Aristotle is discussing the virtues of courage or
liberality (those are co-extensive and harmonize with bourgeois or feudal-Christian
ethics) but others, especially the virtue of megalopsychia (the virtue of being the
Athenian gentleman) or his position on “natural slaves,” reveal the concrete social
conditions from which his system emerges and for which his systems serves. What
Aristotle and all the Greeks lacked, to my mind, was a concept of social totality from the
standpoint of production that subsumed all human relations. To my mind, it was the
Stoics (and, perhaps, the them alone) and their concept of oikeiȏsis that forms the central
pre-Marxist theory of solidarity. Further, I take it that this was possible precisely because
they attempted to understand social relations under the category of totality.
The Stoic concept of oikeiȏsis tries to detail an ongoing developmental process by
which things or agents are rendered appropriate, familiar or congenial to an individual.
In an idiom closer to Marx's, it is the de-alienation of one's being in the world beginning
in the body and proceeding into the social realm. The word itself escapes translation,
though, the process word oikeiȏsis, denotes “having to do with the household (οικος)” or
“rendering something familiar.” The processual character of oikeiȏsis does double duty.
In the first sense it connotes that one is “at home” in the world at large. Further, and
perhaps more important, it is the sense that one should extend the boundaries of this “at
homeness” to relationships with others and the cosmos in general.
While oikeiȏsis is difficult to translate, the opposite term is not. For the Stoics
allotriȏsis as a process, and to be allotrion, is literally “to be alienated from” and “to be
alienated.” For the Stoics, others are to become our kin, part of the universal, rational
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household of the cosmos and its law (logos). Further, and this seems the key advance of
Stoic social theory over the Greek chauvinism that dominates other theories, oikeiȏsis as
a theory of social relations also propels the Stoic into public, active political life. Rather
than the quietism that one might imagine from the Stoic seeking to calm their mind of all
passions, they seem to have set for themselves the goal of rationalizing society itself
through political means. To my mind, it is the Stoics and their cosmopolitanism (literally
world-city-ness) which most closely resembles the solidarity relations I detect in Marx.
What unites them, to my mind, is the shared attempt to grasp society in its totality.

Developmental Oikeiȏsis
First, oikeiȏsis is a developmental account starting at the most primitive origins of
life itself and extends to higher forms of creatures. The philosophical tabloidist Diogenes
Laertius relates a complex process by which the primitive tendency for self-preservation
is eventually supervened upon by reason as the “craftsman of impulse.”2 This process
seems to have the following steps: (1) there is a basic vegetative tendency towards selfpreservation which is oikeion to plants which3 (2) is supervened4 or improved upon by the
introduction of impulse in animals (they can seek out what is oikeion to them in their
2.

Long and Sedley (LS): 57A5

3. Op. cit. Passim. The discussion of this process is a confused jumble in Diogenes.
He jumps back and forth in the order as he describes the developmental story and seems to use
the word “impulse” for both the self-preservation instinct first found in plants with the
“impulse” which allows animals to decide, though pre-conceptually, what is oikeion for them
in terms of food and mating.
4. “Supervened upon” could be (I would argue, should be) read in the Hegelian
language of the process of aufgehoben: negated, conserved, overcome, raised to a higher
form, superseded.
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environment) which, in turn, is (3) supervened upon by what is oikeion to us, namely,
reason in the human being. Here oikeiȏsis seems to function as a principle of speciation
with respect the mode by which an creature thrives in relation to their constitution,
environment, and psychical abilities. It is the mode of production by which they reproduce themselves.
Seneca seems to have thought that this process not only occurs in the development
from less to more rational creatures but also within individual members of a species.
“Each period of life has its own constitution, one of the baby, and another for the boy,
<another for the youth>, and another for the old man. They [one's actions] are all related
appropriately to that constitution in which they exist.”5 What is oikeion for the suckling
babe, the philosopher at their prime and the elderly person suffering from dementia,
though they may all be the same person, will vary in relation physical and, in turn,
psychic constitutions. In so far as a creature's constitution allows for sensation and selfawareness that creature will render oikeion to itself the use of its faculties in relation to its
environment to accomplish its natural ends.6
So far oikeiȏsis seems to have had two moments. The first is the developmental
account of how various species are differentiated by their mode of being in the world, i.e.,
the vegetative tendency of pure self-preservation, the use of impulse in animals and,
finally, reason in human creatures. Secondly, it is how a member of a species self-relates
5.

LS: 57B3

6. Another function of oikeiȏsis, though not the point of this essay, is clearly to refute
the Epicurean position that pleasure is the primary goal of all creatures. Rather, as Seneca
points out, creatures go through considerable pain to master (read: render oikeion) their
bodies to their ends.
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relative to the constitution of that creature at a given time in their development, e.g., what
is oikeion for a baby will not be so for a rational adult. What should be salient at this
point is that if reason is ultimately oikeion for the human, then things such as food, the
sexual drive, life should be considered indifferent for the success of what truly oikeion for
the human being: happiness (eudaimonia) as virtue. While this is certainly key, it is not,
contrary to much analysis of Stoic thought, definitive of Stoicism. Oikeiȏsis means much
more for Stoic public life.

Social Oikeiȏsis
Given the ultimate Stoic commitment to the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, or
eudaimonia, it would seem that being social generally, and being political specifically,
would be either window-dressing or even an impediment to the development of personal
virtue. In other words, the account of oikeiȏsis thus far would seem sufficient to produce
something like Stoic monks. Individual people, once their constitution is developed
enough to reason concerning the world, could realize that only “living in accordance with
nature,” e.g., reason, is sufficient for virtue and should become the very stereotype of the
solitary Stoic sage: alone in a crowd contemplating with private joy their conformity
with the divine logos. However, the Stoics do not end their discussion of oikeiȏsis here.
Rather, and I think importantly, they marshal the idea into both a foundation for not only
Stoic sociality, but as the foundation of justice and political life generally.
What then of oikeiȏsis as it plays out at the register of the social? The Stoics seem
to share two common starting points in their discussion of social oikeiȏsis. First, Stoic
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sociability is the natural disposition for people to care for their families, specifically their
children. It is oikeion to both mate and nurture children for the human. From this natural
affection for children Cicero writes “Hence it follows that mutual attraction between men
is also something natural. Consequently, the mere fact that someone is a man makes it
incumbent on another man not to regard him as alien7....We are therefore by nature suited
to form unions, societies, and states.”8 The second is a straightforward inheritance of the
Peripatetic characterization of man as a “social animal.” The improvement here, over the
Peripatetic assertion of the social character of man, is that the Stoics offer oikeiȏsis as the
reason by which man is social. Hierocles describes man as “an animal, but a gregarious
one which needs someone else as well. For this reason we inhabit cities for there is no
human being who is not part of a city.9 Secondly, we make friendships easily. By eating
together or sitting together in the theater....” Marcus Aurelius extends this line of
thinking such that “Each thing <is made with a view to that> for whose sake it is
constituted....therefore the good of a rational being is community; for it has been proved
that we are born with a view to community.”10
Outside of the immediate scope of the tendency to be oikieon to oneself, through
the process of human development, and to be oikeion to one's children, the Stoics
reasoned that this process should to be extended to the entire human race. The Hierocles
7. This echoes the idea in Diogenes that nature would not provide a create a faculty
and then “alienate” them from the use of it. Here sociality seems linked to human oikeiȏsis.
8. LS: 57F2
9. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's comment in the Politics that “outside the polis
there are only beasts and gods”
10. LS: 63K
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fragment describes a system of ever expanding social circles beginning with one's own
mind, one's body, one's immediate family, extended family, to increasingly distant
strangers and finally the entire human race which, which, when surveyed “the task of the
well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, is to draw the circles together
somehow towards the center, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing
circles into the enclosed ones.”11 Though it be difficult to do so, he advises us to “try
hard to assimilate them” even going to so far as changing our speech to represent the
change in increasing familiarity such that we begin to call “cousins brothers, and uncles
and aunts, fathers and mothers.”12 Such a process is common among progressive
solidarity movements with members of the Black Panther Party referring to each other as
“brothers” and “sisters,” French republicans replacing honorific titles with the simple
“citizen,” or revolutionary socialists referring to each other simply as “comrade.”
What seems clear is that the Stoics held that it was oikeion for humans to form
social bonds founded upon the filial affection one has for one's children which should
extend to humanity universally. Specifically, it seems natural, i.e., rational, to make such
bonds and a Stoic sage would not only have children and friends, engage in socializing,
but also participate in political life.13

11. LS: 57G5
12. Op. Cit., 7
13. LS: 57F8
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Oikeiȏsis and Justice
It is clear that the Stoa, or at least Chrysippus, held justice itself had its origin in
oikeiȏsis. Though, it is not at all clear how. In fact, Stoic comments on “justice” are
conspicuously scarce. Zeno of Citium, the first Stoic scholarch, seems to have held that
justice was “prudence in matters requiring distribution”14 a definition that Stobaeus and
others seem to reiterate. On Tad Brennan's account, in so far as the Stoics had an
unmitigated concern for their own eudaimonia (which is simply the virtue of living in
accordance to nature, e.g., reason) the so-called “preferred indifferents15,” such as food,
can be distributed so as to maximize public welfare. Brennan sets up his account of Stoic
social justice as a form of a good news / bad news jokes:
Here's the bad news: people are irredeemably selfish and self-centered about any
value that they think really matters. Here's the good news – people can come to
see that not much matters – nothing at all, except virtue.
Again:
Here's the good news: people can come to act with perfect impartiality about the
distribution of good, wealth and the rest of the so-called 'goods'.
Here's the bad news: they are capable of such selfless generosity only on the
condition that they think none of those things are really good.16

14. LS: 61B
15. It is my sense that both the Stoics and Marx actually share a theory of
“indifferents” and for oddly similar reasons. For the Stoics something could only be said to be
“good” or “bad” in so far as it did or did not correspond to virtue. Thus suicide, cannibalism,
love, honor, etc., were not “good” or “bad” strictly speaking but indifferent (though
“preferred” or “dis-preferred” given the circumstance). The same structure is at work in my
read of the mature Marx. Nothing is moral or immoral in itself, rather, the question is always
about the adequacy of that action or intention to the class struggle and its solidarity building.
So too, with the Stoics and oikeiȏsis.
16. Brennan: 2007, 166
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On this model, we are just not because of a commitment to the other qua other but, as
Brennan writes, “qua our own, oikeion, 'mine'.17 Injustice, on the other hand, on
Brennan's view, are the kinds of actions that stem from confusing indifferent things such
as food and wealth as good and thus lacking prudence in distributing them, to use Zeno's
language.
This account seems to get the question half-correct to my mind. His analysis of
the how the indifference of the 'goods' such as wealth and food could be justly distributed
given the Stoics sage's apatheia seems correct. Yet, it only provides necessary condition
for the Stoic to distribute 'goods.' In other words, there is no real moral force at work in
his account. A Stoic may, on this model, justly distribute such 'good's' but it doesn't seem
that he ought to, unless, of course, sociality is a moment in rationality, something missing
from Brennan's account. Secondly, given the dearth of stoic sages it would seem that
regimes would not only tend towards injustice but that it would be surprising to find one
in which injustice is not the rule. Unless, of course, it is precisely the task of the Stoic,
because sociality is a moment in rationality, to enter into politics: the task of rendering
the social rational. To my mind, the famed Stoic cosmopolitanism is logical result given
that the Stoics held that it was oikeion for humans to engage actively in political life.

17. Op. cit., 163.
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Sub Species Totalitas18
For the Stoics, the cosmos is a physical system pervaded by a rational, pervasive
animating principle by which it is logically ordered and the force by which everything
exists. This force is variously called “God” or the “logos.” Given this, it seems
appropriate to to situate the Stoics in the category of those philosophers, such as Spinoza
or Hegel for whom the notion of totality is a driving concern. Indeed, the totality of all
causal forces is denoted by the Stoics as fate or destiny.19 Further, human beings are just
those kinds of creatures whose ruling faculty, our hegemonikon, shares in a parity
relationship with the pervasive divine reason (this leading faculty of our hegemonikon
being denoted as our logistikon). It is the essentially human task to perfect this reasoning
capacity by aligning our will with the will of God as logos, understanding all other
features of the cosmos as indifferent to us and thus arriving at the state of tranquility
(ataraxia) via a comportment of apatheia or indifference to the passions. This state, and
this state alone, is virtue and can be the only good given the dialectical relationship
between Stoic physics, cosmology, and theology. Given their comportment towards
understanding themselves sub species totalitas, the Stoic naturally understand themselves
primarily as “children of God” or “citizens of the world.”

18. What follows in this short section should be more a more or less uncontroversial
discussion of Stoic cosmology as it relates directly to human concerns. I won't point to
specific sections in LS, etc as I don't think any of what will follow is unorthodox.
19. I will not deal with the problems concerning the question of political engagement
as regards the Stoic theory of fate and the thorny issue of the “lazy argument.” While I remain
unconvinced that the Stoic argument for the possibility of something being “up to us,” I am
thinking of Chrysippus' notion of events being “co-fated,” the question of fate and its
relationship to political action and the active life only reinforce the Stoic commitment to
systematic philosophy.
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At the political register they take themselves to be “citizens of the world” first,
and members of specific political bodies, second, if at all. Take, for instance, Seneca
when he separates two senses of community, “Let us take hold of the fact that there are
two communities – the one, which is great and truly common, embracing gods and men, I
which we look neither to this corner nor that, but measure the boundaries of out state by
the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of our birth.20
Epictetus notes, “Furthermore, you are a citizen of the world and a part of it, not one of
the underlings but one of the foremost constituents. For you are capable of attending to
the divine government and of calculating its consequences. What then is a citizen's
profession? To regard nothing as of private interest, to deliberate as about nothing as if
one were cut off [from the whole].”21 Plutarch who, paraphrasing Zeno, describes Stoic
cosmopolitanism precisely in terms of the process of oikeiȏsis:
The much admired Republic of Zeno...is aimed at this one main point, that our
household arrangements (dēmous oikōmen) should not be based on cities or
parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all
men as fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and
order.22
Two things seem key in this statement: (1) the linking of oikeiȏsis with cosmopolitanism
in the form of world-citizenship and (2) the unity of all law under one law, which could
be no other than that known by the sage, as pointed out by Epictetus and Cicero. That is
to say, what seems to be the motor for Stoic cosmopolitanism is a combination of a
20. LS: 67K. The same sense is given in L by Arius Didymus.
21. LS: 59Q3
22. LS: 67A
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commitment to the divinely rational character of natural law in addition to the process of
oikeiȏsis by which we de-alienate ourselves from others in the world. It is only a small
step, it seems to me, for the Stoics to not only allow one to participate in politics as a kind
of institutional oikeiȏsis, the systematic rationalizing of the social world, but to require
that one do so.

Natural Law, Justice, and the Active Life
Based on lists of works by Stoics we know they were keenly interested in political
questions. Though, unlike other schools, it seems that the Stoics wrote surprisingly little
on the popular topic of “kingship.” However, it is not clear that they positively and
programmatically supported another form of political arrangement. While their rivals,
the Epicureans, held a kind of proto-Hobbesian view that humans were inherently selfish
and therefore willing to engage in violence to get what they want, the Stoics, given their
concept of oikeiȏsis outlined above, regarded others more altruistically. Further, while
the Epicureans held that the purpose of politics was simply to ensure the security of a
more or less private, or at least non-public, contemplative life, Chrysippus and others
held that one should engage in public, political life. Cicero is, perhaps, the most clear on
this matter, “The Stoics hold that the world is governed by divine will: it is as it were a
city and state shared by men and gods, and each of us is part of this world. From this is a
natural consequence that we prefer the common advantage to our own....Furthermore, we
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are driven by nature to desire to benefit as many people as possible, and especially by
giving instructions and handing on the principles of prudence.”23
What then should the active Stoic – the Stoic activist, if you will – do? It seems
to directly follow what has been said that the Stoic will work actively in the body politic
for progressive regimes to bring the laws of the state, most of which have been founded
by vicious people, into alignment with the natural law in terms of universal reason. If the
Stoics held to a vision of developmental, personal and ultimately social oikeiȏsis it seems
that, by only a little extension, they would have also held a commitment to institutional
oikeiȏsis by which the state would attempt to perfect its members. .
It seems oikeion for the Stoic to engage in the co-piloting of the state via politics.
This may also explain why the Stoics would praise the virtue of dying for a state or
patriotism in general. Why it seems contrary to Stoic cosmopolitanism to be patriotic for
any specific country, it may be proper to do so if those regimes are group “progressors,”
to use their langauge. Similar to the sage participating in the lives of individual others in
order to help to them onward to sagehood, it seems that the Stoic would urge the same aid
to the aggregate other at the level of the polis. Arius Didymus, summarizing Epictetus'
thinking along lines similar to those outlined above, notes:
Following on these points is the thesis that the wise man takes part in politics, and
especially so in sort sorts of political societies which show some progress towards
being perfect societies, also the theses that he legislates and that he educates
people, and again that it is appropriate for the morally good to compose writings
which can benefit those who encounter the writings; also the thesis that he
descends both to marriage and to having children, both for himself and for his
country, and endures struggles and death for it, if is is a moderate regime.
23. LS: 57F3,4
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Thus participation in the state is linked to the idea that those regimes are sufficiently
progressing toward perfection. Hence, this may also explain why many of the early
Stoics did not participate in public life (the regimes were too far off the mark) but why,
for instance Cato and Cicero, would have defended the Roman Republic against Caesar's
dictatorship. The key idea of the Stoic position on the active life is that it is proper to
engage in political life within regimes which are progressive, just as it is appropriate to
writes books for those who are not yet sages. Just as Cicero pointed out, in that it is
proper, because of oikeiȏsis, to write books to aide progressors it is also proper to engage
in active life in progressive regimes in order to act according to our natural beneficence.

Zeno's Republic and its Utopian Cosmopolitanism
As a kind of case study given my analysis above, I want to look briefly at Zeno's
Republic. Though, it seems, that only the most scandalous and radical elements of Zeno's
Republic have survived. Diogenes and others, argue that this early work of Zeno
represents his lingering cynic tendencies. Zeno, the Phoenician trader, studied under
Crates the Cynic for many years and his books were disparagingly described as being
“written on the tail of a dog,” punning on the origins of the term “cynic” with the Greek
word for “dog.” Despite usually being quoted to embarrass the Stoics, I would argue
that, read in the light of their commitment to cosmopolitanism, most if not all of these
elements begin to make sense.
For instance, Zeno rejected the classical education curriculum, city planning
which prohibits the construction of temples, courts of law and gymnasiums, and
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supported the elimination of currency. All of these otherwise scandalous social
recommendations make a certain sense given the Stoic commitment to the elimination of
the separation between Greek and barbarian, citizen and non-citizen as the world is
brought into harmony with the will of the Zeus through the work of sagely legislators.
As Dawson points out, the educational curriculum and the gymnasiums were, in fact,
organized to produce and maintain a distinction between Greeks and barbarians. The
state-backed reading of Hesiod and Homer would have little place in a polis that
understands itself as part of a cosmic whole as opposed to a group unto itself. Temples
would no be longer be required as Zeus is worshiped through the inner joy of the sage.
Courts of law would likewise be less and less needed as people achieved sagehood.
Given the Stoic conception of practical justice, Zeno's notion of justice as “prudence in
matters requiring distribution,” in addition to the completion of the process of social
oikeiȏsis, currency would no longer be necessary. Indeed, the Stoics use the analogy of
the the theater to describe their imagined relationship to private property: while the
theater is publicly owned each person may only possess a seat as needs be.24 Ownership,
after all, is an indifferent and “prudence in matters requiring distribution” is, practically
speaking, justice for the Stoics.
This anti-nomian streak in Stoic thinking was used by their enemies to paint them
negatively, as insane and downright traitorous, but I think it reveals a primitive diagnosis
and criticism of ideology, in the Marxist sense of that term. For the Stoics, the good was
simply virtue as identity with universal reason at the metaphysical register and solidarity
24. Dawson: 1992, 190 points out that this only works given the more democratic
Greek theater system. By the Roman period, however, permanently purchased seats, for
instance for senators and the wealthy elite, were the rule.
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at the social. This mean that actions in themselves were indifferent and that the sage
could even know when it was appropriate to engage in cannibalism and incest according
to Chrysippus. Of course, this scandalized Hellenistic society. Yet, under the scope of
totality, virtue just is adequacy to that totality. As we have seen, the Stoics held that
traditional religion, private property, and overtly Greek-centric institutions were an
impediment to the development of people who, through relations of solidarity, overcame
their particularity by understanding that virtue alone was good. Zeno's republic, and the
few insights we are given by Marx about the future Communist world, are strikingly
familiar. Yet, and this is where the idealism of Stoicism fails it. Stoicism did have a
relatively radical approach to equalizing all people including slaves. Epictetus himself
was a slave and is quoted by Marcus Aurelius with nothing other than profound
admiration. Seneca himself urged Lucilius to think of slaves in a very un-Roman
manner:
"Slaves!" No, comrades. "Slaves!" No, they are unpretentious friends. "Slaves!"
No, they are our fellow-slaves, if one reflects that Fortune has equal rights over
slaves and free men alike....Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave
sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms
with yourself breathes, lives, and dies.25
Again, the appeal to treating slaves in this manner is ground in the appeal to solidarity by
reference to totality. Yet, the totality Stoicism appeals to is idealist in character. The
Stoics, to my knowledge, never question slavery as a mode of production. It is often
forgotten that the Greek engineer Hero invented the steam engine, known to them as the
aeolipile, a generation before Epictetus and two millenia before the Industrial Revolution.
25.

Seneca: 1969, 90

198

Though, because of the advanced character of the slave system of production, it does not
appear that anyone, including Stoic philosophers, saw the enormous potential for human
liberation in its ability dramatically increase their society's productive capacity. Because
the Stoics did not begin with a materialist investigation into the concrete conditions of
their society's reproduction, the most they could actually produce was a societal reform
marked external clemency and internal apatheia.
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